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Chapter 1
Introduction: A fundamental framework
for the analysis of complex economies
Chapter Abstract
This introductory paper introduces the idea of a symbiotic relationship between evolutionary-
institutional and complexity economics. It consists of two main parts:
The first part focuses on how the emerging research program of complexity economics can
benefit from evolutionary-institutional theory and begins by showing that complexity economics
still lacks an adequate philosophical foundation. I explicate why such a foundation is needed if
complexity economics is to promote further scientific progress and that such a foundation must
consist of an adequate ontology, epistemology, and methodology. The following parts of the
paper then draw upon institutionalist and social theory to develop these three aspects: I derive a
definition of complex economic systems by identifying their essential properties. I then propose
an epistemology that is based on the concepts of mechanism-based explanation, generative
sufficiency, and an extended version of Uskali Mäki’s concept of “Models as Isolations and
Surrogate Systems”. I continue with some methodological considerations and argue that the
method of Agent based computational economic modeling must play a distinctive role for the
analysis of complex economies.
The second part of the introductory paper anticipates subsequent chapters by sketching
how evolutionary-institutionalism can profit from a methodological transfer from complexity
economics. In particular I argue that the method of Agent based computational modeling can
advance institutionalism both as a formalization device and by providing theoretical concepts
that are useful for institutionalist theorizing itself. Then I give a short overview on the chapters
that follow and explain their mutual relationships.
The introductory paper closes by discussing a potential convergence of evolutionary-institutional




This thesis deals with the symbiotic relationship between evolutionary-institutional and com-
plexity economics. In this sense, this introductory paper and the following four chapters are
complementary to each other: the chapters put their focus on how institutionalism can benefit
from the application of complex systems methods, and the introduction complements them
by focusing on how complexity economics can benefit from exploiting the reflective nature of
institutionalist theory and its implicit systemist foundations (see also figure 1.1 below).
While evolutionary-institutional economics has a very long tradition in economics and dates
back to the works of Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell, among others, the research program of
complexity economics is relatively new. It emerged from the workshop on Evolutionary Paths
of the Global Economy in 1987 at the Santa Fe Institute (SFI) and is now considered a most
innovative and promising, but also a still premature area of economic research: while the research
community has developed an impressive body of formal, particularly computational, modeling
techniques suitable for the analysis of complex systems, there is only very little work on the
philosophical underpinnings of these models: what does it mean for the economy to be complex?
Why exactly should we use advanced simulation techniques to study a complex economy? How
can two complex models be compared concerning their explanatory content? And finally, what is
the essence of a complexity approach to economics? There is neither much explicit consideration
of these questions nor a systematic way in which these questions are approached by complexity
economists.
But these fundamental questions must be answered if further progress in the research program
of complexity economics is to be made. If they are not answered properly, the community will run
the risk of becoming fragmented. First symptoms of such a development are already observable:
many researchers working on complexity economics have very diverse backgrounds, have very
different conceptions of what economic models should do and how they should be designed.
Complexity economics
Institutionalist economics
Systemism- Provision of adequate ontology and epistemology- Provision of economic topoi














There is no common denominator through which these (formally very elaborated) models are
related, other than the (ambiguous) claim that they analyze the economy as a complex system,
a statement that can be interpreted very differently. As an example, consider the claims of the
two subsequent leaders of the complexity economics research program at SFI, Brian Arthur
(1988-1989 and 1995) and Steven Durlauf (1996-1998). Brian Arthur argues that
...this new approach is not just an extension of standard economics, nor does it
consist of adding agent-based behavior to standard models. It is a different way
of seeing the economy. [...] This view, in other words, gives us a world closer
to that of political economy than to neoclassical theory, a world that is organic,
evolutionary, and historically-contingent. Equilibrium economics is a special case of
nonequilibrium and hence complexity economics, therefore complexity economics
is economics done in a more general way. (Arthur (2015, p. 2) italics by CG)
He thus makes a clear distinction between complexity and neoclassical economics since the
two differ from each other in very fundamental ways. In particular, he considers neoclassical
economics as a particular special case of complexity economics where most fundamental and
interesting economic issues - such as the absence of an equilibrium or the impossibility to
calculate rational expectations - are simply not apparent and can be neglected. Steven Durlauf,
on the other hand, argues that complexity economics only represents a one special case of
neoclassical economics. In the introduction to the conference proceedings of the annual meeting
of the complexity economics research program he writes:
The models presented here do not represent any sort of rejection of neoclassical
economics. One reason for this is related to the misunderstanding of many non-
economists about the nature of economic theory; simply put, the theory was able to
absorb SFI-type advances without changing its fundamental nature. Put differently,
economic theory has an immense number of strengths that have been complemented
an thereby enriched by the SFI approach. (Blume and Durlauf (2006, p. 2), italics
by CG)
This view entails a very different epistemological, ontological, and methodological position than
that of Brian Arthur. The fact that both consider themselves, and are considered, as leading
complexity economists is only one example of the diversity in the field.
The first central contribution of this thesis addresses the resulting ambiguity by supplying an
overall framework that helps to structure this diversity and to answer the fundamental questions
posed at the beginning. As such it contributes to a unifying starting point for research dealing with
economic complexity. This unifying starting point consists of an ontology, epistemology, and
methodology for the analysis of complex economic systems. All three concepts are necessary and
closely related: there can be no epistemology of something of which we do not know what it is -
therefore we need to develop an adequate definition (and thus an ontology) of complex economic
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systems. There can be no fruitful methodological discussion if it is not clear how knowledge can
be created, which is why the epistemology is needed. And knowing that something exists, and
how one could in principle acquire knowledge about it is useless if the adequate tools are not at
one’s disposal - therefore, an adequate methodology is also required.
This contribution of the thesis therefore puts complexity economics on sound theoretical
footage.
The second central contribution is related to the path that is taken to achieve this first aim: In
developing this framework for complexity economics, I will draw on insights from evolutionary-
institutional economics. Evolutionary-institutional economics has itself experienced a number of
important and productive reflections on its ontological and epistemological base and it can now
be considered one of the most reflective and - in this sense - richest paradigms in economics.
Much knowledge may be carried over to an emerging research program such as complexity
economics.
Additionally, many evolutionary-institutional economists themselves implicitly consider the
economy to be an evolving complex system. But the modern literature on economic complexity,
in particular the formal approaches advocated therein, does not play any distinctive role in
the classical and most contemporary writings of institutional economics.1 The two research
programs were largely separated from each other and even today there are only some very few
exceptions who are actually aware of this implicit relation (examples include Elsner (2012),
Bowles (2014), Elsner, Heinrich, and Schwardt (2014), or Arthur (2015)). Using evolutionary-
institutional economics as a starting point for a philosophical underpinning for complexity
economics will therefore reveal a number of complementarities among these research programs
and will prove useful in modernizing the very conservative methodological base of evolutionary-
institutional economics itself. This is a similar strategy to that of Elsner (2012) for the method of
(evolutionary) game theory: just as game theorists can profit from the sound epistemological
base of institutionalism, evolutionary institutionalism profit from the formal methods provided
by game theorists.
Lastly, it is one of the fundamental research objects of evolutionary-institutional economics,
social institutions, that constitutes an important argument for why we actually should consider
the economy to be an evolving complex system in the sense advocated in this thesis. This
closes the circle back to complexity economics: I will show that there is a potential symbiosis
among evolutionary-institutional and complexity economics that simply needs to be identified,
understood, and exploited. The development of a systematic framework for the computational
analysis of complex economies will therefore lead to a vision of a coherent and promising
research area that exploits the mutual complementarities among evolutionary-institutional and
complexity economics and paves the way for most promising avenues of future research. This is
1This also relates to the question of the relation between evolutionary-institutional and modern evolutionary, or
neo-Schumpeterian economics. I discuss this matter in more depth in section chapter 4.
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the second major contribution of this thesis.
The roadmap for the rest of this introductory paper is the following: The first three sections
are about the ontology (section 1.2), epistemology (section 1.3), and methodology (section 1.4)
of complex economic systems.
After this general framework for complexity economics is established, I anticipate the
following chapters by giving an overview about how evolutionary-institutional economics can
benefit from the theory of complexity in section 1.5. Section 1.6 then gives an overview over the
chapters that follow. The final section then provides a summary of what has been accomplished
in this introduction, and, more importantly, gives an outlook on further lines of research that can
be based on the research program constituted by this thesis.
1.2 Ontology: What is a complex economic system?
1.2.1 The need for an ontological starting point
Clearly any such awareness [of the fact that the basic (deductivist) method of
mainstream economics is inappropriate to its subject matter] presupposes a prior
analysis of the nature of social phenomena - as does any project of developing an
alternative. Fleetwood (2002, p. 129), note by CG.
If one advocates a complexity approach to economics, one must be able to answer fundamental
questions such as “What is complexity?” and “What makes an economic system complex?”.
Being able to answer such questions is important because shared meanings are a necessary
prerequisite for communication and mutual understanding among members of the scientific
community (see also Hodgson (2015, p. 26)). If there is no mutual understanding of what the
particular property that constitutes a complex economic system as such is, then complexity is a
poor starting point for a research program and complexity economics is not likely to promote
scientific progress. The reason is that without a shared language, meanings, and understanding
of the objects under investigation, researchers will inevitably work in parallel and separately,
rather than referring constructively to each others works.
Unfortunately, the current literature does not provide satisfactory answers to the question
of what a complex economic systems is: Usually, either very general, semantic definitions,
such as “a complex economic system is characterized by heterogeneous agents that act in an
interdependent manner”, or very specialized quantitative definitions of certain aspects of a
social system, such as “the decision problems of the agents in the system under investigation
are NP-hard and thus impossibly decided in polynomial time”, are used. While the semantic
answer usually remains very vague, quantitative answers are often too specific to justify a general
approach of complexity economics.
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Another answer is the reference to the universality of power laws in important economic
quantities which, at least in statistical physics, often occur in out-of-equilibrium systems and
systems in a state close to criticality.2 But on top of the problem of just applying theoretical
concepts from physics to social and economic phenomena,3 there are at least two additional
problems with such an approach of motivating a complexity approach with reference to power
laws: firstly, it is very difficult to identify power laws empirically and data is usually difficult to
obtain. The field of economic networks is a very good example to illustrate this: for some time
there was huge excitement about a universal property of real world networks, namely to have
scale-free degree distributions. But after some time scientists became skeptical of whether these
degree distributions were really scale-free or not. And for most cases, there was not enough
data to reach a reliable final conclusion (Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009; Mitchell, 2009;
Shalizi, 2014). Secondly, even if a power law can be identified, this fact in itself does not tell you
anything about the underlying mechanisms because “there turn out to be nine and sixty ways of
constructing power laws, and every single one of them is right, in that it does indeed produce
a power law.” (Shalizi, 2014). So having identified a power law can ‘only’ be a first step of
understanding a system: because the power law could have emerged for very different reasons, a
next step must be to identify the particular mechanisms that have produced the power law.4 Of
course, power laws may hint at processes of self-organization and certainly limit the number of
candidate mechanisms operating in the system - but they should not be taken as sole evidence for
showing a system to be complex (Solow, 2005). Thus, all these answers on what constitutes a
complex system in the context of economics are unsatisfactory.
The reason why there is no satisfactory explanation of what is a complex economic system is
the absence of any elaborated ontological basis for the analysis of economies as complex systems.
There has been enormous and impressing progress in studying economies from a complexity
perspective, but the corresponding studies were mostly motivated by the interdisciplinary interest
of the researchers, or the examples of past successes of such an application. I do not deny that
the semantic justification of many heterogeneous and interdependent agents hints at an essential
ontological aspect of economies that justifies a complex systems perspective. But what is needed
is a general ontological and epistemological motivation to take the complexity perspective on
social systems. Simply applying concepts from the natural sciences to the social sciences is not
enough.5 We therefore need a theoretical motivation for the study of economies as complex
2For more information on this see Landau and Lifshitz (2013).
3I am not arguing against interdisciplinary cooperation among physicists and economists - to the contrary. But if
we wish to apply concepts from physics (or any other scientific discipline) in economics, we should to this with
good reasons. Here I argue that the reference to the (alleged) universality of power laws in economic data is in itself
not a sufficient reason.
4Mitzenmacher (2003) provides a nice (but non-exhaustive) list for generative mechanisms that all produce
power law distributions.
5In fact, this has done great harm to scientific progress in economics: much of the now outdated parts of
neoclassical theory were built upon concepts imported from physics. And the unreflected import of biological
analogies such as ‘natural selection’ to economics also seems to be rather counterproductive (Cordes, 2006).
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systems that is grounded in and based on social theory. Developing this perspective from an
evolutionary-institutional perspective turns out to be particularly promising: firstly, evolutionary-
institutional economics is well grounded in social theory6. Secondly, in chapters 2 and 4 I identify
the systemist foundations of evolutionary-institutional economics. This concept of systemism
also serves as a very good vantage point for developing an ontology (and epistemology) for
complexity economics.
1.2.2 The ontological essence of complex economic systems
What is required is the identification of the essence of complex economic systems. The word
essence has a well defined theoretical meaning in the social sciences:7 “The essential properties
of an entity of a particular kind are those properties of the object that it must have if it is to
be an object of that kind.” (O’Neill, 1998, p. 9). We may therefore distinguish essential from
accidental properties which a thing might have, but the loss of which would not make the thing
become a thing of a different kind. Identifying the essential properties of a thing and elaborating
an adequate definition of it is therefore a question of ontology. We will see, however, in the
next section that the definition of complex economic systems, and therefore the provision of a
very general ontological basis for their analysis, has some straightforward epistemological and
methodological implications that can be exploited. But before we turn to this next step, we must
find an ontological definition of a complex economic system.8 Such a definition must include
the essential features that make a complex economic system what it is, and what demarcates it
from both non-complex social systems and from non-social complex systems.
The first obvious step in reaching such a clear definition of complex economic systems is to
clarify what is meant by a system. I argue more extensively in chapter 2 that a useful starting
point is the assertion of Bunge (1996) according to whom any object or entity is either “a system
or a part of one”, and that every component of a system “is connected with other parts of the
same object in such a manner that the whole possesses some features that its components lack -
that is, emergent properties” (Bunge, 1996, p. 20).
A system thus consists of parts, and relations among these parts: whenever we perceive
something as being composed of parts, we can speak of a system.
Interestingly, for Bunge, the concept of a system is inextricably linked with the concept of
a mechanism. Mechanisms are essential elements of any system and express themselves “as
a process (or sequence of states, or pathway) in a concrete system, natural or social” (Bunge,
2004, p. 186). This means that every system has an associated set of relations, determining its
6With ‘social theory’ I mean all the sciences that consider themselves generically devoted to studying society,
i.e. social philosophy, sociology, political sciences, (parts of) economics, anthropology, history, etc.
7For a more detailed exposition of essentialism and its relevance to the social sciences see e.g. Hodgson (2015).
8To show that ontology cannot be reduced to epistemology is one of the central achievements of critical realism.
Since Bhaskar (1975) the reduction of being to knowledge about this being has been known as the epistemic fallacy.
For a further discussion on this matter and its relevance to economic research see Archer (1995) or Lawson (2003).
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relational structure, and a set of particular mechanisms. We will therefore say that a system is
complex if its relations and mechanisms are of a particular kind.
But Bunge’s systemism is not very helpful in determining these particular properties as it
does not offer any explicit treatment of the concept of complexity. I will therefore substantiate
the particular kind of relations and mechanisms with a reference to the physicist and philosopher
Warren Weaver, who gave a very illuminating distinction between simple and complex problems.9
In this context he comes up with a definition for problems of organized complexity: according
to Weaver (1948), problems of organized complexity include a moderate number of variables
(more than two, but less than several billions) amongst which a certain degree of organization
exists. This means that these variables are not disorganized, such as the million particles making
up a gas that may conveniently be described with a Brownian motion. The variables Weaver
has in mind show a certain kind of internal organization, i.e. a particular configuration of their
relations, so that, taken together, they make up an organic whole (Weaver, 1948, p. 539).
It is important to note that Weaver did not use the word ‘organic’ with any particular biological
(e.g. ontogenic or phylogenic) analogy in mind. Rather he used it to clarify that the parts systems
characterized by organized complexity “are in close relation” (Weaver, 1948, p. 537).
He provides an illustrative example for what he means by this when he asks “why one
chemical substance is a poison when another, whose molecules have just the same atoms but
are assembled into a mirror-image pattern, is completely harmless”. This example highlights
well the importance of the relational structure of the molecules. To accentuate this focus on
the relational structures and in order to avoid confusion about whether the notion of an organic
whole should have any particular biological meaning (i.e. a phylogenetic or ontogenetic analogy,
see e.g. Dopfer and Potts (2008, p. 20)), I will use the term systemic whole instead.
I now propose to combine Weaver’s classification of problems with Bunge’s concept of
systems to reach an intermediate ontological definition of a complex economic system: an
economic system is complex if it consists of parts, among which their relations are organized so
that they make up an systemic whole (Weaver, 1948, p. 539) and that this whole possesses some
features that its components lack (Bunge, 1996, p. 20).
But this intermediate definition leaves two important questions still unanswered: Firstly,
what does it mean that the parts must be organized so that they make up an systemic whole
in the sense that the parts of the system are related closely to each other? Do the relations
between the different parts somehow need to be special? And secondly, what is the source
for this organization? Must it necessarily be endogenous in the sense that it results from the
processes of the system itself (i.e. its mechanisms)? We will turn to these two questions one by
one.
9The distinction is discussed in more depth in chapters 2 and 4.
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Scrutinizing the relational structure of complex economic systems
Weaver is very clear when the nature of the relations is concerned: if the relations are such
that they do not follow any particular order, but still lead to emergent properties, then we do
not speak of organized, but disorganized complexity (Weaver, 1948, p. 537). Weaver uses the
example of a gas where there are a considerable number of variables (i.e. position and velocity
of any particular molecule), but because the interactions between the variables smooth each other
out (i.e. when one molecule hits another, position and velocity are altered in a simple additive
fashion), the overall distribution of the gas can be described via the behavior of the average
molecule: the pressure of a gas, for example, depends on the average force of the molecules and
the size of the container in which the gas is located.
This is a situation with no particular interdependence between the single elements of the gas,
or, in mathematical terms, the superposition principle holds.10
Therefore, no exact knowledge of the mechanism on the micro level is required: we do not
need any theory about the precise movement of any single molecule, because taken together and
thanks to the superposition principle, a regular statistical distribution describing their movement
in a statistical manner emerges and information in terms of the average molecule is useful to
describe the behavior of the whole.
This phenomenon can be captured more generally if we consider a random variable X that
has mean µ: we may not know what the next individual realizations of X will be. But if we
have a large number of realizations, and the realizations are independent from each other, then
we know that the distribution of the many realizations almost certainly has mean µ . This is
true thanks to the absence of any dependence of one realization of X to another. Also, when
aggregating the single realizations into an average, the particular small realizations smooth out
the particular large realizations.
Much of conventional economic theory assumes the economy to be a system that is charac-
terized by such a kind of disorganized complexity. But this is not what is meant by a complex
system in this thesis. I refuse to use the label ‘complex system’ for such systems because this
would broaden the concept to an extent where it loses any significant meaning.
Rather, I use Weaver’s idea of disorganized complexity as a demarcation: for an economic
system to be complex, the relations between its parts must be non-trivial so that interactions
depend on each other. Consider the following example based on Miller and Page (2007):
50 people need to decide sequentially whether they go in one of two different shops. If there
is no direct interaction among the individuals, and people have no particular preference for either
of the two shops, then the agents make their decision randomly and pick either shop with equal
probability. The result is plotted in figure 1.2a: the number of visitors for each shop will follow
approximately a normal distribution with mean 25.
If there is direct interaction among the individuals, and each individual tries to go to the shop
10A system obeys the superposition principle if the equations describing its behavior have both the property of
additivity (i.e. f (xi)+ f (x j) = f (xi+ x j) ∀i, j) and homogeneity (i.e. f (a · x) = a · f (x)).
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(a) The resulting distribution of independent agents
choose each shop with probability 0.5.
(b) The resulting distribution of interdependent
agents try to get into the less frequented shop.
(c) The resulting distribution of interdependent
agents try to get into the more frequented shop.
(d) The resulting distribution for the example with
the bank.
Figure 1.2: The resulting distributions and kernel estimations for 500 runs of the respective
experiments.
visited by fewer people, then the system will equilibrate with exactly 25 people going to each
shop - with no normal, but a degenerate distribution (1.2b). However, if people try to go to the
shop where most of the people go, then all people will certainly go to the same shop, resulting in
a two-peaked distribution (see figure 1.2c).
The last situation is representative of a wide range of social phenomena where the existence
of positive feedback (e.g. through the existence of network effects) renders the study of average
individuals rather misleading. Consider the case where the 50 agents now go to a bank to
withdraw currency with probability 0.5 for each agent. Suppose the bank holds enough deposits
to cover the withdraws of 30 people. If more than 30 people try to withdraw their money, the
bank risks bankruptcy causing all agents to panic and withdraw their money. The resulting
distribution of remaining deposits follows a normal distribution up to the threshold of 20, then
all the remaining probability density goes to the lower end of the distribution, see 1.2d.
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Thus, if one considers the resulting distributions of the four situations, it becomes immediately
obvious that as soon as direct interdependence between the agents enters the picture, and the
interactions among the agents do not follow linear patterns, then the overall behavior of the
system changes dramatically.
In this kind of situations the superposition principle fails and the dependency structure among
the different parts becomes important. It is no longer possible to simply add up the behavior of
individual parts (or small subgroups) to get an adequate description of the whole, and simply
averaging over the individuals does not work out anymore. Consequently, the assumption of the
representative individual (which is in some sense an average individual) becomes misleading
and alternative modeling approaches must be taken into consideration (Kirman, 1992).
Self-organization as a constituent feature of complex economic systems
The second open question with regard to our preliminary definition of a complex economic
system concerns its degree of self-organization: how does the organizational structure among
the parts of the system emerge? To tackle this question from the opposite direction, we may
ask whether an economic system that is entirely controlled by one central authority is actually
conceivable? In reality, such systems are practically not existent.11 All existing economic
systems are to some extent self-organized: the organization of the relations among the parts
(most of the time the economic agents) emerged endogenously from the dynamics of the system.
Of course, there has always been strategic link creation and destruction by a central entity, but
this is mostly driven by the decisions of the agents themselves. There are, of course, exam-
ples of where a centralized institution such as the state or a powerful corporation is able to
control link creation and destruction among the economic agents, but there is certainly no case
in which such a control is absolute. This means that for a theoretical conception of complex
economic systems, it is easy to stay agnostic of whether the organization among the parts of the
system emerged in a decentralized manner or during a centralized process: it is an empirical
necessity to allow for decentralized link formation and destruction in all socio-economic systems.
That being said, why is accounting for self-organization so important? It turned out that the
particular kind of self-organization has often important consequences for the micro and macro
dynamics of the systems under investigation. The resulting dynamics are often very different
from those predicted by equilibrium models.
For example, conventional economic theory based on the equilibrium concept has severe
problems in accounting for the size distributions of firms which frequently follows a Zipf
distribution (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 1999; Axtell, 2001; Heinrich & Dai, 2014). The
11One may think of the hypothetical economy of the canonical general equilibrium model of Arrow and Debreu
(1954) with its Walrasian auctioneer who calls out a price vector bringing the economy to a competitive equilibrium.
But note that this is a model and thus a hypothetical economy. The question of whether we can learn something about
real economies via such model constructions is a question of epistemology rather than ontology and is discussed in
section 1.3, and chapters 3 and 5.
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reason may well be that the processes generating these distributions represent some form of
self-organization: Axtell and Florida (2006) propose a model whose macro behavior replicates
the Zipf distribution both for city size and firm size. The model is based on autonomous agents
interacting directly with each other forming cities and production teams within a spatial setting.
The resulting size distribution is thus the consequence of the kind of self-organization resulting
from the interaction among the individuals. 12
This example shows that self-organization seems to be not only an important aspect of real
economies, it also seems to have very relevant implications.
1.2.3 Summary: The ontological essence of complex economic systems
We now have a useful ontological working definition of a complex economic system:
An economic system is complex if it consists of potentially heterogeneous and
potentially adapting parts, among which their relations are (at least partly) self-
organized such that they make up an systemic whole in the sense that the interactions
among the parts are nonlinear and that this whole possesses some features that its
components lack.
Two further qualifications have been added: the qualification of potentially heterogeneity has
been added because it usually makes a huge difference whether one considers homogeneous of
heterogeneous building blocks for a system (Kirman, 1992). While complex economic systems
with homogeneous parts are potentially conceivable, they are empirically insignificant. There
is, however, no reason to a priori exclude them from the definition. The same holds true for
the qualification of potentially adaptivity of the parts: most economic (sub)systems and parts
(e.g. agents) are constantly evolving and thus adapting, a fact that cannot be captured with
conventional economic theory (Lucas, 1976; Farmer, 2012) but plays a central role in complexity
approaches to economics (Arthur, 2011).
The resulting definition is theoretically well grounded in the social theory on systems and the
theory on complexity. It is the ontological basis that underlies all the chapters that follow and it
is an important prerequisite for their consistency.
The obvious complementarity of the two approaches by Weaver and Bunge may suggest
that both of them refer to each other. Considering Bunge, however, we do not find any explicit
reference to the literature on complexity, despite the fact that he uses the term complex various
times when describing the systems he has in mind. But there is no hint that he gives it a particular
meaning. Weaver, on the other hand, does not seem to be interested in the particular ontological
12Such kind of non-equilibrium models are very promising in explaining how empirical regularities such as
Zipf’s law could have emerged - in sharp contrast to models relying on standard equilibrium approaches, as is now
acknowledged even by more conventional economists (Fujita et al., 1999). But this is a methodological question to
be discussed in section 1.4.
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foundations of his classification at all, probably because he did not consider social systems
explicitly (although he mentions some examples for organized complexity that come from the
social sciences).
One may now be tempted to use our definition of complex economic systems to scrutinize
the general relevance of the complexity approach to economics: are the systems we observe in
the real world complex in the sense it is used here? If they were not, the rest of this work would
be useless, as would be the many promising research projects on economic complexity. But we
are not yet equipped with the adequate toolset to answer this question: If economic systems in
the real world are indeed complex, then we must ask the question of how we can understand
them. Only if we know how to understand them, we can finally claim that they may or may not
be existent, and, if they exist, study their functioning. This is why any framework for the study
of complex economic systems must supply an adequate epistemology of complex economic
systems. Again, I argue for a liaison of literature coming from the complexity sciences and social
theory to build such an epistemology.
1.3 Epistemology: How to derive knowledge on complex eco-
nomic systems
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of noteworthy kind. They
are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes
an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is - insofar as it is thinkable at all -
primitive and muddled. Einstein (1949, p. 683-684)
Currently, there are only few explicit epistemological treatments of complex systems. This is why
I spent considerable effort both in this thesis (chapters 3, 4, and 5) to develop an epistemology
that is based on and consistent with the ontological concept of complex economic systems
elaborated above.13 At this point, I will provide an overview over this concept and extend it
further because it is a key element of the framework constituted by the following chapters. The
epistemology I propose draws on four main sources of inspiration:
Firstly, the concept of Bunge’s systemism as introduced above serves as a good starting point,
although I focus on a different aspect than in the preceding section. Secondly, institutionalist
economic theory is necessary to correct a certain incompleteness and naïvité of systemism when
it comes to economic systems.14 Thirdly, the concept of generative social sciences as proposed by
Joshua Epstein and Axtell (1996) and J. Epstein (1999) does provide some insightful arguments
from the perspective of a complexity scholar. And finally, work based on epistemological
13I also have another paper dealing with this topic that is not part of this dissertation thesis. In Gräbner (2015c)
I develop the framework in more depth and use it to compare macroeconomic modeling using ACE and DSGE
models.
14Beyond its contribution to this meta-theoretical framework, institutionalism can play an important role as a
theory itself. I elaborate more on this in section 1.5.
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contributions of the critical methodologist Uskali Mäki will prove useful when it comes to assess
the epistemic content of particular models.
Taken together, a conjunction of these four sources will put the analysis of complex economic
systems as defined above on sound epistemological footage and pave the way for a fertile
methodological discussion of the adequate tools, both in the chapters that follow and in section
1.4.
1.3.1 The need for mechanism-based explanations
As anticipated above, for Bunge, the concepts of systems and mechanisms are inextricably related:
mechanisms are an essential aspect of any system. For the full understanding of a system, it
is therefore indispensable to identify its relevant mechanisms. This means that in the end any
explanation of social phenomena must be mechanism-based, or mechanismic (Bunge, 2004, p.
188).15
A mechanismic explanation is not primarily aimed at generating particularly adequate
predictions (although good mechanism-based theories often generate good predictions). It
mainly aims at identifying the particular social or cognitive mechanisms operating in the real
world and having brought about it’s status quo.
In doing this, mechanismic explanations go beyond a purely descriptive analysis that provides
a very detailed exposition of the particular events leading from one situation to another. Instead
of being focused on particular case studies, mechanism-based explanations are theories of
medium-range: they do not constitute universal laws, but do have a certain generality (Hedström
& Swedberg, 2005). The generality stems from the fact that the identified mechanism is an
essential or accidental part of the system under investigation, and different instances of this
mechanism can operate within the system. Also, as we will see below, a mechanism can be
(accidentally or essentially) associated with different systems. But before elaborating on this
matter further, a more precise definition of a mechanism is required.
Schelling (2005, p. 33) defines a mechanism as a “a plausible hypothesis, or a set of plausible
hypotheses, that could be the explanation of some social phenomenon, the explanation being
in terms of interactions among individuals or between individuals and some aggregate”. As
mechanisms are to be considered “sequences of states within a given system” (Bunge, 2004),
the “explanation” mentioned by Schelling means the identification of such a sequence.16 This
again shows that a mechanism-based explanation goes beyond a pure description of what can be
15Although the concept of mechanismic explanation is a key element of systemism as advocated by Bunge, it
originates from a broader movement in the social sciences that originally comes from analytic sociology (Hedström
& Swedberg, 2005), but that is also advocated by economists such as Schelling (2005).
16This definition is sufficient for the present purpose. But there is considerable literature on what is meant by a
social mechanism. Particularly insightful is the overview in Hedström and Swedberg (2005), and the discussion
of Bunge (2004) who explains why the two concepts of mechanisms and systems are inextricably linked, but
nevertheless distinct: one must not conflate the categories of a being (in our case: a system), and the change of this
being.
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observed (what institutionalists such as Wilber and Harrison (1978) claim to be the institutional-
ist method17), but is in line with what many of the (truly) classical institutionalists advocated:
Gunnar Myrdal, for example, developed several fairly general mechanisms, such as backwash
and spread effects (Myrdal, 1973) or circular cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1944; Berger &
Elsner, 2007). Thorstein Veblen not only started theorizing about the instrumental-ceremonial
dichotomy of institutions (Veblen, [1899]2009), but also worked on several behavioral disposi-
tions (or instincts as he calls them) that are explanatory for individual behavior (e.g. the instinct
of workmenship (Veblen, 1898a)) or entrepreneurial motivations (e.g. the concept of sabotage
(Veblen, 1921)).18 All these mechanisms are (essentially or accidentally) associated with very
different economic systems.
But why would one advocate mechanismic explanations in the first place? Similar to institu-
tionalists (Wilber & Harrison, 1978), Hedström and Swedberg (2005) motivated the concept of
mechanismic explanation as an alternative to the conventional covering law model of explanation
(which dates back to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948)).19 They argue in particular that the specific
application of a law to a particular situation, as it is the usual practice prescribed by the covering
law model, does not provide more information than what is already contained in the law. It
does therefore not explain why the law should hold under these particular circumstances or not
(von Wright, 1971). To state, for example, that Mr. Johnson will eventually die because he is a
human, and all humans are mortal, is not a very illuminating explanation (Bunge, 1997, p. 412).
There is nothing in the covering law model that requires one to specify clearly the link from the
explanans (the general law and the initial conditions) and the explanandum.20 Mechanism-based
explanation, on the other hand, addresses this drawback by explicitly encouraging such an in-
depth investigation by giving priority to explanations that provide as much information about the
underlying sequence of causal links as possible.21 But it would be desirable to have a justification
for the approach ‘from first principles’, i.e. without referring to the disadvantages of alternative
modes of explanation. Such a justification should be derived directly from the ontology on
17This is a conclusion of the requirements they formulate before. I have no disagreement with the requirements
they develop. To the contrary, they provide a encouraging starting point for social research. But at the time the paper
was written, the tools I advocate to study social systems were not yet available.
18In chapter 4 I elaborate in more detail why I do think that these concepts must be considered as mechanisms,
despite the fact that some institutionalists claim otherwise.
19According to the covering law model, to explain an observed phenomenon E means to deduce it as the logical
consequence of the application of certain laws L1, ... on particular initial conditions C1, .... Its canonical logical
form is thus given by
L1 L2
C1 C2
E . One particular feature of the covering law model is therefore the logical (and
practical) equivalence of explanation and prediction.
20I will not provide a full-fledged critique of the covering law model here. This has been accomplished elsewhere,
see e.g. Wilber and Harrison (1978), O’Shaughnessy (1992), or Bunge (1997).
21Furthermore, as elaborated in chapters 2 and 3, the mapping of functions (i.e. means to achieve a given aim) to
mechanisms (i.e. a description of how things work) is one to many. consequently, arguing with outcomes is not
sufficient any more. To judge the plausibility of a given theory, an assessment must not focus on the results of the
theory alone. It must also refer to the model assumptions and the concrete mechanisms considered in the theory.
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which the epistemology is going to be built: in our case, the being under investigation is an
economic system. As it has been defined above, such a system consists of parts (or subsystems),
their relations, and mechanisms associated with the system. Identifying these mechanisms
therefore tells us something about the most fundamental nature of the object we are investigating.
This is scientifically appealing because one investigates the essential core of one’s subject directly.
Note that the dictum of mechanismic explanation does not commit the epistemological
fallacy of a priori and ad hoc excluding potential explanatory mechanisms. In particular, it
does not exclude effects operating from higher ontological levels on lower ontological levels,
i.e. top-down effects. 22 There is no a priori reason to assume that sub-systems can affect their
corresponding super-systems, but not the other way around. A canonical example from economic
theory where exactly this is happening is an institution: it both depends on the behavior of
individuals, but it also affects the behavior of individuals (see chapter 4 for multiple practical
examples).
But the concept of mechanismic explanation is attractive for yet another reason: it provides a
straightforward measure to choose between different models that explain the same phenomenon
in a different way. This is a great asset compared to most conventional approaches: within a
widely shared (implicit or explicit) instrumentalism,23 the dubious concept of Occam’s razor is
usually put forward as the standard measure to distinguish between similar theories: according
to the razor, if two theories explain the same phenomenon equally well, the simpler one is to be
preferred. But there are two fundamental problems: Firstly, it is very difficult to measure the
simplicity of a particular explanation.24 Secondly, it is by far not clear when two theories explain
the same phenomena equally well.25
In economics, the resulting strive for ‘simplicity’ (however defined) has led to a severe bias
towards overly simplistic and unrealistic theories. One symptom of this is the abundance of
assumptions that are made for convenience or to make a model more tractable. This practice has
led to a situation where many essential features of the systems studied by economists are now
absent from the majority of their models (a fact that becomes even more obvious and intuitive if
22A naive form of methodological individualism, as advocated by many economists working in the context of
rational choice, commits this epistemological fallacy (the so called hierarchical fallacy, see chapter 3 for a concise
discussion).
23Instrumentalists claim that reality can only be understood through using models (a claim that I share), no matter
how realistic the assumptions of these models are (a claim I do not share). Instrumental models usually focus on
prediction and are often embedded into a positivist concept of scientific reasoning. The most famous example in
economics is probably Friedman (1953), whose form of theorizing has come under serious critique (e.g. Musgrave
(1981), among many others). See the edited volume of Mäki (2009c) for extensive discussions on this issue.
24For an extensive discussion of this subject see already Bunge (1961). This is one of the very few occasions
where Bunge writes about issues of complexity, but in a very different meaning than we use it in this thesis.
25This is particularly the case if two explanations come from different, potentially incomensurable paradigms
(Kuhn, 1962). As economics can currently be considered a multi-paradigmatic science (Elsner, 1986), this is a
probable coincidence. I argue below that a comparison of different explanations is nevertheless possible, at least to
some extent, if one accepts the discrimination method of the deepness of theories.
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one uses the epistemological device developed below in section 1.3.4.).26
Within the approach of mechanismic explanations, an attractive and more precise alternative
to Occam’s razor is available: not simpler theories should be preferred, but deeper theories. One
theory is deeper than another if it explains observed phenomena with recourse to more of the
underlying mechanisms. Consider the following example: why does a rise in real per-capita
income lead to increased per capita consumption expenditure? This is a central question if one
wishes to understand the sustainability of growth rates.
Now consider two possible theoretical explanations for this observed pattern: The first
one is a classical approach that assumes agents maximizing their utility for given preference
relation which, among others, must fulfill the axiom of local non-satiation. This assumption is
necessary if the results of classical demand theory should hold (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green,
1995). Starting from these assumptions there is a number of results that derive the empirical
consumption patterns as an equilibrium solution. In particular, a changing proportion of goods
consumed if the real income rises can be introduced by considering substitution effects due to
the inferiority and superiority of goods, the latter being part of the preference relation assumed
in the beginning. A considerable number of results could be obtained using this kind of approach
(e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Wadman (2000)).
However, as Witt (2001) points out, these studies do not explain where the assumed preference
relations come from, and how they may change over time. In the strict sense, the majority of
the explanatory content of these studies comes from the assumption of local non-satiation (Witt,
2001, p. 24). But where does this assumption come from, despite being a ‘standard assumption of
microeconomic theory’ (Mas-Colell et al., 1995)? As argued by Witt (2001, 2010), consumption
always serves the satisfaction of certain needs and wants.
These needs and wants can be either physiologically determined and thus homeostatic (e.g.
for the need to collect food and shelter), or they can be non-physiological and non-homeostatic
(e.g. for the want for group conformity or status seeking).
Witt goes on to propose an explanation on the grounds of his continuity hypotheses according
to which the origins of preferences are to be explained rather than being assumed. He refers
to the limited cognitive resources of human beings and the need for social cognitive learning
which is then the vantage point for the social construction of symbolic commodity characteristics.
Because of these symbolic properties, which are the results of a social coordination process,
some products become capable of serving the individual need for social status. As a consequence,
the demand for these (often rather expensive) goods rises. 27
26This potential danger of Occam’s razor was already explicated by Galileo Galilei in 1632, and, later for the
case of economics, by Carl Menger, who warned that “it is vain to do with fewer what requires more” (Menger,
1960, 4, p. 415). Today, more and more scientists (in physics, chemistry, and the life sciences) therefore are either
very critical of, or reject Occam’s razor as a critical principle for science altogether. See in particular the extensive
qualitative survey of Riesch (2010).
27This is a very reduced form of the overall argument. Refer to Witt (2001) and Witt (2010) for a fuller description
and a formal model.
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Of course, the first type of model is much simpler than the second one, and all reach the same
result. But the model by Witt (2001, 2010) considers the mechanisms underlying the formation of
the preference structure. In the classical case they are simply assumed making the explanation ad
hoc. Witt’s model therefore ultimately leads to a much deeper and more illuminating explanation
of the changing consumption in times of economic growth. Thus, this second type of model
should clearly be preferred. Using Occam’s razor as an alternative discrimination device would
be less clear: while the first type of model is ‘simpler’ and both approaches come to the same
conclusions, one may be tempted to use Occam’s razor to support the first one. Defenders of
Occam’s razor could then argue that the second theory explains the observed facts better than the
first one, but then they would lack a concept giving substance to this judgment. 28
While I would argue that the idea of mechanismic explanation is of general importance for all
social sciences, it is of particular relevance if the systems we consider are complex: according to
the ontological definition from section 1.2.3, complex systems must be expected to carry a number
of different mechanisms. These mechanisms may interfere with each other from time to time
and important interaction effects among them may play an important role. It would therefore be
advantageous to develop a certain toolbox of mechanisms, then to consider the particular situation
at hand and identify which particular mechanisms are likely to be at work, and finally to consider
these mechanisms plus their interaction effects: there is no a priori reason that mechanisms
operate similarly in isolation and in conjunction with other mechanisms (S. Page, 2012).29
An approach not focusing on mechanisms, in particular instrumental approaches, are likely to
overlook these peculiar difficulties and will therefore run into trouble if they consider ‘new’
(or ‘out of sample’) situations (see for example Gigerenzer (2015) for numerous illustrations of
problems arising if mechanisms operating on the individual level are not adequately considered).
But the idea of mechanismic explanations also comes up with a number of difficulties: firstly,
to identify a particular mechanism in practice is difficult. This difficulty has a theoretical and a
methodological aspect. The two aspects are discussed below in sections 1.3 and 1.4 respectively.
Secondly, ambiguity can enter through confusion about what is meant by a social mechanism:
Cowen (2005) for example argues that (neoclassical) economics is very successful in providing
mechanismic explanations by showing how the market mechanism brings about a certain result.
It is of course very misleading to characterize the market as one particular mechanism (a
widespread belief among economists from different persuasions, see already von Mises (1949)
who considers the market as a particular process.)30 Institutionalists have argued for a very long
28The idea of mechanismic explanation is a common topic in all chapters that follow and is most specifically
discussed in chapter 3 (for the case of aggregation and dis-aggregation mechanisms) and 4.
29Note that we are still at an epistemological level. This is what would be desirable. But finding adequate methods
that assist the researcher with this task is difficult, but not impossible, as will become clear from the methodological
elaborations in the next section.
30Furthermore, Cowen’s definition of social mechanisms as “rational-choice accounts of how a specified combi-
nation of preferences and constraints can give rise to more complex social outcomes” (Cowen, 2005, p. 125) seems
to be more than questionable as it certainly conflates an ontological question (i.e. what a social mechanism is) with
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time that markets are institutions and can function in very different ways, i.e. can represent
very different mechanisms.31 Furthermore, there are certainly social mechanisms that cannot
be classified as a ‘market-mechanism’, even in a very broad sense, but that are nevertheless
economically relevant - the evolution of preferences and social norms are only two examples.
But such examples show that the concept of systemism was not initially designed to serve as a
basis for economic theory. It is therefore to be complemented by institutionalist theory which
can facilitate the search for and identification of particular explanatory mechanisms in economic
systems.
1.3.2 Institutionalist contributions
When it comes to epistemology, institutionalists have always been a very sensitive research
community. Much research effort was spent on building a well-reflected epistemology of
institutionalist analysis (Elsner, 2012). In chapter 4 I elaborate extensively on two classical
institutionalist papers, Wilber and Harrison (1978) and Myrdal (1978), that, despite their early
publication date, are still very representative of the way institutionalists think about studying
economic systems. Because formal models always require certain idealizing assumptions, and
institutionalists are very eager to provide as realistic investigations of real systems as possible,
they usually reject making the assumptions necessary for formal models, and instead advocate
a certain way of verbal storytelling which they call pattern modeling (Wilber & Harrison,
1978; Tool, 2007) and which today is also known under the label of an embedding narrative
(Elsner, 2015). I argue in chapters 2, 4, and 5 that this methodological conclusion of rejecting
formal modeling per se is wrong: it is indeed possible to develop formal models in a realist
tradition which foster our understanding of the real world. But the epistemology underlying their
argument is very illuminating and shares with the preceding section the focus on mechanisms
as the fundamental essence of explanation (although the authors do not state this explicitly). In
addition, Wilber and Harrison (1978) and Myrdal (1978) formulate several requirements that
institutionalist analysis must meet if it is considered to have epistemic content. These demands
include a holist and systemist perspective. I show in chapter 4 that in fact modern systemism
describes very well what was meant and that the terms of holism and systemism as used by
them are now outdated. I therefore claim that a very natural relation between systemism and
institutionalism exists (see chapter 2).
This relation is mutually beneficial: systemism provides a clear theoretical meta-language
and well elaborated philosophical concepts and categories which can structure institutionalist
theory and under which institutionalist concepts can be subsumed. Institutionalists provide
a methodological question (i.e. whether social mechanisms can be studied using rational choice theory).
31The definition of a market itself is not straightforward at all. Not only has the term been used for so many things
that it has lost much of its initial explanatory appeal, its definition also depends on other concepts, in particular
those of ownership and contract. Building on this insight, Hodgson (2015) makes a nice proposal by defining a
market as organized and institutionalized recurrent exchange (p. 139). Because of the indeterminacy of the term, it
may be even better to avoid it entirely and instead describe the exchange mechanisms one has in mind more directly.
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concepts that are more applied and add economic content to the systemist concepts.32 In
particular, the institutionalist epistemology does not remain on a meta-theoretical level but
provides concrete topoi that help the researcher to identify the essential mechanisms: examples
include the consideration of institutions and their underlying value base, as elaborated by Bush
(1987) in his theory of institutional change, the considerations of power relations among members
of different groups in society (Wilber & Harrison, 1978), the reflection of the epistemological
implications of research tools such as game theory (Elsner (2012), see also chapter 5), the
recourse on instinct-habit psychology as a starting point for the conceptualization of individual
agency (James, 1890; Veblen, 1898b; Hodgson, 2004) and assumptions that are consistent
with the insights of anthropology and evolutionary biology Witt (2004), Richerson and Boyd
(2005), Cordes (2006), Witt and Schwesinger (2013)33. The latter was termed the ‘principle of
evolutionary explanation’ (Hodgson, 2004), and is a very nice illustration of how the provision
of these particular topoi helps to identify particular mechanisms and elaborate mechanismic
explanations: it both gives hints at where particular mechanisms can be found, and represents a
test whether conjectured mechanisms are really explanatory.34
Consider the example of explaining the dynamics of consumption patterns in times of
economic growth again:
Explanations similar to that ofWitt (2001) were already anticipated by evolutionary-institutional
economists such as Veblen ([1899]2009), whose recourse on the instinct-habit psychology in
the tradition of William James (in particular (James, 1890)) and William McDougall (e.g. Mc-
Dougall (1908)) allowed him to identify certain instincts of humans that help explaining their
behavior. His consideration of such particular psychological mechanisms led to the elaboration
of particular social mechanisms such as invidious distinction and its corollaries including con-
spicuous consumption and trickle down effects. These provide plausible explanations for the
increased consumption of ever more expensive luxury goods without using the doubtful formal
maximization and equilibrium framework of neoclassical economics (Veblen, [1899]2009). In
this case, his implicit practice of the principle of evolutionary explanation (see above) made
him reject the premature results of neoclassical theory, and motivated to search for deeper
explanations. It also suggested where these explanations could be located, i.e. in the evolutionary
processes underlying preference formation. With his work, he thus paved the way for even more
32In this sense, institutionalist theory fulfills the task of a particular theory in Ostrom’s distinction between
frameworks, theories, and models, which is an essential part of the methodological discussion in chapter 5. Note,
however, that the philosophical framework elaborated here is even one level of abstraction above the concept of a
framework in Ostrom’s taxonomy. I clarify this more precisely in section 1.6.
33I elaborate on the relationship between original institutionalism and modern evolutionary economics, to which
the latter authors should be counted, in chapter 4. While the two schools have somehow departed, they share the
same roots and, hopefully, will move closer together as part of the greater movement of complexity economics.
34It is also an example of how close the relation between ontology and epistemology is: the contributions of
evolutionary economists and psychologists often deal both with the being of humans and their nature, and how
knowledge about this being can be gathered. In the context of complexity economics the role played by these
contributions is mainly epistemological as they provide topoi of how a complex economic system can be studied,
not what exactly makes the system complex in the first place.
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deeper explanations that consider recent advantages in evolutionary biology, psychology, and
anthropology, of which Witt (2001) is one particular illuminating example.
1.3.3 The criterion of generative sufficiency
As became clear from the preceding section, it is desirable to have clear criteria for the kind of
mechanisms that one accepts for explanatory purposes. I therefore add a further refinement to
our epistemological framework for the analysis of complex economic systems: Joshua Epstein
and Axtell (1996) and J. Epstein (1999) developed the idea of generative social science, an
approach to modeling that has similar epistemological implications as the systemist concept of
mechanismic explanations.35 Unlike systemism, the idea of generative social sciences originated
from a methodological, rather than epistemological debate and remains incomplete concerning
the ontological and epistemological justification of its viable claims. However, it complements
the concept of mechanismic explanation with the important criterion of generative sufficiency:
According to the dictum of generative sufficiency, any explanation in the context of the social
sciences (including economics) must include a procedure of how the explanandum is generated
by the interaction of the parts in the system under investigation.36 As we will see in section
1.4, this claim is very different to what is currently practiced in most of the social sciences
and involves non-trivial methodological consequences: The equilibrium mode of explanation,
for example, is not necessarily compatible with the epistemological requirement of generative
explanation. Currently, explanation often means showing that what is to be explained is the
equilibrium outcome of an interaction among different rational players. But despite the fact that
this often requires unrealistic assumptions concerning the computational capacities of individual
agents, many equilibria in a neoclassical or game theoretic context are simply not attainable,
even for fully rational agents. Take as an example the model by J. M. Epstein and Hammond
(2002), where the authors study a very simple game of spatial dynamics where almost all analytic
equilibria cannot be reached by rational agents. Such a model would not be explanatory in the
generativist sense.
The requirement of generative sufficiency is useful because the systems we observe in reality
have been generated by certain mechanisms. So if we consider our claim as identifying these
mechanisms, then the test of whether the proposed mechanisms are able to generate what we
observe in reality is helpful: it excludes potentially misleading explanations and reduces the set
of candidate mechanisms and explanations.37 Further, if one wishes to develop policy advice,
35But they are not the first ones who argued in this direction. A very similar statement can already be found in
v. Hayek (1945).
36Note that this claim already requires a notion of a system and implicitly assumes that systems must be made
of interconnected parts. The criterion of generative sufficiency is thus obviously compatible with our ontology of
complex economic systems developed above.
37In particular, several mechanisms can bring about the same result in reality, so every method to discriminate
among candidate explanations is highly welcome. I discuss this issue in more depth in chapter 3.
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one has to ensure that the suggested measures are actually able to generate the desired outcome.
In some respect, the criterion of generative sufficiency goes beyond the dictum of mechanismic
explanation (because not all mechanisms we can think of are computable and thus potentially
generated by the interaction of individual agents).
But in other instances, the principle of mechanismic explanation is more demanding than
the generativist approach: Darley and Latané (1968), for example, discovered the so called
Bystander-Effect according to which people start being reluctant to help others in distress if the
number of bystanders increases. Their underlying idea was that interpreting social situations is
extremely demanding for the human brain. Humans therefore developed heuristics to decrease
the computational burden. To explain the particular cognitive processes underlying the decision
to help someone in distress, Latané and Darley (1970) developed a five-level model of human
decision making that includes noticing that something is happening, interpreting the event as an
emergency, taking responsibility for providing help, and deciding to help. The last two steps are
important here: to decrease the computational costs of decision making, humans try to orient
their behavior on others who can be expected to have made a (costly and reflected) decision
themselves. This kind of behavior is therefore likely to be the result of an evolutionary process
of heuristic formation.
If this is to be implemented in a generativist model as advocated by Epstein, one would
program agents that make their decision to help as a probabilistic function of those who observe
the event without providing help. If this leads to the observed behavior (i.e. that people are
more likely not to help others if there are more bystanders), then this would meet the criterion of
generative sufficiency. But it does not provide as much insight into the system under study as the
claim of Latané and Darley (1970) which adds two important aspects to the explanation: firstly,
the authors claim that the cognitive processes underlying the decision to help others involve the
functional relationship between the probability to help and the number of bystanders. Secondly,
the psychologists explain why people have developed such cognitive processes involving a
majority rule. The resulting explanation thus provides an even deeper explanation than simply
putting the majority rule into the code for the individuals of a computer simulation, which could
also be a simple ad hoc decision. Of course there is nothing wrong in building such a simulation
if the implementation of the majority rule is justified by psychological evidence - but then we
move beyond what is demanded by the generative dictum: the true explanatory value added
comes from the recourse to the additional mechanism.
1.3.4 How to identify social mechanisms? Building models as surrogate
systems
So far I have argued that an understanding of complex economies comes from the identification
of particular economic mechanisms that meet the criterion of generative sufficiency..
What remains open is what the identification process can look like - both in theory and in
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practice. The latter is a question of methodology and is taken up in section 1.4. The former is a
matter of epistemology and is discussed in the following. I will argue that the only conceivable
way of identifying mechanisms in the social sciences is to build models that help to isolate the
effect of particular mechanisms.
By nature, a model is an abstract and thus coarse-grained picture of reality. This is inevitable:
even if one does not confine oneself to any formal modeling framework and describes the system
under investigation with pure words, one will never be able describe it completely.38 For example,
if one wishes to explain the industrial dynamics of the IT sector in Germany, then there is no need
to describe the exact composition of the workforce of every single company. While this would
make the model more realistic, it would not not help in illustrating the industrial dynamics.
Usually the answer of which details to include in a model is less easy to be found and the
epistemological question of how we can learn from models whose assumptions are, at least
partly, ‘false’, is important: Building upon the work of Uskali Mäki and the following chapters
of this thesis, I develop an epistemological framework that illustrates the way we learn from
models and that helps to wrap up what has been said about social mechanisms. It is built upon
Mäkis concept of “models as isolations and surrogate systems” (MISS, Mäki (2009a, 2009b))
and it highlights the essential part of modeling: to isolate the important from the unimportant. In
our case it will be used to isolate social mechanisms and their interaction effects:
In the MISS approach models are considered to have two fundamental aspects. First, they
represent the real world. As reality is too complex to be understood directly, we need to reduce its
complexity by abstracting from details, thus building a coarse-grained picture of reality. Here we
make the important distinction between surrogate models and substitute models (Mäki, 2009a):
A surrogate model results from an active and reasonable attempt to learn something about reality
and is therefore a direct representation of the real world situations under study. In contrast, we
speak of a substitute model if the act of representing reality was a failure, either because the
researchers did not accomplish their goal (e.g. by choosing a wrong form of representation
and by missing the essentials of the system under investigation) or because they simply want
to study the model for its own sake. At this point, it becomes clear that it is important to have
at least a rough ontology underlying the model building because it gives important clues about
what should be included in the model: it is the set of essential features of the system under
investigation that deserves particular attention.
The second aspect of a model is that of resemblance. If reality is observed at two successive
points of time, its state has changed. The underlying mechanisms are, for reasons of complexity,
often not directly understandable. One therefore studies the model one has built as a represen-
tation of reality. If the state of the model is recorded at two points of time, it has changed due
38To some extent the division into verbal and formal models is artificial: not only do both reduce the complexity
of their target system, both use a certain grammar system to structure their description. Nevertheless, they often









g : R→ S
Representation h : S→ R
Resemblance
s : S→ S
Inference of facts
r : R→ R
Inference of
mechanisms
Figure 1.3: A development of Mäki’s MISS concept, where I interpret modeling as a mapping
process (following Miller and Page (2007)) and distinguish between the inference of mechanisms
and facts. The figure is taken from Gräbner (2015c).
to the mechanisms built into the model. Studying the behavior of the model (e.g. by altering
certain parameters or by implementing different functions) is called model exploration. If we can
learn something about the real world by the exploration of our model, the model resembles the
real world. Here, the act of ‘understanding reality’ can be interpreted in different ways, but we
already elaborated on what this understanding means for us: to identify the particular generative
mechanisms operating in reality.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the fundamental idea of the MISS approach. The modeler builds a
surrogate St of reality Rt at time t = 0, which is of lower complexity than reality itself. This
process can be thought of as a mapping g from reality to the model. The processes that drive
the dynamics of the model can be thought of as a mapping s, and the processes that drive the
dynamics of reality can be thought of as a mapping r. After the model world has evolved from S0
to S1 at time t = 1, one can then compare the resulting system S1 with reality R1 via the mapping
h (i.e. comparing the resulting ‘facts’). Or, one may assess the plausibility of the mechanisms
operating in the model compared with reality, which may or may not lead to a similarity between
R1 and S1.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the approach and clarifies why a sole focus on predicting the right
variables is not sufficient to guarantee a model’s usefulness for understanding the mechanisms
operating in the real world. One may either infer facts correctly without having used adequate
mechanisms in the model (a common drawback of purely instrumental models) or make incorrect
predictions even if one has implemented the right mechanisms. Consider, for example, chaotic
systems. Here one knows that an exact prediction is impossible precisely because one knows the
mechanisms governing the dynamics of the system. A more practical example is the evolution of
technology. In Arthur (1989), a model of technology choice, it is impossible to predict ex ante
which technology will be the dominant one (or even if a single technology becomes dominant),
but the behavior of the model is nevertheless very well understood.
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1.3.5 Summary: an epistemological foundation for the analysis of com-
plex economies
The sound ontological definition of complex economies from section 1.2 allowed us to develop
a corresponding epistemological framework for the analysis of such economies. The parts
of this framework come from analytical sociology and Bunge’s systemism, enriched by the
epistemological awareness and the economic topoi of original institutionalist economic theory,
the criterion of generative sufficiency, and the epistemological device developed based on Mäki
(2009a, 2009b).39 All of the four parts are important. We end up with a research strategy that
aims at identifying social mechanisms that are potential (and probable) drivers of what we can
observe in the real world and that makes explicit use of models that isolate both the effects of
single mechanisms and the relation between different mechanisms. Hereby, we favor models that
are particular deep in the sense that they refer to as many explanatory mechanisms as possible
without conflating their particular effects. In such sort of framework, there is a natural incentive
to replace assumptions made for convenience with those that can be justified with recourse to
plausible mechanisms.
The final step that remains in building a full-fledged framework for the analysis of complex
economies is an adequate methodology: what are suitable and promising means to generate
knowledge as it is suggested in this section?
1.4 Methodology: Complexity economics needs computational
methods
The tool kit is not as important as the perspective, but it is imperative for giving the
perspective meaning in any applied sense. Hayden (1982, p. 638)
Given our elaborations on the ontology and epistemology of complex economics systems, we
now turn to the question with which tools these systems are to be analyzed. This question
necessarily comes third after deciding which system to study (i.e. clarifying the underlying
ontology) and how knowledge about such systems can be generated in principle (i.e. clarifying
the corresponding epistemology).
While the choice of a particular research tool is not necessarily bound to a certain theoretical
orientation, and tools and theory are certainly distinct from each other, there is an important
relation between them: certain methods are incompatible with certain epistemological and
ontological frameworks, so the decision for a particular modeling framework always entails
certain epistemological and ontological statements (which is one of the main topics of chapter
39I have further extended this device further to its current form and applied it to modern DSGE modeling in a
paper that is not part of this thesis (Gräbner, 2015c).
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5). But also within a certain epistemological and ontological framework, different methods are
available and the choice can (and should) be made according to convenience and ease.
Throughout this section I will argue that there are, in principle, several different methods
suitable for the study of complex economic systems. Some of them focus on abstract theorizing
and theory-building (e.g. difference equations, replicator dynamics, or evolutionary game
theory), others on the exploratory study of complex economic systems or hypothesis testing (e.g.
statistical network analysis or machine learning). But there is one method that takes a special
place among the tools used to study complex economic systems: firstly because this method is
somehow in between purely theoretical and empirical methods and provides a very direct test of
theoretical mechanisms against empirical data (see S.-H. Chen (2012) and chapter 5).
Secondly, because it serves as an ultimate plausibility check of whether the arguments
brought forward by a certain theory are consistent with the ontological and epistemological
framework developed above. This method is referred to as agent based computational economics
(ACE).40 Because of this distinctive status among the existing modeling tools I will focus on
ACE modeling throughout this methodological section.
The fundamental idea of ACE models is to explain the dynamics of an economic system
through the behavior of and the interactions among the fundamental entities of this system. These
models are called computational because they derive the implications of their assumptions by
the sequential application of a set of computations involving its entities.41
ACE models are a particular subset of computational models that accentuate both a flexible
and more realistic conception of individual agents and allow studying the interplay between
different ontological levels of the economy: despite their name, ACE models are not neces-
sarily purely ‘agent-based’: causal processes in the models can go from the agents to meso
and macro structure and vice versa. This makes them particularly suitable for the analysis of
institutions, a point that is taken up again in the next section. Nevertheless, their main feature
is the consideration of a large number of heterogeneous agents that interact directly with each
other and with their environment - therefore the name agent-based is now widely accepted.
40I provide a non-technical introduction in chapter 4.
41Note that not all computational models involve computer simulations: Schelling’s dynamic models or seg-
regation, including the famous checkerboard model (Schelling, 1971), do not involve a computer simulation in
the usual sense: Schelling used a piece of paper and colored coins to carry out his ‘computations’. Nevertheless,
the logic of the model was computational (because his coins ‘moved’ according to a well-specified set of rules)
and it can straightforwardly be implemented on a digital computer. In this respect it differs from the classical
general equilibrium models: before Scarf (1973) developed his famous algorithm that used a particular simplex
method to actually compute the equilibria of general equilibrium models, it was by no means clear that theoretical
equilibria could be computed using real data in applied work (Arrow, 2005). The branch of applied microeconomics
that resulted from Scarf’s work is called computable general equilibrium modeling and is still very different to
the pure general equilibrium theory, which is not at all computational. But contrary to what is advocated in this
thesis as mechanismic explanations, there is no intuitive interpretation for what the Scarf algorithm does: it uses an
elaborated simplex method to find equilibria. But there is certainly no such mechanism operating in reality: even if
there were mechanisms that push the economy towards an equilibrium, such mechanisms would not have to do
anything with simplexes at all.
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Technically, however, the name object-based would be more appropriate because most ACE
models are written according to a programming paradigm called object oriented programming,
where every artificial entity is an object. Note that an agent is an object, as is its environment and
(depending on the design) an institution influencing its behavior, or even the society as a whole -
the hierarchy between the different objects enters through the interpretation of the model. It is
not prescribed by its technical design. The way to represent elements of the real world directly
as objects in the model is a major demarcation point to many analytical equation based models.
Although this is not a technical distinction, it illustrates a distinctive style that makes it easy to
align models with the real world systems they should represent. On the other hand, this style
makes it difficult to communicate the models within the scientific community and to align them
with existing, analytical models.42
The rest of this section is about why ACE models are particularly useful for the study of
complex economies: I will first show that ACE models conform to our conception of complex
economic systems and that they are a viable tool for their analysis (section 1.4.1). I then go
one step further and argue that ACE models are in fact indispensable for the study of complex
economic systems (section 1.4.2). This, however, does not mean that there should be an exclusive
focus on ACE models: these models have some important weaknesses discussed in section 1.4.3
that can only be addressed effectively if there is a certain pluralism of methods. Building on this
observation, I argue that many alleged dichotomies of ACE models and alternative approaches
are artificial. I illustrate this in section 1.4.4 by explaining that agent-based and equation-based
modeling approaches are to be considered complements rather than substitutes, and in section
1.4.5 that ACE can and should be a useful bridge between theoretical and empirical analysis.
1.4.1 ACE models are consistent with the ontological and epistemological
framework
According to the previous elaborations on the ontology and epistemology of complex economies,
an adequate method to study complex economic systems must meet the following general criteria:
1. From the ontological nature of complex economic systems it follows that an adequate
method must be able to represent the system under investigation as a system of organized
parts, or subsystems.
2. From this ontology it also follows that an adequate method must be able to represent
mechanisms operating in these (sub)systems. In particular it has to account for a potential
self-organization of the system, potential interaction effects among different mechanisms,
and for both top-down and bottom-up effects.
42Aligning models with each other is generally difficult. Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, and Cohen (1996) developed a
useful framework to align simulation models. As we have shown in Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015), this works equally
well for the case of simulation and non-simulation models.
27
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
3. My epistemology of complex systems requires a method that is capable of providing
mechanismic and generative explanations for the phenomena under study. In this context,
it must be able to potentially represent a wide range of mechanisms (going beyond pure
market mechanisms).
I argue that ACE modeling meets all these criteria and is therefore a viable method to study
complex economic systems. I have elaborated on related arguments in the context of how ACE
models can be helpful for institutionalist theorizing in chapters 2, 4, and 5. These arguments
equally apply in the current context. In the following I will therefore only extend these arguments
in relation to our conception of complex economic systems where necessary:
The representation of sub- and super-systems Today ACE models are usually programmed
according to the object oriented programming paradigm. This means the programs consist of
objects and methods working on these objects. This allows one to represent entities in the real
world as objects giving them a straightforward interpretation. Such a way of programming aligns
perfectly well with the ontology suggested above: each system can be modeled as an object (more
specifically: an instantiation of a class), and the mechanisms this system carries are the methods
of this class. Subsystems of these systems can equally be modeled as classes and refer directly to
the properties of their super-system. Note that this hierarchical structure of sub- and supersystems
is not a technical necessity. It is reflected only in the causal relationship among the classes
and only during the interpretation of the model this hierarchy becomes explicit. Technically,
an agent is a class just as a social institution and their hierarchical relation is constituted in
the interpretation we give to the two classes. The fact that emergence of e.g. a certain wealth
distribution is considered and upward effect, and that the way people orient themselves on social
institutions is considered a downward effect does not follow from the technical specification of
the ACE model alone.
The representation of mechanisms and their interactions Mechanisms are implemented in
ACE models as methods - a very clear programming concept. ACE models are also a natural way
to represent many different parts of a system (e.g. agents, which may be represented as instances
of an agent class) that are related to each other in an organized way (through the exogeneously
given or endogenously emerging network structure) and that lead to emergent properties of the
system. Because the information of the agents is usually (but not necessarily) local, and the
same is true for their interactions, ACE models are also predestined to represent self-organizing
processes.43
43This capability is of particular importance for many heterodox schools of thought that do not consider self-
organization to be a priori beneficial: the consequences may well be devastating for the agents involved. In
such cases, it is appropriate to think about how to control the self-organizing mechansims. This is ultimately a
question of studying the interaction effects of different mechanisms, a task that is very difficult to accomplish with
non-computational tools.
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The isolation of mechanisms and mechanismic and generative explanations More impor-
tant than representing mechanisms is to isolate their effect on the economic system under study:
most mechanisms in an ACE model are (or at least should be) accounted for in a modular way:
this means that the modeler can turn them on and off and thus elaborate very explicitly on their
isolated effect and the interaction among different mechanisms by studying their effect both in
co-existence and absence of another mechanism. In Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015), for example,
we study the effect of different institutions of reproduction on the inequality dynamics of a
particular society. In our model we can vary the degree of assortativity among different social
classes and determine the effect on the timing on inequality dynamics. This allows us very
well to isolate the precise effect of assortativity when it comes to marriage and reproductive
institutions.Another example that also illustrates how both upward and downward effects can be
implemented in a simple ACE is the model by Hodgson and Knudsen (2004). For more details I
refer to the extensive discussion of the model in chapter 4. In this chapter I also give various
examples of how mechanisms that have received particular attention in institutionalist theory
can be accounted for in ACE models. Furthermore, explanations in terms of ACE models are
also consistent with the requirement for generative explanations: In fact, the whole concept of
generative social sciences comes from the agent-based simulation community (Joshua Epstein &
Axtell, 1996; J. Epstein, 1999). ACE models are the prototype to deduce aggregate dynamics
from the interaction among heterogeneous and interdependent agents.
1.4.2 Why ACE models are required for the study of complex economic
systems
ACE models are not only a viable, but also an indispensable tool for an ultimate understanding
of complex economic systems. There are three main reasons for this:
1. The essential mechanisms or composition of certain complex economic systems may be
such that even the simplest adequate representation can be studied only through agent-
based simulations.44 One example is a two-sided market: here the nonlinear interaction
among different microeconomic actors exceed any level that can be dealt with in analytical
models and the decision making strategies of the agents are of such theoretical relevance
that abstracting the micro level would signify an enormous loss of credibility for the model
(Heinrich & Gräbner, 2015). See Furtado and Sakowski (2014) for an outline of various
mechanisms that require the ACE framework to be represented adequately.
2. Even in the case where a surrogate model of the complex system under study is available
without using the ACE framework, ACE models are usually the only modeling device that
44Note the direct link to the epistemological device and the ontological definition elaborated above: a system
consists of an organizational composition and it carries mechanisms. The essential properties of both of these




allows for an effective study of the interaction effects among different mechanisms, which
are, by definition, part of any complex economic system (see Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015)
and chapter 4).
3. ACE models provide the ultimate proof that the implemented mechanismic explanation
meets the criterion of generative sufficiency. While there are in principle also other ways
than direct computation to prove that the equilibria derived in an equilibrium model
are in fact computable and stable, such methods are seldomly applied and not always
available. See Velupillai (2000) for a greater exposition of the application of constructive
mathematics in the context of computable economics. But these explanations often suffer
from a lack of reference to real world mechanisms and thus regularly fail the requirement
of mechanismic explanation.
These arguments neither mean to downgrade non-computational work in the context of social
economic systems neither do they suggest an exclusive methodological focus on ACE: as we
will see below, ACE models are not without problems. In particular, the resulting models are
often complex and not easy to describe. They must therefore be built on very clear theory, which
may well be provided by other kind of theorizing.45
1.4.3 Potential pitfalls of ACE models
There are a number of objections against ACE modeling. The most reasonable and common
ones are discussed in considerable detail in chapter 4. Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks
that deserve to be mentioned here because they substantiate my claim that while computational
models are indispensable, one should not rely on them exclusively.
Overfitting and too complex models Most ACE models are simulation studies. Such models
lack the pragmatic disciplining device of a solution concept based on equilibrium analysis which
always provides a natural incentive to keep models as simple and illustrative as possible (a
drawback simulation models share with many other approaches in economics, e.g. experimental
economics (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 70)). Simulation studies are often complex and involve
many lines of programming code. This entails both a pragmatic and a serious disadvantage: the
pragmatic disadvantage is that a large part of the corresponding papers should be devoted to the
description of the model and less on the discussion to the results.
The serious disadvantage of this is that isolation of mechanisms within these models may quickly
become difficult and the exact functioning of the model is not clear any more. This is particularly
discouraging if a mechanismic explanation is aspired: even if the model provided reasonable
45I have argued elsewhere that building ACE models out of well-defined equation based models is a fruitful way
of research, which is why I consider the two approaches to be complements rather than substitutes (see also section
1.4.4). One example is Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015).
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predictions, as long as the mechanisms operating within the model are not clear, it does not meet
the epistemological demands formulated in the preceding section.
Concerning the particular research practice pursued, it would therefore be desirable to first
establish analytical proofs for further reduced version of one’s model and then to move on to the
more complicated computational models. In order to keep the latter as transparent as possible, the
first aim of the computational model should always be the replication of the mathematical results
obtained before. Such a strategy is a reasonable disciplining strategy to avoid overparametrization
of the simulation model and ensures the identification of particular mechanisms and their mutual
influences.46 It also anticipates my claim that analytical and ACE models usually should be
considered complements rather than substitutes (see Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015) and section
1.4.4). However, such a strategy may not always be feasible: sometimes, even the simplest
possible surrogate model is not subject to an analytical treatment, either because there are too
many essential mechanisms and details in the system under consideration, or there are some
particular features (e.g. true uncertainty or a particular learning behavior) that prohibit an
analytical treatment. In such cases, only careful documentation, publication of the source code,
and careful reference to comparable models can help.
Confusing equifinality One difficulty of the social sciences in general is the that fact that
equifinality is a common phenomenon: There is usually more than one particular mechanism
that yields the same particular consequence.47 In the context of the particular ACE models,
this raises the concern of potentially arbitrary choices of mechanisms within the model: if one
chooses to model the learning behavior of an agent, there are many different learning algorithms
available (Brenner, 2006). And usually, there is not enough information available to make a
theoretically well-grounded choice among the different algorithms. Then the only choice that
remains is to test whether the consequences of using different algorithms are negligible. If this
was not the case, the only viable strategy would be stating explicitly the relevance of the choice
of the algorithm. But since models are usually built to illustrate the importance of mechanisms
other than the particular learning algorithm of the agents itself, this procedure is unfortunately
not very common. This can then lead to a certain intransparency concerning the results of ACE
models as readers may not be sure about where exactly the results come from. Again, there is no
other option than ensuring a premium on scientific honesty and to provide incentives that ensure
the publication of the source code of published simulation papers. This would ensure that the
results can be replicated and assessed by other researchers. Fortunately, this is more and more
becoming a dominant practice for simulation models.48
46For concrete examples in the literature see e.g. Miller and Page (2007), Bednar and Page (2007) or Hong and
Page (2012).
47Or, in the words of chapter 2: “the function-mechanism relation is principally one-to-many, since different
mechanisms can be used to achieve a specific aim.” (Gräbner & Kapeller, 2015a, p. 435).
48See, for example, the webpage on ‘OpenABM’, where many published ACE models are freely available.
Simulation journals such as JASSS explicitly require authors to publish their models on such outlets.
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Note, however, that the problem is not specific to ACE modeling but also exists in applied
micro and macroeconomics (in particular the most common modeling frameworks of computable
and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, where the results may even depend upon
the exact specification of the utility functions or the approximation algorithms used to solve the
models (Heiberger, Klarl, & Maußner, 2015)) and econometrics (where multiple candidates for
the estimation of inference method exist, data can be either included or excluded (e.g. Herndon,
Ash, and Pollin (2014)), or p value hacking is used to ensure significant estimation results (Nuzzo,
2014)). And even in pure microeconomics, it is often not explicitly discussed why the particular
form of utility function has been used.
Difficulties of micro-calibration The problem of difficult micro-calibration relates to the
problem mentioned above: because ACE models are not confined to the model of a utility
maximizing agent (or a profit-maximizing firm), an alternative decision making algorithm on
the micro level of the model must be employed. But which one exactly is to be used is often
a difficult question without an unambiguous answer since “there is only one way to be fully
rational, but there are many ways to be less rational.” (Holland & Miller, 1991, 2, p. 367). This
provides a certain room for arbitrary choices by the modeler, and requires again a confinement to
transparent research and the publication of the simulation code to make the models reproducible
and to actively test the theoretical consequences of different micro specifications.
But this potential weakness can also be turned into a strength if good theoretical justifications
for the micro specifications exist. Some more sophisticated ACE models even take an experi-
mental approach to exploit this potential: Here, humans take the position of the artificial agents
and the latter are then calibrated to the behavior of real human beings.
And note that the lack of micro-calibration is a serious drawback of alternative modeling
approaches such as computable or dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modeling: here,
the results are rendered dubious because these models cannot be calibrated to match realistic
behavior on the micro level and are forced to employ the (empirically more than questionable)
rational utility maximizing agent.
Communication of models and results Mäki (2011) studies the different aspects of economic
models and distinguishes between ontological and pragmatic constraints to economic modeling:
ontological constraints originate from the ontological nature of the system under consideration
and prohibit, for example, the use of a macroeconomic model to study microeconomic questions.
Pragmatic constraints are set by the researcher and the scientific community: a model that has
the aim to illustrate particular mechanisms should not be calibrated to yield optimal predictions.
And a model that should be published in the, say, Journal of Economic Issues should at least
discuss the relevance of the model to the respective research community.
In this sense, it is important that the language used to describe the model is understood and
accepted by the desired audience of the model. Most economic models therefore use the language
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of mathematical equations. Consequently, introducing models that are written (partly or entirely)
in algorithms, or that defy the conventional maximizing-cum-equilibrium approach, is not always
easy: usually, one requires more space to introduce even basic concepts, as most economists
are still not very familiar with algorithmic models. From a technical or logical viewpoint,
there is absolutely no difference between an algorithm or an equation (see Hodel (2013) and
section 1.4.4), but the way the two strategies of building a model are perceived by the economic
community are very different: the use of an algorithmic modeling style usually still warrants
precise justification and the model description often already takes a large part of the respective
research paper, leaving less space for the discussion of the actual results.49 While this last point
is pragmatic, rather than technical, it is still important since it affects the way ACE models are
designed, presented, perceived, and interpreted.
1.4.4 The symbiotic relationship of ACE and equation-based models
Unfortunately, methodological discussions about the adequacy of ACE modeling are often
framed as decisions among mutually exclusive modeling paradigms that cannot be related to
each other. For example, using an ACE model or an equation-based model (EBM) is frequently
considered a mutually exclusive way of approaching a problem. But framing this decision in
such a dichotomous way overstates both the theoretical and technical differences among the
approaches.
From a technical perspective, ACE models consist of equations as do EBM consist of
algorithms. Due to the Church-Turing thesis, every algorithm could equally be expressed as a
recursive function and vice versa (Joshua Epstein, 2006; Hodel, 2013). And from a theoretical
perspective, most ACE models involve aspects that are represented as equations. Though one may
classify most models as either EBM or ACE models based on whether their fundamental aspects
are expressed through equations or through algorithms. Nevertheless, a clear classification is
not always feasible and a gray area between the two classes of the models does exist (see also
Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2015)).
But even in the cases where a rough distinction between ACE models and EBM can be made,
the two classes can be related to each other very productively.
The epistemological framework outlined in section 1.3 provides a straightforward justification
to view a phenomenon both from an equation-based and an agent-based perspective. EBM are
usually very exact in the process of model exploration. This is because all mechanisms are
expressed via clear equations and verification can take the form of a rigorous proof (at least if
the model is tractable). ACE models are often represented in an algorithmic form and must be
simulated and a single simulation only represents one potential trajectory through the state space
of the model.
49In econometrics, usually less space is devoted to the actual estimation procedure. This is, however, entirely
accepted by the economic community, as the tools are already considered standard.
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On the other hand, the ability of EBMs to represent the real world is usually more restricted
than that of ACE models: Due to tractability considerations, EBMs have fewer dimensions than
ACE models and EBMs require a greater reduction of complexity. This means that they can
be explored in fewer directions than ACE models. Also, there are particular mechanisms that
are very difficult to represent in an EBM, such as learning (Furtado & Sakowski, 2014), true
uncertainty (Pyka & Fagiolo, 2007), or the endogenous formation of preferences (Hodgson &
Knudsen, 2004). The greater flexibility of ACE models makes them suitable devices to test
for the importance of implicit assumptions made during the representation process in an EBM
(()rahm08):
Consider the role of aggregation mechanisms as a practical example. ACE models can
be used to explicitly study the aggregation mechanisms generating the macro observables of
the system, or can take macro (or meso) variables themselves as fundamental starting points.
EBMs often start with such macro observables and assume a certain aggregation mechanism as
given (Parunak, Savit, & Riolo, 1998). By comparing the ACE model (where the aggregation
mechanism is explicit) with the EBM (where the aggregation mechanism is implicit), one may
examine whether consideration of the aggregation mechanism is needed. In the context of the
epistemological framework from above, with an ACE model one can identify the situations in
which the aggregation mechanism of an EBM is appropriate and whether the EBM is an adequate
surrogate of the system under investigation (or whether the aggregation mechanism in the EBM
is misleading and it should be considered an substitute model instead). As such, the ACE model
can increase the explanatory meaning of its associated EBM.
The strengths and weaknesses of EBMs and ACE models are thus complementary and EBMs
are often important in order to get a good intuition about the mechanisms of the system under
investigation. In the end, however, to completely meet the demands for adequate modeling
complex economic system, an agent-based version of the equation-based model is required
(see section 1.4.2). But as already anticipated in section 1.4.3, in the process of developing
such models, the development of good equation-based models may be an important step that
effectively addresses potential over-fitting of ACE models.
1.4.5 ACE modeling and empirical research
At the end of this section I comment on a too often unrecognized potential of ACE modeling:
the systemic empirical evaluation of theories. If the required data is available, ACE models
can evaluate theories on different ontological levels in one consistent model: they are subject
to micro-, meso-, and macro-evaluation, and produce data on intermediate steps in the model,
which may be mapped against real data (Rahmandad & Sterman, 2008). The fact that such an
approach requires a lot of quantitative data is not a disadvantage compared to other empirical
approaches.
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One drawback of such a strategy is of course that one can only identify possible explanations
for the observed data: if an ACE model replicates the observed macro and and meso data with
sufficient statistical precision, one can infer that the mechanisms of the ACE models are a
plausible explanation for what has been observed in reality. But there can never be an ultimate
answer to the question of whether it is exactly this set of mechanism. This is, of course, a problem
for any form of scientific inquiry in the social sciences: even if one describes the system under
investigation with a very detailed verbal exposition, one conducts a reduction of complexity
of the original system and proposes mechanisms that are consistent with the data we possess
about the system. The huge advantage of the ACE models is that they provide an environment to
test for the consistency of various hypotheses concerning micro, macro, and meso level of the
economy simultaneously.
A very similar research strategy has been taken by conventional macroeconomics with the
DSGE approach which was initially meant to go beyond less theoretical time series analysis:50
here the models contain a set of hypotheses about how the economy under study works, and
then either the model parameters are calibrated to match the time series of interest (the so called
calibration approach) or to estimate the free parameters of the model and then test whether the
model replicates the empirical data (the so called estimation approach).
ACE models can be used in a very similar manner, only that - contrary to the models of
the DSGE class - they allow for a true evaluation of their micro and meso foundations, and the
concrete mechanisms implemented in the model.51 ACE models can thus be thought of as a set
of various hypothesis about the system under investigation, i.e. its properties, mechanisms, and
future dynamics, which are tested at once.
Also, ACE models allow integrating information from qualitative research in a much more
direct way than the majority of formal models currently available in economics: due to their
algorithmic design, qualitative answers of questionnaires can be mapped to mechanisms in the
model much more easily than if everything in the model was written in equation form.52
50Some argue that this move was counter-productive and that macroeconomics should be more focused on the
statistical analysis rather than imposing the questionable assumptions necessary to derive a workable DSGE model
(e.g. P. Chen (2010)). I argue that ACE models are the preferable option to proceed with because they are more
theory-driven than pure econometrics and machine learning, and provide the freedom to use theory beyond the
conventional general equilibrium framework.
51One example of where the empirical assessment of DSGE models regularly fails is the test of how well the
Euler equation matches the data: they usually simply do not fit the data (Canzoneri, Cumby, & Diba, 2007). The
fact that both the micro assumptions and the meso consequences are severely at odds with reality should cast doubt
on the statement that DSGE models are ‘microfounded’ macro models.
52This fact is a direct consequence of Newell and Simon (1972) who claim that human decision making is
algorithmic: human decisions are usually easily expressed via algorithms, but to translate them into equations or
even maximization problems is by far more difficult and error-prone.
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1.4.6 Summary: Agent-based computational models and a generative so-
cial science of complex systems
This section addresses one of the key questions that emerges from the ontological and epistemo-
logical frameworks developed before: how can one study complex economic systems and learn
about how they work?
Two important conclusions emerge from this section: firstly, there is no single method that is
adequate for all situations in which knowledge about complex economic systems is sought. Sec-
ondly, the method of ACE modeling takes a special place in the set of adequate tools, because it is
the only formal method that meets all ultimate criteria of the epistemology derived from the ontol-
ogy of complex systems. It is therefore of central importance for the study of complex economic
systems. The reason why nevertheless other modeling approaches are required is that ACE mod-
eling is not without problems and important intermediate results can be gained rigorously with
other modeling approaches, such as recursions, replicator dynamics, or evolutionary game theory.
In the end, ACE models are an indispensable tool for the systemist analysis of complex
economic systems: The explanations offered by them are generative and it is straightforward
to build mechanismic explanations in the ACE framework. Furthermore, they are well suited
to investigate the interaction effects of different mechanisms, e.g. whether a certain bargaining
mechanism yields different results if the population is characterized by a scale-free interaction
structure or a complete interaction structure (S. Page, 2012). This means that the results obtained
by simpler, analytical models can and should be used as a starting point for more complex ACE
models that can be used to explore the consistency of results obtained by different analytical
models and merge them into more complex and general theories.
Another important aspect of ACE models is that they stimulate researchers to think in terms
of computations, i.e. in algorithms. This is important for social scientists because humans usually
think algorithmically (Newell & Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Berg & Gigerenzer,
2010) and consequently all social structures involving human reasoning must somehow refer
to computational terms. The language suggested by object-oriented programming provides an
intuitive and rigorous way to express these computational terms in a formal way. But this also
means that formalizing a theory in computational terms can itself advance this theory - beyond
the usual advantages of formalization. In the next section, for example, I will argue how the
computational terms provided by the method of ACE modeling can help to refine the theoretical
concept of an institution and thus advance institutional theory as such - beyond being useful as a
formalization device.
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1.5 How institutionalism benefits from the theory of economic
complexity
The preceding part of this introduction was mainly concerned with the provision of a solid
foundation for the study of complex economic systems, enriched with theoretical content from
other social sciences and economics.
In this section and the upcoming chapters I now turn to the question of how evolutionary-
institutional economics can benefit from a theoretical and, in particular, methodological transfer
from the field of complexity science. To illustrate this, consider again figure 1.1: while the first
sections were about the upper left part, we now consider the lower left part of the figure.53
To this end, I firstly claim that institutionalist economists implicitly concern themselves with
complex economic systems (section 1.5.1). This means that from an ontological viewpoint,
a knowledge transfer from complexity to institutionalist theory is conceivable. While having
produced a very rich body of theory, institutionalism lacks adequate formal modeling tools to
study economic systems more deeply (section 1.5.2). Using methods from complexity science in
institutionalist research therefore bears the potential to eliminate this weakness and seems to be
a promising area of further research. Finally, as I argue in section 1.5.3, this is particularly true
because beyond the methodological contribution, ACE models can contribute to institutionalist
theory directly.
1.5.1 Institutionalism is about complex economic systems
Based on the ontological definition of complex systems elaborated in section 1.2.3, I claim that
the research object of evolutionary-institutional economics is the economy as a complex system:
An economic system is complex if it consists of potentially heterogeneous and
potentially adaptive parts, among which their relations are (at least partly) self-
organized so that they make up an systemic whole in the sense that the interactions
among the parts are nonlinear and that this whole possesses some features that its
components lack.
Institutionalists reject the idea of a representative individual because they claim that heterogeneity
is a key aspect to be considered (Veblen, 1897; Hodgson, 2004; Hildenbrand, 2014). One
important reason for this is the tension between inherited instincts, different motivations and
the resulting moldability of humans and their behavior. The corresponding debate dates back
to Smith (in particular Smith (2011 [1759])) and Veblen (in particular his criticism of Marxist
materialism in Veblen (1897)) and has been continuing to be an important debate in evolutionary-
institutionalist economics with important new insights from the cognitive sciences entering the
debate (e.g. Vromen (2003)).
53Because the main arguments are central aspects of the upcoming chapters, this section merely sketches the
argument. The detailed elaboration of the arguments comes in the chapters that follow.
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Furthermore, individuals are generally considered to be directly interdependent and socially
embedded (Elsner et al., 2014). They also emphasize the role of institutions and other social
structures that exist on a different ontological level than that of the individual parts. Institutions,
for example, are now considered to depend on individuals, but also affect their behavior through
a reciprocal relationship (Searle, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). This idea expresses itself in a layered
ontology consistent with my conception of a complex economy (Hodgson, 2004). Furthermore,
the concept of self-organization is also implicitly present in institutionalist reasoning: because
although centralized actors such as the state of transnational companies receive particular
attention, the focus on a rich conception of individual agency (Veblen, 1897; Hodgson, 2004;
Cordes, 2009) and the consideration of social structures into which individuals are embedded
implies the rejection of centralized control mechanisms that leaves no room for individual and
dispersed decision making (see also section 3.3.2, and Hodgson (2007), Elsner (2012), Elsner
et al. (2014)).
Thus all elements of the ontological definition of a complex systems are met by the research
practice of institutionalism. This suggests the potential for a closer collaboration between
institutionalists and complexity economists. One of the major motivations for such a collaboration
from an institutionalist perspective is that complexity scholars can address one of the central
weaknesses of institutionalism in its current form: a lack of adequate formal modeling tools that
allow to unravel the mechanisms of the complex economic systems institutionalists are interested
in.
1.5.2 Institutionalism lacks adequate methods
Some argue that institutionalist economics is opposed to formal modeling per se. Wilber and Har-
rison (1978), for example, claim that the method of institutionalism is the participant-observer
approach, a method originating from anthropology and of purely verbal character. I argue,
however, in chapter 5 that institutionalism is not completely opposed to formal modeling, but just
formulates very high demands for formal methods. There are indeed a few formal methods used
in institutionalism that I review and discuss in this chapter. During the methodological debate
about these methods, several arguments were made repetitively: For example, both Radzicki
(1988) and Elsner (2012) criticized an alleged lack of logical depth of verbal institutionalist
pattern modeling (a fact that also is acknowledged by Wilber and Harrison (1978, p. 87)). An-
other drawback of the reluctance to use formal methods is a focus on very detailed case studies,
rather than the identification of more general insights (such as mechanism-based explanations),
an argument already made by one of the founding fathers of institutionalism, Wesley Mitchell
(Hirsch, 1994).
Also, if institutionalists are really aspiring to study the economy as a complex system, then
issues such as the particular compositional structure of the systems, the relations among the
actors, the mechanisms underlying the aggregation of individual behavior, and the interactions
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among different mechanisms must be studied explicitly. To fulfill this task without a recourse to
formal methods does not seem to be conceivable. For example, even to express the particular
compositional structure of an economic system with even moderate precision requires concepts
of network theory. And to use existing data about these structures, and to elaborate on the
consequences of this structure without using the precise language of graph theory is simply
impossible.54
The potential that lies in the application of formal modeling is also illustrated by the recent
progress of modern evolutionary economics (the other current branch of evolutionary-institutional
economics today): in their studies of innovation, industrial dynamics, and technological change,
neo-Schumpeterian economists frequently used dynamic tools from mathematics to substantiate
their arguments, to generalize their results, and to test the empirical adequacy of their theories.
Contributions of evolutionary economists to topics more closely associated with the institutional-
ist branch of evolutionary-institutional economics also illustrated the usefulness of mathematical
modeling, if applied adequately (see e.g. Cordes (2006)). In chapter 4 I argue that particularly
the method of ACE modeling is consistent with the theoretical demands of institutionalism,
but also make the claim that the methodological umbrella of ACE bears the potential to bring
the institutionalist and the modern evolutionary branch of evolutionary-institutional economics
closer together again.
To summarize, there is an effective deficit of formal modeling tools in current institutionalism
and the provision of adequate modeling techniques could significantly advance institutionalist
economics. As it will be shown in the chapters that follow, ACE modeling can be used to exploit
this potential.
1.5.3 ACE modeling can advance institutionalist theory
ACE modeling does not only serve as a viable research tool. By introducing the adequate
language to formalize computational reasoning, it can also directly enable superior theorizing:
One example for this is provided by the fact that ACE models do explicitly and intuitively
refer to the theoretical concept of computation. This is usually not possible in analytical
models: they are either concerned with the consequences of individual behavior (as in the case
of evolutionary game theory, replicator dynamics or system dynamics), or confined to as if
arguments in the spirit of Friedman (1953) - an unattractive alternative for institutionalists who
are (critical) realists rather than instrumentalists. For them, it is important to note that in the end
every person does make computations when making decisions.55 And the human brain performs
these computations in an algorithmic manner: there is now plenty of evidence that the human
54I provide more examples of issues where a formalization would be very beneficial to institutionalist research in
chapters 4 and 5.
55The term computation is used in its original meaning, i.e. executing an algorithm. Or, more formally, the
actions undertaken by a Turing machine or any comparable theoretical computer model.
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brain does not maximize anything like a utility function, but uses heuristics to carry out the
computations necessary to reach a decision (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1981; Gigerenzer &
Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
This fact is not only the result of the superior accuracy-effort ratio of heuristics: whenever
agents face a situation of true uncertainty rational expectations are not defined any more. In
this case heuristics also are the best option available to the decision maker and produce better
results than rational choice models relying on estimating the uncertain parameters of the decision
framework (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010).
The modeling techniques that institutionalists use to study human decision making should
therefore be able to (i) explicitly represent heuristics, (ii) allow for decision making under true
uncertainty, and (iii) provide measures for the particular cognitive capacities of the economic
agent (Miller & Page, 2007; Bednar & Page, 2007). ACE modeling meets these criteria.
Now having such a modeling device at one’s disposal is not only important for building
descriptively accurate models: it also makes one think about particular questions that are usually
overlooked in purely analytical models.
Consider the example of bounded rationality: in contrast to computational models bounded
rationality is something that is not naturally part of an analytical model, but has to be included
explicitly - a task that is far from trivial. In a computational, and particularly ACE modeling
context, on the other hand, it is not only easy to account for particular heuristics explicitly, there
are also a number of formal methods that allows the modeler to alter the degree of computational
capacity of economic agents, e.g. by using genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975; Mitchell, 1999;
Geisendorf, 2011, 5), or finite state machines (Rubinstein, 1998; Bednar & Page, 2007).56 All
these methods not only enable the researcher to model situations that could not be modeled with
conventional modeling techniques - it bears the potential to make her also think about certain
aspects of human decision making and its consequences in a much more advanced way.
Another example where such theoretical reasoning in agent-based computational terms has
the potential to advance theory on its own is the definition of an institution: existing conceptions
of institutions are either completely verbal (e.g. Searle (2005) or Hodgson (2006)) or rely mainly
on game theory (e.g. Greif and Kingston (2011) or Elsner (2012)). Both approaches have their
problems: the verbal definition remains necessarily imprecise and does not allow for a serious
consistency check or the integration to more complicated and realistic formal models. The game
theoretic conception, on the other hand, relies on the demanding assumptions on individual
preference structures and makes it difficult to account for central pillars of institutionalist theory
such as bounded rationality, path dependence, or the social embeddedness of the actors, and
the way these concepts relate to each other. A computational definition of institutions (e.g. to
consider institutions as networks of certain decision making algorithms) may capture all the
essential aspects of institutions (i.e. their reliance on shared belief systems, their dependence on
56Note that simple models in this context may still be solved without simulation (Lipman, 1995; Rubinstein,
1998). Nevertheless, the logic of such models is computational.
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Chapter 1 (Intro)
- Development of an adequate ontology,
- epistemology, and methodology for complexity
- economics
Chapter 3 (HB)
- In-depth discussion of systemism and its
- usefulness
- Importance of considering mechanisms among
- different ontological levels
Chapter 4 (JoIE)
- Discussion of the methodological transfer of ACE
to EIE,
- Relation between modern evolutionary economics
and EIE topoi
Chapter 5 (FSE)
- Relation of ACE modeling to other formalisms
- Ontological and epistemological implications of the
- choice among methods
- Clarification of the concept of a ’formalism’
Chapter 2 (JEI)
- Outline of the general argument
- Suggests relating institutionalism, complexity,
- systemism, and ACE modeling
Figure 1.4: An overview of the different chapters of the dissertation. An arrow from one chapter
to another means that the first refers to arguments more explicitly elaborated by the second.
some critical mass of followers, their ability to reduce the complexity of the decision making
problems for individual agents, and their dynamic nature), but also allows putting them in a
formal, yet algorithmic language and consider the role of institutions in more general models.57
These example show that the benefit of ACE modeling for institutionalism goes beyond the
formalization of institutionalist theory, but also represents a direct theoretical value in itself.
1.6 An overview over the papers of this dissertation
In this section I give an outlook on the chapters that follow in this dissertation. For a graphical
illustration of the relationship among the different chapters see figure 1.4. The arrows in the
figure indicate that the introduction used several arguments that are elaborated more explic-
itly in following papers. Furthermore, while this introduction mainly focused on how new
foundations for a research program of complexity economics can benefit from the theoretical
contributions of institutionalism, the following chapters focus on the opposite direction, i.e. on
how institutionalism can benefit from theory and methods of complexity theory.
As illustrated in figure 1.1, the introduction and the papers therefore complement each other.
57For a similar approach when it comes to conceptualizing culture, see Bednar and Page (2007).
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1.6.1 New perspectives on institutionalist pattern modeling: Systemism,
complexity, and agent-based modeling
In this article58 we identify the theoretical proximity and relatedness among (1) original institu-
tionalist theory, (2) the philosophical concept of systemism, and (3) the theory and methods of
complexity economics. As such, it paves the stage for the chapters that follow.
The first part of the paper focuses on the affinity between institutionalism and systemism.
Building upon the seminal contributions of Wilber and Harrison (1978) and Myrdal (1978), and
considering the research practice within institutionalism thereafter, we argue that “systemism is
an implicit cornerstone of institutionalist theorizing and modeling” (p. 64).
We elaborate on several examples that substantiate this claim: for example, a layered on-
tology is central both to institutionalism with its consideration of individual agency and social
structures (see e.g. Hodgson (2004)), and systemism with its idea of sub- and super-systems
and their respective parts (see e.g. (Bunge, 1996)). Also, Bunge’s focus on emergent properties
and the resulting potential for both upward and downward effects aligns well with the particular
attention devoted to the study of social institutions and their consequences for individual decision
making in institutionalism (Gruchy, 1947; Hodgson, 2006; Elsner & Schwardt, 2014).
The second part of the paper links this reasoning to the fundamental dictum of complexity
science, namely that “more is different” (Anderson, 1972). We sketch the argument that the con-
cept of organized complexity as introduced by Weaver (1948) is very much what institutionalists
have (implicitly) in mind when they describe the nature of the economy. But we also point out
that the epistemological and ontological basis of complexity economics is still weak and not
comparable to the theoretical foundations of institutionalism. This observation has been taken
up in the first sections of this introduction when I tried to close this gap with the transfer of ideas
from institutionalism and its systemist foundation to complexity economics. But the argument in
this chapter goes in the opposite direction: we argue that institutionalism lacks adequate formal
methods to study the economic systems it considers in more depth. Then we propose to consider
agent-based computational modeling as a new baseline formalism for institutionalism: as ACE
modeling is widely used within complexity science to study non-trivial aggregation relationships,
and institutionalism shares this interest on aggregation mechanisms with complexity scholars, a
methodological transfer to institutionalism seems promising.
The final part of the article therefore anticipates the main claim of chapter 4, namely that
institutionalsm can benefit greatly by exploiting the advantages of ACE modeling. The main
argument besides the focus on aggregation procedures is in this article that ACE modeling allows
58The article was co-authored by Jakob Kapeller from the Johannes Keppler University in Linz. It was published
in the June issue of the Journal of Economic Issues in 2015. For my personal contribution to the article see the
attachment to the present thesis.
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the incorporation of more realistic representation of real world objects. With respect tothe aim of
the article, this is a viable approach because institutionalism has a (critical) realist conception of
science (Bhaskar, 1975; Cherryholmes, 1992; Hodgson, 2004; Hall & Whybrow, 2009). We use
the example of Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) to show what such a liaison could look like, but
leave the exact methodological discussion as an area of further research, which is taken up in
subsequent chapters, in particular chapter 4 and 5.
This article provides a first consistent outline of the central arguments of the research
program developed in this thesis. The particular arguments are then elaborated in more detail
in the subsequent chapters and in this introduction: the consistency between ACE modeling
and institutionalism is the central topic of chapter 4, the particular usefulness of systemism
for institutionalism (and heterodoxy in general) is illustrated in chapter 3, and the potential of
institutionalist theory and systemism for giving a sound philosophical framework to complexity
economics was discussed in the first sections of this introduction. This chapter should therefore
be considered a vantage point for the remaining arguments of this thesis (see also figure 1.4).
1.6.2 The micro-macro link in heterodox economics
This paper59 extends the argument of the previous paper by showing that systemism can serve
as a general philosophical framework for the study of the micro-macro link from a heterodox
viewpoint. Because it is not focused on socio-economics or institutionalism, it is the chapter with
the broadest perspective in this thesis. It extends several of the key arguments made previously,
in particular the justification of an overall philosophical framework for the study of economic
systems, the necessity for mechanismic explanations, and the consideration of both bottom-up
and top-down effects.
We first establish the general importance of considering the micro-macro link explicitly in
economic modeling. We do this by pointing to four general fallacies that can occur if such an
explicit treatment does not take place: the failure of ignoring relations among different parts on
the micro level of the system under investigation (the simplistic fallacy), the misleading assertion
that all aggregate properties can be epistemologically reduced to micro properties (the static
fallacy), the fallacious refusal of studying higher-level mechanisms on their own (the dogmatic
fallacy), and finally the epistemological fallacy of a priori ignoring the possibility of downward
causation (the hierarchical fallacy).
At this point, the chapter substantiates the arguments from section 1.3 by providing more
concrete examples of how a model can fail to become a good surrogate for reality, if the com-
59The article was co-authored by Jakob Kapeller from the Johannes Keppler University in Linz. It is going to be
published in the Handbook of Heterodox Economics, edited by Tae-Hee Jo, Lynne Chester, and D’lppoliti, and to be




plexity reduction function is specified poorly with respect to the micro-macro relationship. Note
that it has been argued earlier that ACE models can be used to identify these fallacies.
After establishing the necessity of an explicit treatment of the micro-macro relationship, we
elaborate on how this challenge has been taken up by current heterodox approaches. We identify
four different heterodox perspectives the micro-macro link that allow to circumvent the fallacies
outlined before and show that these are potentially integrated with a general systemist frame-
work for heterodox theorizing. Here, the chapter again extends and substantiates the arguments
outlined in the previous chapter by introducing the concept of systemism in more detail, and to
provide an in-depth justification for its usefulness in economic theory including some illustrative
examples of how existing theories can be aligned with the systemist meta-language.
The chapter closes with the claim that systemism can serve as a common denominator for
the different heterodox approaches to the micro-macro link, enabling mutual communication
and comparability among them. This argument is important in three ways: firstly, it supports
Elsner’s claim for a heterodox convergence among socio-economics and institutionalism (Elsner,
2014). Secondly, it further supports the role I ascribe systemism in my framework for complexity
economics in sections 1.2 and 1.3 because it again clarifies the importance of a common meta-
language for a consistent research framework. And finally it provides evidence for my specific
hypothesis of a theoretical convergence between evolutionary-institutionalism and complexity
economics, because both approaches do (or should) be based on a systemist foundation (see also
section 1.7).
1.6.3 Agent-based computational models - A formal heuristic for institu-
tionalist pattern modeling?
In this article60 I elaborate on the methodological foundations of original institutionalism by
taking into account the classical contributions of Myrdal (1978), Wilber and Harrison (1978),
and Hodgson (1988), the recent discussions about a stronger orientation towards Darwinism, and
the relation between institutionalism and modern evolutionary economics.
The first contribution of the article is therefore to identify the actual methodological foun-
dations of institutionalism, reconsidering the classic contributions, and interpreting them in the
context of recent advances in economic methodology and philosophy of science. In particular, I
show that two fundamental methodological pillars of institutionalism, holism and systemism, are
to be revised and summarized by the modern conception of systemism as it was outlined above.
In clarifying the methodological base of modern institutionalist theory, I also consider recent
ontological debates, in particular the important debate about the role of Darwinian principles
60This article was published in the Journal of Institutional Economics as an online first article in June 2015.
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in institutionalist and evolutionary economic theory: I show, that while the debate is important
on a meta-theoretical level, the positions of those advocating a generalized Darwinisim (Hodg-
son, 2002; Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010) and those arguing in favor of the so called continuity
hypothesis (Witt, 2004; Cordes, 2006; Witt & Schwesinger, 2013), yield similar methodological
demands. These clarifications also take into account the arguments made in the discussions about
evolutionary game theory (Elsner, 2012) and system dynamics (Radzicki, 1988) and close an
important gap in the theoretical literature about the methodology of institutionalism.
These results represent the vantage point for the second major contribution of the article,
namely the detailed investigation of the consistency of ACE modeling with the methodological
demands of institutionalism. The related discussion clarifies in detail what the potential advan-
tages and pitfalls of ACE modeling are, both in the context of institutionalist economics, and in
general: thus, the potential pitfalls identified and discussed are also important in the context of
complexity economics, which is why this part of the article plays an important role in the whole
research program I outlined in this introduction.
A third important contribution of this article is then the clarification of the relationship
between institutionalism and modern evolutionary economics during the last decades: while
these two research programs have their theoretical roots in original evolutionary-institutional
economics, they have been moving along separately the last years.61 Nevertheless there is hope of
bringing them closer together under the methodological umbrella of ACE modeling. The article
argues that this is an attractive research strategy, given that the major topics considered by the
two communities are different, but closely related to each other: much of evolutionary economics
is concerned with technological change, innovation, and industrial dynamics. Institutionalists
have focused on the roles of institutions for growth, distribution and for policy making.
However, much recent work in both areas acknowledged the importance of institutions in the
context of innovation and technological change, the central role of technology, innovation, and
market dynamics for societal development, and the distribution of power and wealth (Iacopetta,
2008; Greenwood & Holt, 2008; Oleinik, 2013; Russo, Riccetti, & Gallegati, 2015; Franzini &
Pianta, 2016).
To bring the results of institutionalist and evolutionary economics together and re-integrate
them again in a new evolutionary-institutionalist economics therefore seems to be an attractive
research outline. Such a program could successfully be based on the method of ACE modeling
and would necessarily have a strong affinity with the research program of complexity economics
outlined in this introduction (see also section 1.7).
61Nevertheless their underlying ontology is still very similar. See for example the proposed ontology of Dopfer
and Potts (2004) which is complementary to the ontology outlined in this introduction. I elaborate on this in more
detail in chapter 4.
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1.6.4 Formal Approaches to Socio Economic Analysis - Past and Perspec-
tives
This final chapter62 takes a slightly different starting point than the preceding one by focusing
on social rather than institutionalist economics. This serves two purposes: firstly, it helps to
broaden the applicability of my approach and establishes theoretical links to areas of economics
beyond original institutionalism. Secondly, and more importantly, Elsner (2014) recently argued
for a heterodox convergence in that different heterodox schools of thought are now converging to
certain shared principles (I took up this important argument already in the context of the micro-
macro link in heterodox economics, see chapter 3). His major example was the convergence
between institutionalist and social economics. This chapter therefore assesses this claim in the
sense that it considers formal methods in the context of both social and institutionalist economics.
If it found significant similarities among the modeling practices of institutionalism and social
economics, then this would be a convincing argument in favor of Elsner’s thesis of a heterodox
convergence.
The first important contribution of the article is a rigorous assessment of the status quo of
formal modeling within social (and institutional) economics: After introducing an adequate
definition of a formalism in the broader sense, it concisely introduces the most common formal
approaches satisfying this definition: the social fabric matrix (Hayden, 2006a), system dynamics
(Radzicki, 1988), the institutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom, 2011), and
(evolutionary) game theory (Elsner, 2012). It then proposes ACE modeling as a new socio
economic method.
Considering the debates on the introduction of these methods is particularly illuminating
because several arguments come up regularly and independently of each other: both Elsner
(2012) and Radzicki (1988) criticized the lack of rigor in purely verbal institutionalist pattern
modeling and therefore suggested enriching the institutionalist toolset with game theory and
system dynamics respectively. My epistemological claim is similar. But later in the article I
compare the different methods to each other and conclude - inter alia - that there is a potential
complementarity between game theory and ACE modeling, but not with system dynamics. So
while I share Radzicki’s methodological critique of institutionalism, I agree only partly to his
methodological conclusions.63
The second contribution of the article is then the substantiated claim that there are no virgin
methods: the choice of a particular form of modeling always entails certain ontological and
62This article was published in the Forum for Social Economics as an online first article in June 2015.
63Note that the discussion is about combining the methods in one single model. I do not deny that it can be
illuminating to consider a phenomenon both from an ACE and system dynamics perspective. As elaborated in
section 1.4.4, ACE models can also be used to assess the adequacy of the aggregation and homogeneity assumptions
implicit in any system dynamic model.
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epistemological convictions that are often not well reflected. I therefore clarify the implicit
epistemological and ontological tendencies of all these modeling frameworks and summarize
them in table 5.1. Already at this point, I will have identified ACE modeling as inherently affine
to a systemist conception of the economy. These clarifications also illustrate the importance of a
well reflected epistemological and ontological base for any research framework. Otherwise, the
resulting models could be inconsistent and difficult to compare.
The third important contribution is the clarification of how the different methods relate
to each other: I classify the approaches according to the distinction of frameworks, theories,
and models by Ostrom (2011) and elaborate on potential complementarities and antagonisms
among them. Note that this kind of distinction does not apply to the philosophical framework
for complexity economics developed in the first sections of this introduction: This ontological
and epistemological framework represents a meta-theoretical foundation for future research on
complex economies. While it narrows the set of potential methods, it is less applied than the
frameworks of Ostrom’s classification, and less concrete than the theories in the classification:
it may be possible to build a model that is based on Ostrom’s IAD framework, theoretically
informed and made concrete by institutionalist theory, but also consistent with and informed by
the epistemological and ontological framework developed above. There is, however, a certain
similarity among the role played by institutionalism in my foundation for complexity economics
and that of a theory in Ostrom’s taxonomy: institutionalism indeed added economic substance
and concreteness to my foundation, as does a theory in Ostrom’s framework.
In the end, this article serves the important purpose of summarizing the status quo of formal
modeling in social and institutionalist economics, and in illustrating once again the attractiveness
of a systemist perspective on the economy, in particular through the application of ACE modeling.
It also provides further evidence to Elsner’s thesis of a heterodox convergence, at least among
institutionalist and social economics, by illustrating the methodological convergence of the two
approaches. Finally, the paper clarifies the relationship among different formalisms currently
employed by institutionalists and socio economists and thus provides a useful guidance for future
research projects.
1.7 Conclusion and outlook: This dissertation as a starting
point
1.7.1 A convergence of heterodoxies?
Elsner (2014) recently argued that there is a theoretical and methodological convergence between
social and (Veblenian) institutional economics. He terms the resulting common research program
“socio-economics” (Elsner, 2014, p. 2). Given the preceding elaborations, we may ask how the
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research program of complexity economics as outlined above relates to socio-economics, and to
what extent institutionalism is itself transforming into some sort of complexity economics.
Currently, institutionalism and complexity economics are still largely separated: there is only
a small number of researchers that consider themselves part of both research communities and
who foster an effective knowledge transfer between them. The present work aims at effecting
such a mutual transfer of knowledge by referring to institutionalist concepts when building a
philosophical framework for complexity economics, and by effecting a methodological transfer
from complexity to institutionalist economics. This hopefully brings about a closer collaboration
among the two communities as the preceding elaborations revealed a considerable number
of complementarities and similarities between these approaches. But it will take a long time
until an effective convergence will take place. The reason for this is pragmatic rather than
theoretical: currently, the background of scientists working explicitly on economic complexity is
very different to classical institutionalist economists: while the former often come from fields
such as mathematics, computer science, physics, or biology, the latter mainly come from the
fields of political economy, sociology, political science, and history. This entails a different
language, different research institutions (including different associations and journals), and a
different research culture with institutionalists focusing much more on issues such as ethics,
normativity, justice, and fairness than most complexity economists (compare, for example, the
methodological contributions of Farmer (2013) with that of Hayden (2006b)). And as until
now complexity economics (in contrast to institutionalism) has had no consistent philosophical
foundation, it was particularly difficult to identify and exploit the complementarities and to
resolve the differences between complexity and institutionalist economics. Nevertheless, thanks
to the explicit ontology and epistemology provided earlier, theories and models of complexity
and institutionalist economics can now be compared and aligned much more easily. Through
this process we may then develop the ’shared meaning’ (Hodgson, 2015) required for enhanced
scientific cooperation.
1.7.2 The future of complexity economics
Irrespective of whether there will actually be a full (or partial) convergence of complexity, social,
and institutionalist economics, the emerging research program of complexity economics faces a
promising future.
Departing from the solid ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundation pro-
vided above, there is a large set of urgent questions that call for being studied from such a
complexity perspective. Examples range from very theoretical to very applied cases and include
the following:
1. Social power is frequently considered to be of central importance for economics (e.g.,
Galbraith (1973), Kapp (1976), Rothschild (2002), or Wäckerle (2014)), but remains a
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completely unformalized and vague concept.64 As power is concerned with individuals,
their relations, and social positions and institutions, it is predestined to be studied through
theory and methods of complexity economics. Considering recent advances in conceptual-
izing culture (Bednar & Page, 2007), and, hopefully, institutions (see above), this seems to
be a promising way for further research.
2. The strong relation between institutions, innovation, and technological change has been
emphasized by many economists from very different orientations ever since, e.g. Schum-
peter (1942), Ayres (1996), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). Up to now, these topics were
the subject of quite different research paradigms that have not yet brought together their
theoretical and empirical results. Modern evolutionary economists have made considerable
process in understanding technological change and innovation by using tools from com-
plexity economics, in particular ACE modeling and network analysis. As the potential for
applying these tools and the corresponding theory of economic complexity to the study of
institutions is one of the central messages of the chapters that follow, a joint consideration
of the three topics under the umbrella of complexity economics would be a logical next
step. This would come close the vision of economists such as Schumpeter and Ayres who
anticipated such a unified treatment a long time ago.
3. Economic and social development has been one of the key topics for economists ever since.
Most of the existing theories are unfortunately not satisfactory at all, since “despite the
considerable amount of research devoted to economic growth and development, economists
have not yet discovered how to make poor countries rich.” (Azariadis & Stachurski, 2005).
One reason for this might be that there is tons of fragmented evidence for particular
mechanisms or institutions that could be the cause for underdevelopment, but there has
never been the attempt of an integrative approach to study e.g. the mechanisms underlying
the distribution of wealth and the role played by technological change and the institutions
into which these processes are embedded in one coherent model. Complex simulation
models could fill this gap, in particular because a significant body of theoretical and
empirical literature already exists: the simulation models could be built from sound
theoretical basis so that overparametrization could be avoided (see above section 1.4.3).
Further these topics are predestined to be studied from a complexity perspective because
of ontological reasons: the heterogeneity and the particular dependence structure of the
actors involved is important, the relevant mechanisms operate on different ontological
level and interact with each other, and the ongoing dynamics of the processes including
positive feedback loops make the application of equilibrium models particularly doubtful.
4. The theory of economic complexity not only entails important policy implication in
general (Elsner, 2015). As it became clear from the epistemology of complexity eco-
64Or it is defined purely in competition-based terms such as pricing power in monopolistic markets or bargaining
power in certain classes of games. See Rothschild (2002)for a critique.
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nomics elaborated above, the kind of explanations provided by complexity economics
are mechanism-based and generative. This also means that they can more easily be trans-
formed into policy advice than the outcomes of general equilibrium models. Moreover,
ACE modeling as a method is predestined to conduct policy experiments and related
forms of counterfactual analysis (Moss, 2002; Dosi, Fagiolo, & Roventini, 2010; Borrill
& Tesfatsion, 2011). The main reasons besides their generative nature is their ability to
consider feedback mechanisms, adaption processes, and higher order effects of policy
interventions directly. There is simply no alternative modeling device that meets the
demands of developing particular policy measures as perfectly as ACE.
These areas of study all embrace aspects that were studied quite extensively in isolation by
either classical institutionalists, modern evolutionary economists, complexity economists, social
economists, or others. To bring them together under the framework of complexity economics
as outlined in this thesis will help to finally unify the dispersed theoretical fragments. This
will result in a full-fledged interdisciplinary, real-world oriented, and policy relevant research
program that will prove useful in tackling today’s urgent questions of economics and society.
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Chapter 2
New Perspectives on Institutionalist
Pattern Modeling: Systemism, Complexity,
and Agent-Based Modeling
Chapter Abstract
This paper focuses on the complementarity between original institutional economics, Mario
Bunge’s framework of systemism, and the formal tools developed by complexity economists,
especially in the context of agent-based modeling. Thereby, we assert that original institutional
economics might profit from exploiting this complementarity.
This chapter has been published as a regular research article in the Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 49(2),
2015.
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2.1 Introduction
Since their emergence, institutional economists have discussed potential philosophical under-
pinnings of institutionalist theory, as well as the appropriate role for formal modeling tools in
economic thinking. In this paper, we use the classic methodological contributions of Myrdal
(1978) andWilber and Harrison (1978) as a starting point to illustrate the affinity between original
institutionalism and the concept of systemism as summarized and refined in the writings of the
eminent philosopher Mario Bunge. Systemism thereby puts an emphasis on the relations between
individual agents or entities, which constitute an aggregate system. Such a relational perspective
implies that different ontological levels are mutually interdependent, since individuals are always
relationally embedded, allowing for the whole to influence its parts and for the parts to influence
the whole. As a consequence, the question of aggregation of individual behavior is seen as an
interesting and potentially complicated theoretical problem instead of being understood as merely
an arithmetic procedure of “summing up”. This perspective aligns well with the growing research
on economic complexity, which provides a similar account on aggregation within social systems.
While complexity economics is often vague on its epistemological and ontological fundamentals,
it has developed a rich toolset of formal models tailored to the analysis of complex social systems.
We take the writings of Weaver (1948) on complexity as a vantage point of showing how com-
plexity aligns with systemism and institutional economics. In doing so, we search for potential
complementarities between these concepts, and how these complementarities might be exploited.
In particular, we discuss the potential of using agent-based models within institutionalist research.
This paper is structured as follows: Section two introduces the philosophical concept of
systemism, and illustrates how it aligns to institutional thought and complexity economics as
well as possibly provides a unifying framework for these two approaches. Section three tries to
develop a specific example of the general argument sketched in section two by referring to the
use of agent-based models in institutionalist analysis. Section four contains our conclusions.
2.2 Systemism, Complexity, and Institutionalist PatternMod-
eling
Although the label of systemism might seem novel, the corresponding ideas regarding research
practice are far from being entirely new. In his various writings on systemism, Mario Bunge
provides a series of illustrative examples for “systemist” social research. In this context, Bunge
gives due credit to a series of well-known institutional economists, whom he conceives as
systemist researchers — in particular, he mentions Gunnar Myrdal (Bunge, 2012, p. 30), Max
Weber, Joseph A. Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen, and K. William Kapp (Bunge, 1979, p. 92-
93), as well as John Maynard Keynes and Wassily Leontief (Bunge, 2004, p. 187). Bunge’s
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observation suggests a clear affinity between the concept of systemism and institutionalist
economics.
In his account on systemism, Bunge asserts that any object or entity is either “a system or
a part of one . . . [whereby] a system is a complex object, every part or component of which
is connected with other parts of the same object in such a manner that the whole possesses
some features that its components lack — that is, emergent properties” (Bunge, 1996, p. 20).
Hence, he ties the concept of a system to the idea of related nodes forming an aggregate with
some emergent properties. These emergent properties carry mechanisms, whose effects lead
to continuous effects of change and stabilization, because of which we conceive of them “as
a process (or sequence of states, or pathway) in a concrete system, natural or social” (Bunge,
2004, p. 186). These mechanisms are mostly “concealed,” and thus “have to be conjectured”
Bunge, 2004, p. 186, which constitutes an important parallel to the natural sciences. Some
mechanisms are “essential” in that they are unique to a given system (Bunge, 2004, p. 193), and
that they potentially carry “specific” functions that may be used to achieve specific goals. While
mechanisms can be distinguished from functions (the former answer how things work, while
the latter show how to achieve a given aim), they can still be mapped onto each other. In this
context, the function-mechanism relation is principally one-to-many, since different mechanisms
can be used to achieve a specific aim. Success on markets, for instance, can be achieved through
a variety of mechanisms, hence “markets can be conquered” on different ways, for example, “by
force, dumping, free-trade agreements or even honest competition” (Bunge, 2004, p. 194).
Any system can be characterized by a specific composition (the set of nodes), an environment
and a certain structure or organization (the collection of relations between the nodes as well as
between the nodes and the environment). The latter is a novel and necessary element of any
system as well as the source of emergent properties, hence mechanisms. For instance, the degree
distribution of the network structure representing scientific communication, which often follows
a power-law, is intrinsically related to what Robert K. Merton famously termed the “Matthew
Effect”, i.e., the mechanism allocating prestige to different scientists, which is determined by
the relative prestige these scientists have accrued in the past (Merton, 2011; de Solla Price,
1965). Thus, one main contribution of systemism from a practical perspective is its capacity of
putting the most interesting aspect of any system and structures therein — e.g., the organization
of relations — at the center stage. While this basic concept of a system can be applied to a
variety of concrete or even conceptual items, for the matter at hand, we can explicitly apply
it to social systems like a family, a firm, or a nation. Therefore, novel properties emerge at
the level of the whole system (global properties, such as a firm’s success or failure), or at the
level of its individual components (relational properties, such as the role assigned to a given
employee). By focusing on the relations between individuals, systemism aims to transgress the
traditional dichotomy of individualist and holist approaches, and thereby to preserve “the grains
of truth” involved in these approaches. Following this argument, Bunge juxtaposes systemism
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Ontology












A society is a system
composed of changing




Social science is the
study of the
individual, and to








social facts, which, in
turn, determine
individual behavior.
Social science is the study
of social systems; their
changing composition,
environment and structure,
as well as the mechanisms
they bring forth.
Table 2.1: Individualism, Holism, and Systemism in Comparison
to individualism and holism by referring to three different layers: ontology, methodology, and
morals (Bunge, 1996, 2000). Table 2.1 gives a stylized representation of the differences between
three distinctive approaches with respect to ontology and methodology, which are in the focus of
this paper.
The idea of systemism is not entirely new to institutionalist economics. In their classical
methodological papers, Myrdal (1978) and Wilber and Harrison (1978) already emphasize
both, systemism and holism. According to their definitions, the former means that the patterns
emerging from the joint behavior cannot be derived from analyzing a single agent in isolation,
while the latter was meant to accentuate the importance of potential downward effects in social
systems. In this context Bunge’s main contribution to institutional economics is in explicitly
clarifying the double role of emergent properties in this specific context, which are constituted
by joint interaction, and thus may carry mechanisms of downward causation. Hence, in Bunge’s
account of systemism, the complexity introduced by relations may give rise to mechanisms
of downward causation, thereby rendering the reference to holism superfluous by deriving the
possibility of downward causation from the original proposition that “parts are so related that
their functioning is conditioned by their interrelations” (Gruchy, 1947, p. 4) . The fact that, for
Bunge, social systems and their constituents are inherently dynamic provides another parallel to
the classic account of Wilber and Harrison, 1978, who assign an important role to evolutionary
thinking. Given this background, it seems fair to say that systemism is an implicit cornerstone of
institutionalist theorizing and modeling.
Moreover, a close reading of Wilber and Harrison (1978) also suggests that a high priority
was given to understanding the relation between different ontological levels of the economy. A
similar emphasis can also be found in Bunge (1996), who argues that “social sciences study
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social systems and their subsystems and supersystems” (p. 273). He recognizes that any system
carries emergent properties as ontological novelties, which may come in two forms: either the
system possesses some properties that its parts do not possess (global properties), or the parts
possess some properties exactly because they are part of a given system (relational properties).
Therefore, the approach to understand emergent properties as ontological novelties is rather a
universal take on the question of whether “more is different” (Anderson, 1972).
Systemism further posits that different ontological levels in social research — no matter
where these levels are exactly located in a given application — are bridged by mechanisms
(additionally to within-level mechanisms), which replace those simple aggregation rules that are
exemplified by typical formal procedures (e.g., summing up, calculating a mean, classifying,
etc.). The question of “aggregation” is explicitly tackled as a potentially interesting theoretical
problem and not primarily as a technical difficulty. Thereby, these “bridging” mechanisms can
take the form of agency-structure relations (i.e., a bottom-up mechanism or upward causation),
or structure-agency relations (i.e., top-down mechanisms or downward causation).
Institutionalists have already developed numerous candidates for such bridging mechanisms
in their (mainly verbal) models, such as, for example, the concept of reconstitutive downward
effects (Hodgson, 2002, 2006, 2011), or social emulation (Veblen, 1898). The question of
whether there are more formal tools that can help institutionalists understand aggregation via
mechanisms, as suggested by systemism, has led to another stream of literature, known as
complexity economics. This line of research has developed numerous, mainly formal tools that
allow for studying the economy as a complex system. Although the idea of complexity developed
independently from systemism and institutionalism, the similarities of the theoretical frameworks
are striking. The concept of complexity dates back to, at least, 1948, when Weaver made the
important distinction between simple and complex scientific problems. Simple problems include
only very few variables and were studied by pre-1900 physics and engineering. All problems,
involving living organisms, can never fall into this category as they involve many different
aspects and interrelated factors that can hardly be separated (Weaver, 1948, p. 537-538). Weaver
distinguished between organized and disorganized complexity. A system consisting of many
components shows disorganized complexity if some emergent pattern exists because the linear
interactions between the different elements smooth each other out. The Law of Large Numbers
can be interpreted as such an emergent pattern. Econometric work generally assumes this kind of
complexity when it takes error terms to be identically and independently distributed. By contrast,
a system showing organized complexity exhibits patterns that emerge because the interactions of
the different elements do not smooth each other out (i.e., are non-linear). In such a case, there
is a kind of self-organization of the system, so that the factors are interrelated into an organic
whole (Weaver, 1948, p. 539).
While the analytical models of neoclassical economics presume the economy to show
disorganized complexity, the perspective of institutionalist modeling expects the economy to be
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characterized by organized complexity. The strong theoretical affinity between the complexity
approach to the economy and the perspective of insitutionalism/systemism suggests numerous
potential complementarities. In particular, institutionalists might find some of the formal tools of
complexity economics adequate to enhance the generality and the rigor of their verbal pattern
models. On the other hand, complexity economics is a very diverse field that lacks a general
epistemological and methodological foundation. In this context, systemism might provide both
accounts with a common philosophical framework and a general platform for the discussion and
development of theoretical arguments.
In the next section, we assess the potential of one particular tool, often related to complexity
economics — agent based modeling. We do this in order to enhance and complement institutional
pattern modeling aiming to gain a deeper understanding of the systemic properties of complex
economic and social systems.
2.3 Systemic Analysis: A Plea for Agent-Based Models in
Economics
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are usually expressed via a programming language and aim to
represent situations, where individual actions lead to patterns, which, in turn, reflect on individual
behavior. One can conduct artificial experiments by changing an aspect of the model, and then
study how this affects the dynamics of the system under observation. While ABMs are considered
to be formal models, they differ from the strict analytical framework of conventional economics
as the modeler is not forced to make assumptions in such a way that the system stays analytically
tractable and exhibits a clear equilibrium. Because the models are solved computationally,
assumptions can be made on entirely proper considerations. In particular, agents’ behavior does
not have to be represented via convenient equations, but agents are more intuitively specified
by attributes and rules implemented in a certain programming language. Such a specification
of the agents allows the natural implementation of heuristics, learning behavior, and habits into
the methods of the agent objects. The social embeddedness of agents is considered through an
underlying — possibly changing — graph that specifies the neighborhood of an agent, i.e., the
set of agents it can interact with. Depending on the degree of realism implemented in crafting
the model, such a graph could represent a simple grid or an actual interaction structure among
the agents. The advantages, in contrast to conventional economics, are twofold: First, there
is a greater degree of freedom regarding the specification of individual behavior. Second, the
interdependence of the economic agents is taken into account, so that group formation and
dynamic power relations among agents can be explicitly modeled. Both aspects, in turn, allow
for introducing more realism in economic modeling.
Because agents’ rules may not only consider the current state of an agent, but also that of
other single agents, a group of agents, or the state of the system as a whole, the interdependence
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of different ontological levels can be directly implemented in an ABM. Another particular feature
of ABMs, in comparison with analytical models, is that they refrain from assumptions about
fictitious central planning mechanisms, such as the Walrasian auctioneer. Consequently, they
allow the study of the economy as a self-organizing system without central control. The overall
dynamics is then truly the result of the interactions of its constituent parts and the interplay of
different ontological levels.
The resulting models are very diverse. There are ABMs that aim to be as realistic as
possible and are extremely complex, while others try to illustrate a certain mechanism or a
combination of mechanisms and remain rather abstract. Not all potential ABMs are compatible
with institutionalist methodology and theory and, in most cases, the ABMs are only one piece of
a broader institutionalist analysis of the problem at hand. Nonetheless, the following example
illustrates what institutionalist ABMs could look like, and what role they can play in a broader
analysis.
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) use an ABM to illustrate the importance of habit formation for
the emergence of social conventions in a setting, where reconstitutive downward effect plays an
important role and the different ontological levels of the system under investigation are strongly
interrelated. The authors study the emergence and evolution of a simple traffic convention, where
agents drive cars on a ring structure — half of them clockwise, the other half anti-clockwise. At
every round, each driver has to decide whether he/she wants to drive on the right or on the left.
The authors clarify that the experimentation with different decision rules in their ABM helped
them identify a surprisingly easy, but very effective decision procedure(Hodgson & Knudsen,
2004, p. 23). That is, drivers develop a habit of driving either on the left or right side and
the model shows how the presence of habit fosters a convergence to a drive-left or drive-right
convention. The model also shows that habit formation alone is not sufficient for the emergence
of the convention, but has to be supplemented by a selection mechanism to lead to a stable traffic
rule. Due to the modular structure of their ABM, Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) were also able to
study what happens if habit is substituted by inertia, which resulted in less convergence in terms
of traffic rules. Based on these findings, they conclude that the functioning of institutions is best
interpreted as influencing habits rather than behavior or preferences. This application illustrates
how ABM can be used to study different mechanism and their mutual influences on each other
in one coherent model. Other recent examples of papers that successfully make use of ABM
to implement an institutional pattern model include the following: Elsner and Heinrich (2009),
who focus on the meso-level of the economy, use an ABM to study the group sizes and agency
mechanisms that foster cooperative behavior among agents and use their findings to provide
a model-based rationale for the existence of a “variety of capitalism” (Hall & Soskice, 2011).
Rengs and Wäckerle (2014) build an extensive ABM of the European Monetary Union. They
include fundamental institutionalist concepts such as conspicuous consumption in a model that
represents both the real and the financial sector of several countries, including their political
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institutions, and allows for a dynamic analysis of different institutional settings. Wäckerle,
Rengs, and Radax (2014) illustrate the impact of trust and leadership on the life cycles of social
institutions. Compared to classical game theoretic contributions, their agent-based framework
allows them to study the interplay of agency and social structure more explicitly.
2.4 Conclusion
We argued that institutionalists can benefit greatly both from the philosophical framework of
systemism and the application of ABMs as one possible operationalization of this general
framework. In some classic methodological research, institutionalist authors identified holism,
systemism, and evolution as the cornerstones of institutionalist analysis. Bunge’s concept of
systemism ties together all these ideas in one coherent framework, labeled systemism. We tried
to show that this systemist perspective on the economy aligns well with a conception of the
economy as a complex system. Building upon the definition of organized complexity due to
Weaver (1948), we argued that there are considerable complementarities between complexity
economics and original institutionalism, which are easily accessed from a systemist viewpoint.
Finally, we illustrated our claims by referring to a simple ABM (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004),
which incorporates some of these complementary aspects. The above said, of course, does
not meant that ABMs substitute a broader analysis, but have to be embedded into an adequate
institutionalist process story in order to get epistemic meaningfulness.
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The micro-macro link in heterodox
economics
Chapter Abstract
This paper provides an introduction to a unifying heterodox approach to the micro-macro link in
economics. It emphasizes the analytical problems that may arise from popular misunderstandings
about the relationship of individual and aggregate level and thereby illustrates why a thorough
understanding of aggregation and aggregates in science is necessary.
In particular, we show that existing heterodox approaches to the micro-macro link in economics
are not only consistent, but complementary to each other. We then propose a ‘systemist’ frame-
work and show that heterodox economic theory and research practice can be substantiated and
summarized by a more general, philosophical framework on aggregates and aggregation in
science.
We argue that such a general philosophical framework will be helpful in advancing heterodox
theory because it allows scholars from different heterodox starting points to relate their theories
to each other via a consistent meta language and to explore the commonalities and differences in
various heterodox approaches to the micro-macro link in economics.
Such a practice will facilitate a ‘heterodox convergence’, as in the case of evolutionary-
institutional and social economics (Elsner, 2014), or help to ensure a transparent relationship
in the form of productive disagreement, rather than a unreflected co-existence of the different
approaches.
A productive scientific endeavor requires a common denominator for the different approaches
enabling mutual communication and comparability. We argue this missing component is exactly
what systemism can supply.
This chapter is going to be published in the Handbook for Heterodox Economics, edited by Lynne Chester,
Carlo D’lppoliti, and Tae-Hee Jo. The handbook will be published by Routledge and will appear in late 2016.
71
CHAPTER 3: THE MICRO-MACRO LINK IN HETERODOX ECONOMICS
3.1 Introduction
Any discussion of the micro-macro link in heterodox economics entails two main questions.
The first question is relevant for social sciences in general and asks for the correct or adequate
treatment of aggregates and aggregation in social theory. Any answer to this general question
incorporates a series of diverse philosophical viewpoints, including ontological claims (e.g. do
social and economic aggregates exist?), epistemological questions (e.g. which role is played by
aggregates in aggregation in the context of economic theory?) and methodological aspects (e.g.
how to adequately model processes of aggregation?). Given that economics abounds in problems
of aggregation – as in the case of market interaction, macroeconomic aggregates or interpersonal
coordination and contracting - the aim to provide suitable theoretical tools to adequately address
aggregates and aggregation is of special interest to economists of different persuasions.
The second major question is more specific and asks for similarities and differences in
the treatment of aggregates and aggregation among heterodox economists. From a traditional
viewpoint one might question the idea that there is something like a consistent vision of the
micro-macro link in heterodoxy, since different interpretations of the micro-macro link have
been attributed to various heterodox strands of research. While some heterodox economists may
prioritize either micro- or macro-level analysis, others emphasize the necessity to concentrate on
the meso-level as a decisive intermediate layer between the more traditional approaches focusing
on either microeconomic or macroeconomic aspects.
Against this backdrop this paper provides an introduction to a unifying heterodox approach
to the micro-macro link in economics. In doing so, we first emphasize the analytical problems
that may arise from popular misunderstandings about the relationship of individual and aggregate
level and thereby illustrate why a thorough understanding of aggregation and aggregates in
science is necessary (section 3.2). In a second step we show that the different heterodox
approaches to the micro-macro link in economics are not only consistent, but complementary to
each other and allow for a concise treatment of the micro-macro link in economics based on a set
of shared fundamental principles (section 3.3). Eventually, we embed the heterodox economic
view on aggregation in a ‘systemist’ framework and show that heterodox economic theory
and research practice can be substantiated and summarized by a more general, philosophical
perspective on aggregates and aggregation in science (section 3.4). We argue that such a general
philosophical framework will be helpful in advancing heterodox theory because it allows scholars
from different heterodox starting points to relate their theories to each other via a consistent meta
language. The final section offers some concluding thoughts.
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3.2 Aggregates and aggregation in science: an illustration of
compositional fallacies
Scientific endeavor often deals with the relation between aggregate entities, like a family, a
nation or a firm, and their individual constituents – family members, citizens or employees.
In disentangling this relationship between the ‘whole’ and its ‘parts’ errors may occur, which
can be understood as compositional fallacies. Such compositional fallacies arise from either a
wrong treatment of aggregation or a wrong treatment of aggregates and may lead to a deficient
understanding of the whole as well as its parts. This section provides illustrations of four typical
compositional fallacies and their conceptual sources with the aim to develop a basic understand-
ing of the type of problems usually associated with the micro-macro link in the social sciences.
For a more complete exposition of the particular fallacies, see Kapeller (2015).
One typical error related to aggregation is to underestimate the role of relations across indi-
viduals. Aggregates are not only composed out of individual entities, but also contain a set of
relations which tie these individual nodes together and create a certain structure. Taking relations
into account is often crucial for acquiring an adequate understanding of the constitution of
aggregate entities. In fact, a central concern in feminist economists is to take individuals and their
mutual relations instead of households as the starting point for economic analysis: otherwise, the
important ‘aggregation procedure’ from individual to household preferences would eventually
be neglected. However, it is the underlying relational structure among individuals that explains
the often detrimental position of women as an aggregate result (Drèze & Sen, 1989). Taking
the household as a fundamental economic actor therefore contributes to the exclusion of gender
issues from economic analysis. This example illustrates that aggregation problems are central to
economic analysis and appear in quite early stages of theorizing. As a general outlook on what
follows, one might suppose that it is the rule rather than the exception that the behavior of some
aggregate social system, like a family or a nation, strongly depends on its internal structure, that
is, its relational setup.
Most standard economic models ignore relational setups entirely and simply posit that the ag-
gregate behavior is obtained by some simple procedure of summing up across individual entities.
The simplistic fallacy is thereby based on a deficient understanding of aggregation, which argues
that the ‘whole’ is no different from the ‘sum of its parts’. Such a view is in conflict with two
very basic observations: first, aggregates may develop properties no individual part possesses
(e.g. a firm’s success). Second, individuals may acquire some properties exactly because they
are part of some whole (e.g. a country’s citizen). In both cases we find that “more is different”
(Anderson, 1972) as these newly acquired attributes can be conceived as emergent properties, i.e.,
some novel features arising exactly because an aggregate is constituted or sustained. For the case
of families such novel properties include the possibilities of generating and raising offspring,
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lending mutual support as well as creating collective identities and a collective organization of
common rights and duties which may leave some family members in a dependent and potentially
deprived situation compared with others. These aspects are often neglected, for instance, if
households with multiple members are represented by a single utility function.
Another fallacy regarding the mico-macro link in economics is the assumption that causality
across different levels only runs in one direction (either ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’), i.e. the
hierarchical fallacy. Current mainstream economics follows such a routine by imposing a general
“hierarchical stipulation that macro-theories require a microeconomic foundation to obtain full
validity” (Rothschild, 1988, p. 14). The economic mainstream thereby emphasizes the ultimate
need for reductionist strategies, which aim to explain any aggregate phenomena by ‘summing
up’ the behavior and properties of the parts (e.g. Robbins (1932), Lucas (1976), Kydlan and
Prescott (1977)). Heterodox economists of different persuasions on the other hand argue for a
multi-level approach to economic theorizing (e.g. Dopfer, Foster, and Potts (2004), Lee (2011),
King (2012)), by emphasizing the changing conditions and constraints for economic action on
different levels and the mutual co-existence of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms.
One main reason why such a ‘hierarchical stipulation’ creates more problems than it solves
is that in economic contexts emergent properties, not only arise permanently, but also feed back
on their constituents, which cannot be assessed within a unidirectional framework. Consider,
for example, innovation in market environments and the associated forces of ‘creative destruc-
tion’ (Schumpeter, 1942a) and ‘path-dependency’ (David, 1985) or the continuous evolution of
social routines (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004) and consumer preferences (Witt, 2001). In these
contexts, where the relationship between individual action and aggregate outcomes is manifold
and complex, the epistemological presupposition of a ‘hierarchical stipulation’ of micro over
macro acts as a double barrier for understanding. First, assuming that aggregate properties can
always be reduced to lower-level entities amounts to committing the static fallacy, that is, to
underestimate the dynamics and complexity of social interaction and to turn a blind eye on the
unexpected. Second, the related methodological claim that aggregate properties should always
be reduced to (current) micro-knowledge, amounts to committing the dogmatic fallacy: the idea
that higher-level mechanisms are mere residuals of individual behavior and therefore negligible.
Consequentially, they also do not carry any meaningful explanatory role.
In contrast to this assertion stand arguments on causally relevant top-down relationships
in economics and elsewhere, which have to be considered in explaining aggregate as well as
individual phenomena. We can think of the influence of social norms and regulation on business
practices or the social mediation of consumption preferences within a certain community. In
the case of the family issues of tradition, power and hierarchy are of vital importance for
understanding the ‘private sources’ of women’s deprivation (Drèze & Sen, 1989). The importance
74
3.3. A HETERODOX PERSPECTIVE ON THE MICRO-MACRO LINK: WHY THE WHOLE
IS MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
of such top-down mechanisms in economics has long been emphasized by heterodox economists,
some of whom would even claim to inverse the ‘hierarchical stipulation’ inherent in mainstream
economics and, conversely, demand a ‘macroeconomic foundation’ for microeconomics (e.g.
King (2012)).
One natural example for a heterodox research strategy following this tradition is stock-flow
consistent macroeconomics (Godley & Lavoie, 2007). Here, one starts with accounting identities
and other macroeconomic stylized facts to study macroeconomic dynamics, rather than starting
with speculative assumptions about the behavior of a ‘representative household’ (see: Kirman
(1992)), as it is common in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models.
While such a ‘macrofounded’ approach provides an important alternative perspective on
macroeconomic dynamics, it is not to be seen as superior to a micro founded approach per
se. Rather its contribution is to make macroeconomic constraints explicit in modeling, which
serves as an important heuristic even when the model is eventually based on microeconomic
relationships and assumptions as in so called agent-based stock-flow consistent models, that
study the economy as a complex system with both bottom-up and top-down effects (e.g. Caiani
et al. (2015)). Hence, the merit of taking different levels of analysis as vantage points often lies
in the enriching of perspectives on economic phenomena, which heterodox economists practice
in a kind of pluralist engagement.
Table 3.1 summarizes the conceptual and methodological pitfalls collected in this section
and illustrates the relation between these four fallacies. In what follows we first deal with the
question what kind of principles heterodox economists developed to deal with the question of
aggregates and aggregation in economics in (section 3.3), before asking whether there exists a
general philosophical foundation suitable for summarizing heterodox practice (section 3.4).
3.3 A heterodox perspective on the micro-macro link: why
the whole is more than the sum of its parts
One overarching theme in heterodox economic theorizing is the view that the consideration of
social wholes is important for the understanding of socio-economic processes and outcomes.
This general perspective implies that wholes are more than a mere sum of their parts, since they
exhibit non-trivial properties and carry effects of various sorts which cannot be conjectured from
looking solely to their constituent parts. However, this idea has also been subject to different
specific interpretations and applications within heterodox economics leading to a series of distinct
vantage points on the role of aggregates and aggregation in economics: some scholars focus on
the explanatory role of top-down mechanisms. Others try to escape the simplistic fallacy by
building particularly sophisticated microfounded models. But all of them are united in treating
the micro-macro link as a complex relationship that deserves theoretical attention because social
and economic aggregates may constitute novel objects or, at least, come with novel features,
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Table 3.1: An overview over the various fallacies of composition.
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which may have specific real-world consequences. We now turn four fundamental perspectives
that have played a decisive role in heterodox treatments of the micro-macro link.
3.3.1 The whole is more than the sum of its parts
One main implication of the idea that wholes do make a difference is to consider the spatial and
temporal variance of social configurations in order to identify distinct realms of economic activity.
Such distinctions may refer to historical differences (e.g. ‘medieval feudalism’ vs. ‘20th century
welfare state capitalism’), spatial variations (e.g. ‘core’ and ‘periphery’) or distinct spheres of
economic activities (e.g. ‘competitive market societies’ vs. ‘subsistence communities’). These
distinctions are deemed important since the course and effects of economic activity depend on
their social and historical circumstances.
Such differentiations are often found in classical political economy. Consider, for instance,
John Stuart Mill’s distinction between the sphere of production and the sphere of distribution.
For Mill the decisive difference between these two economic realms is that while the former is
constrained by nature, the latter is shaped by human institutions solely (Mill, 1848, pp. II.1.1-2).
Consequently, different laws and assumptions apply in these contexts.
Humankind is clearly subject to ‘macrofoundations’ in the form of environmental, historical
and societal forces in this account, simply because nature, culture and society as well as the stage
of historical developments largely define the constraints and modes of economic activity. In this
regard many heterodox economists argue that holistic factors, like culture or institutions, are
important for explaining social phenomena and allow for top-down effects or downward causation
within their economic theorizing. In a bold, and possibly overarching, interpretation this view
may be extended to the claim that social and economic conditions completely determine actions,
fate and feelings of individuals. Such a view of socio-economic determinism is often associated
with Marx’ concept of historical materialism, although such an interpretation presumably does
not do justice to the original Marxian account.1 In a more modest version such an approach is
similar to the approach of a physician, who studies the behavior of a single element (e.g. the
behavior of a comet entering the solar system or the pressure in some gas-container in a lab)
by taking a full account of the surrounding system (e.g. the composition of the solar system or
the size of the container) to correctly anticipate the impact of the latter (Andersen, Emmeche,
Finnemann, & Christiansen, 2000). This more modest attitude is key for understanding a
variety of heterodox ideas – from ecological economists’ emphasis on absolute constraints
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971) to Keynes personal statements on economic methodology (Keynes,
1938).
1A more accurate account of the relation between structure and agency in Marx can be based on Marx’ claim
that „men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx,
1852, p. 15).
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3.3.2 Relations matter
A second application of the general idea that social wholes make a difference focuses on the
interrelatedness of individuals. Attention is devoted to the relations between individuals and
the corresponding impact of other people’s attitudes and behavior on an individual’s economic
thought and action.
Interactions among agents as well as between structure and agency are of prime interest to
heterodox economists: the analysis of interactions and relations across individual agents and
guides studies on preference formation in the context of social emulation (following Marx (1849)
or Veblen (1898)), the emergence of routines in organizations (Nelson & Winter, 1982), question
of social identity (Fineman, 2005), or the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Bowles
& Gintis, 2011) . Such a perspective naturally takes relations seriously and allows for agents
of different weight – different influence and power so to say – and thereby serves a guide for
theorizing on self-reinforcing effects (Merton, 2011), path dependency (David, 1985; Arthur,
1989), wealth concentration, power structures and elites (Rothschild, 1971) as well as other
forms of cumulative advantage (Myrdal, 1973). One immediate implication of this reasoning is
the conceptualization of an economy as a circular flow, where one person’s expenditure adds to
another person’s income. This view considers monetary transactions as fundamental interactions
constituting mutual interdependencies among single economic actors. The consequences of these
interdependencies are a major theme in heterodox economics.
Additionally this focus on the role of relations complements our argument that social wholes
play an important role, by answering the question of how exactly social wholes come into being.
A key idea in this context is to avoid the simplistic fallacy by understanding social wholes as
constituted by a set of individual nodes and their corresponding relational setup.
Thereby, social relations play a twofold role. First, they serve as a transmission belt for
cultural norms, institutional conventions, established hierarchies or shared goals and aspirations
within a social whole. Second, relations serve as means for understanding how individual action
might influence social wholes and, hence, provide a lens for assessing social change and novelty.
The role of social relations as a transmission belt features prominently in heterodox economic
thought and can be traced back to Karl Marx, who speaks of individuals as an “ensemble of
the social relations” (Marx & Engels, 1845), Thorstein Veblen, who emphasized the social
formation of consumer preferences (Veblen, 1898) or Karl Polanyi, who coined the term ‘embed-
dedness’, which emphasizes that individual economic action is always embedded in a certain
socio-historical context (Pareto, 1944). From a dynamic perspective this view can also be used to
analyze questions of social mobility, where relational structures serve as a means for preserving
social hierarchies as in Bowles and Gintis (1975) or Bourdieu (1994), who studied the role of
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educational systems for stratification in the USA and France.
The second major feature of social relations, which allows active agents to influence aggre-
gate properties, also has a prominent role in heterodox thinking and is exemplified by conceptions
such as Schumpeter’s entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1942b) and/or Keynes’s animal spirits (Keynes,
1997[1936]), who both emphasize that some individual decisions are of great impact for future
developments. Against this backdrop it comes as no surprise that active agency plays an impor-
tant role in heterodox approaches to economic cooperation and trust, institutional design as well
as path creation and path dependence (e.g. Hirschman (1970)).
This dual character of social relations which allow for top-down as well as bottom-up
effects and thereby captures the fact that individual agents and social structure are mutually
interdependent was most explicitly taken up by Mark Granovetter, who refined the concept of
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). Granovetter distinguished between an oversocialized and an
undersocialized conception of individuals, where the latter is attributed to neoclassical and new
institutional economics, while the former can be found in purely holistic approaches to social
and economic analysis.
Both conceptions eventually posit an atomistic conception of individuals devoid of any
relational embedding. For the over-socialized individuals, action has already been completely
determined by social forces as a whole and quite independently of any specific relational setup,
while under-socialized individuals do not have any significant relations to others. Granovetter
sees the embeddedness perspective as a conceptual alternative, where
“[a]ctors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they
adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social
categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations.” (Granovetter, 1985, p.
487).
In this view issues of trust and sympathy affect all interpersonal relations, even in situations
where a relation is only initially constituted as a pure economic relation of exchange. The
economic implications of this reasoning are non-trivial: they concern industrial structure, trust
levels and bargaining processes as well as the level of economic performance. A classic example
is given by the high-tech sector, where clusters of coordination and cooperation are particularly
common. These clusters are characterized by regular interactions among the involved suppliers,
developers and customers, which leads to a quasi-integration of different steps throughout the
supply chain, although theses steps are carried out by formally independent organizations. The
longer such relations exist, the more do they ‘outgrow’ the market and become insensitive against
market signals such as ‘prices’ (Elsner, Heinrich, & Schwardt, 2014).
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Figure 3.1: Three different ideal types of networks.
But Granovetter (1985) stresses that social embeddedness is not only a source for trust,
stability and cooperation, but also for exploitation, disorder and conflict. Hence, Granovetter’s
approach does not allow for general predictions aside from the claim that “network structures
matter”, since outcomes eventually depend on the overall network structure. Whether, for ex-
ample, a system is vulnerable to particular interest groups, who work against general interests
thereby depleting stability and trust, depends on the concrete case at hand.
In standard economic accounts such structural properties largely remain implicit: for instance,
most Walrasian general equilibrium models do not account for networks explicitly, but assume
implicitly the system to be structured as a bipartite star network, as illustrated in figure 3.1(a). In
this setup agents are not directly related to each other, but rather connected indirectly via a central
auctioneer, who has direct relationships with all agents and, hence, resides in the network’s center.
A change of the network structure has non-trivial effects: an otherwise identical model economy
characterized by a ring network figure 3.1(b)) exhibits very different distributional characteristics
and price patterns than the star network, implicit in the conventional Arrow-Debreu economy
(Albin & Foley, 1992).
Real networks are, of course, neither rings nor stars: network analysis has made impressive
progress since the 1990s and found that most empirical networks look in some ways similar to
figure 3.1(c): there are few nodes with many connections, and many nodes with few connections.
Furthermore, nodes are organized into different clusters.2 To explore the economic implications
of this structure is an important avenue for future research.
But can we make reasonable predictions about the meso or macro level of the economy, given
a precise description of the micro components as well as their relations? Notwithstanding the
obvious merits of such an approach, the next section explains why a general affirmative answer
2Many statistics are available for the description of complex networks, and one should definitely be more precise
than the space of this book chapter allows. See Newman (2003) for a nice introduction considering most recent
advances in the literature.
80
3.3. A HETERODOX PERSPECTIVE ON THE MICRO-MACRO LINK: WHY THE WHOLE
IS MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
to this question cannot be provided.
3.3.3 There is real novelty
Another aspect of a heterodox perspective on the micro-macro link, which is strongly intertwined
with claiming the importance of incorporating relations into social and economic analysis, is the
notion that novel objects or properties constantly arise in the course of social interaction. This
specific aspect of social wholes – the fact they are carriers and transmitters of genuine novelty -
is at the heart of this subsection.
Economic systems regularly produce novel features that are not predictable from past data.
The emergence of novelty can be most intuitively illustrated for the case of innovation, which
was a key element in the work of Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter distinguished between five
types of innovation (Schumpeter, 1942b, p. 66), such as the development of a new good, the
introduction of products of higher quality, or alternative methods of production.
All these kind of innovations represent or bring forth novelties that have not been existent
in an economic system before. They may carry new mechanisms that fundamentally change
the functioning of the economic system as a whole: the advent of globalization, for example,
not only came with cheaper import goods, but also introduced a new mechanism – the race
for national competitiveness – which puts different countries in a competition for serving the
interests of powerful transnational corporations. The invention of digital computers, to give
another example, led to new markets, new types of goods, and even new life styles that continue
to influence our society via novel mechanisms in various ways. While innovations can often
be understood as a creative recombination of already existing ideas, neither the exact way of
recombination nor its consequences for society are a priori predictable.
This fact motivated heterodox economists to further elaborate on the micro-macro link
to gain a deeper understanding of this non-predictability. One main pillar in this context is
development of arguments on fundamental uncertainty in economic action which focuses on the
role of crucial decisions in investment, whose effects are very hard or impossible to anticipate.
These circumstances give scope to alternative economic motives beyond conventional utility
maximization such as routines and rules, individual vision and passion (as in Schumpeter’s
entrepreneur) or inherited instincts (as in Veblen’s instinct of workmanship).
Another venue of work in this context aims for a refined conception of ‘meso’ in economic
analysis (Dopfer et al., 2004; Elsner & Schwardt, 2014). Proponents argue for a ‘micro-meso-
macro’ framework as a substitute for the conventional micro-macro dichotomy. In such a
framework the economic agents represent the micro level of the economy and are heterogeneous
as they carry different rules. A rule and all its actualizations constitute a meso unit, which is
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seen as a key element in evolutionary economic investigation, since the interaction of rules is
understood as a main driver of economic change on the macro level. Assume, for instance, that
creditors and debtors in a given economy mutually adapt their crediting and borrowing behavior
to each other. In such a setup increased risk-taking on the side of creditors, who are prone to
forget or ignore past turbulences, would be mirrored by increased borrowing by debtors leading
to potentially unsustainable levels of debt. Hence, we can reach the classic Minskyan result that
“stability breeds instability” (Minsky, 1986) by employing a simple model of rule convergence
on credit markets.
The obvious advantage of such an analytical framework is that it allows focusing on economic
change and thus understanding the source of the unpredictability of real novelty within the
economy: One more specific expression of this rather general claim is provided by the theory
on path dependence, originating from the seminal papers of David (1985) and Arthur (1989)
dealing with technological lock-in. Generically, we can disentangle path dependent processes
into three different phases (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; Dobusch & Kapeller, 2013, 3):
The first phase, path creation, characterizes a situation of contingency. Events happening
at this stage are usually “outside the ex-ante knowledge of the observer” (Arthur, 1989). They
are nevertheless important because these events characterize the initial conditions for the sec-
ond phase, where an ergodic dynamic process, characterized by positive feedback effects and
subsequent, causally linked events, leads to the dominance of one particular standard. The
positive feedback may stem from different forms of network effects based on increasing returns,
preferential attachment, learning and coordination effects, complementarity requirement or the
convergence of expectations. The last phase, the resulting lock-in, then reflects the resilience
of the dominating standard against change. Thus, while it is almost impossible to predict the
diffusion process ex ante, it only becomes possible to identify the dominant technology after one
has entered the second phase of the path dependent process.
Hence, path-dependency theory focuses on the mechanisms underlying the introduction of
novelties and the creation and persistence of social standards of different forms (like social
norms, organizational rules, business practices and technological requirements, etc.). In doing so
it provides a theoretical rationale for the emergence of novelties and explicates the difficulties
in predicting such novelties. At the same time path-dependency theory is silent on the effects
brought forth by such novelties, which often represent controversial questions in heterodox eco-
nomics. A prime example is given by the effect of the adoption and diffusion of new innovations
on the level of employment: while some innovations indeed function as labor-saving devices
(as in the standard Keynesian approach), others may increase employment due the creation of
additional demand induced by novel products or improvements in product-quality and versatility
(as in the Schumpeterian approach, e.g. Witt (2001)). Which effect eventually dominates in the
face of general technological progress or a specific innovation is, hence, a question which can be
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hardly answered ex ante.
These arguments imply that ex ante predictions are often difficult or impossible, since the
emergence and effects of novelties can hardly be fully anticipated. Nevertheless, the relevant
trajectory can of course be explained ex post: We understand well how a specific successful
innovation diffused into society and how it affects their members.
3.3.4 Aggregation and welfare
Finally, our forth perspective on social wholes and their role in economic theorizing relates
to the normative question of economic welfare in the context of aggregation. Mandeville
(1714) advanced the view that ‘private vice’ in the form of egocentric instrumental rationality
will lead to ‘public benefits’, that is the maximization of social welfare. This view is deeply
inscribed in modern mainstream economics, especially in the two fundamental theorems of
welfare economics. While many heterodox economists surely would accept, that the Mandeville-
case is indeed a possible state of affairs, they also tend to critically examine the conditions
required for the Mandeville-case to prevail. Classical examples in this context include rationality
traps – “if I can improve my view in the theater by standing up, will there also be a collective
improvement if everyone follows this rationale?” – or references to the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin, 1968) which describes the unsustainable usage a public good in the absence of a suitable
mode of social coordination (Ostrom, 1990). More formally, such cases can be expressed in
the form of a prisoner’s dilemma, which illustrates the core property of rationality traps and
tragedies of the commons, namely that myopic individually rational actions will lead to the
worst possible aggregate outcome. This relationship is the main reason why some heterodox
economists consider a prisoner’s dilemma as one archetype for heterodox economic modeling
(Elsner et al., 2014). Since the welfare aspects of social organization are a general topos of
heterodox economic theorizing, we find variants of this argument in several heterodox traditions:
ecological economists emphasis on collective good problems (e.g. climate change), Marxian
perspectives on power and conflict and evolutionary as well as institutional economists’ focus on
the role of social norms, conventions and law in resolving social dilemmata.
3.4 Systemism as a general framework
3.4.1 Systemism and heterodoxy
While the concept of systemism might seem new, one can be assured that the practice of
systemism is far from something completely novel. We introduce the concept of systemism to
provide a full-fledged philosophical concept, which encompasses the basic heterodox arguments
on the micro-macro link in economics. The development of systemism owes mainly to the
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works of Mario Bunge, philosopher and polymath, who aimed to transgress the traditional
dichotomy between individualism and holism, which he perceived as an outdated hindrance to
social research and epistemological debate.
Bunge cites a variety of examples for what he conceives as a ‘systemist’ social research.
Interestingly, within these passages the names of heterodox economists come in definitely non-
random abundance: Among others Bunge mentions John Maynard Keynes and Wassily Leontief
(Bunge, 2004, p. 187), Max Weber , Joseph A. Schumpeter, Thorstein B. Veblen or K. William
Kapp (Bunge, 1979, p. 92-93). More recent examples for heterodox approaches compatible
to a systemist perspective are supplied by an understanding of economics as the study of the
social provisioning process (Jo, 2011) or the postulate of evolutionary economists to focus on the
meso-level of economic activity (e.g. Dopfer et al. (2004)). In sum, these observations suggest
that heterodox economic approaches serve as salient candidates for illustrating a systemist
approach to social and economic issues and, conversely, systemism serves as a natural candidate
for epistemologically substantiating heterodox economic research.
3.4.2 Systemism: key ideas and concepts
Systemism is built upon the fundamental twin concept of systems and mechanisms, where the
latter are situated within or between the former. Thereby any object or entity in systemist analysis
is considered either as a system itself or as a component of a system (Bunge, 1996).
A system is composed by a set of nodes or components (its composition) with a particular
relational setup (a system’s structure or organization) situated within a certain environment.
The interrelatedness of agents not only contributes to the constitution of a specific system, but
gives rise to a variety of ‘ontological novelties’, i.e. some features that the whole possess,
but its components lack (global properties, like a nation’s culture or a firm’s success) or some
features components acquire exactly because they are part of some system (relational properties,
like being a creditor, a wife, or an employee; see Bunge (1996). The concept of a system can
therefore be applied on several levels: a family is a system consisting of different members
with particular relations to each other. At the same time it is a part of a community system
where it has several relations to other components of the community. The resulting levels of the
system take the form of a hierarchy of sub- and super-systems which serves as a basic ontological
framework. Such a hierarchical understanding of reality has been insinuated by several heterodox
approaches, in particular in the work of Herbert Simon, who gave an evolutionary explanation
for the predominance of hierarchy in the complex systems of reality (Simon, 1962).
The second fundamental ingredient to systemism are mechanisms: they are essential be-
cause systemist theory aims for mechanism-based (or mechanismic) explanations of phenomena
(Bunge, 1997). Mechanisms work within or across social systems and lead to continuous changes
and stabilization of a given system. This is why we conceive of them “as a process (or sequence
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of states) in a concrete system, natural or social” (Bunge, 2004, p. 186). Thereby three rough
types of mechanisms can be distinguished: first, within-level mechanisms operate within social
systems, but address only one ontological layer (e.g. a reduction in hourly income may induce a
household to increase working hours). Second, bridging mechanisms also work within a certain
social system and can take the form of agency-structure relations (i.e. a bottom-up mechanism
or upward causation) or structure-agency relations (i.e. top-down mechanisms or downward
causation). The former provide a theoretical alternative for the aggregation of individual be-
havior going beyond a mere ‘summing up’ of individual properties, by employing theoretical
mechanisms for means of aggregation. Possible examples for such ‘bridging mechanisms’ are
bandwagon effects, where final outcomes depend on the sequence of individual moves, positive
feedback effects, which may lead to path-dependent properties of social systems or emulation
effects, where individual behavior conforms to or is constrained by the behavior of others (as
in the case of rationality traps). Finally, there are mechanisms operating between a system and
its environment (i.e. overlapping and surrounding systems), like imitation of technologies or
competition among firms. One example of a heterodox approach integrating all these relevant
processes is the agent-based stock-flow consistent model mentioned above: it is an excellent
example of truly systemist research that aims to transcend both, purely individualist and holist
approaches.
This focus on concrete mechanisms in systemist epistemology aims to refine the standard
model of scientific explanation by emphasizing the importance of uncovering the generative
mechanisms underlying empirical relationships instead of simply collecting and applying these
relationships: to explain the death of a person with their property of being human, and the fact
that all humans eventually die, is not very insightful; rather we should try to identify the concrete
mechanisms that have led to the state of affairs to eventually arrive at more general theories
(Bunge, 1997, p. 425).3
Note that systemism is not a theory, but rather an ontological and epistemological heuristic,
like “a viewpoint, or a strategy for designing research projects whose aim is to discover some of
the features of systems of a particular kind” (Bunge, 2004, p. 191). Considering this fact and the
fundamental aspects of systemist models, we claim that systemism is a well-suited philosophical
framework to structure heterodox theorizing on the micro-macro link as outlined above. Based
on these considerations we can now try to explore the relation between heterodox economic
arguments and the systemic framework.
3Note that Bunge (1997) uses this argument not only to question the conventional covering law model, but also
to criticize other concepts, like hermeneutics or Occam’s razor, which neglect the main task to bring forth new and
testable hypotheses.
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Figure 3.2: The relationship between rising inequality and increasing working hours as suggested
by Bowles and Park (2005)
3.4.3 Heterodox economics in a systemist framework
Bunge’s concept of systemism does not only provide a suitable philosophical framework for
heterodox theorizing on the micro-macro link, but also offers an intuitive way to express and
conceptualize theoretical considerations of micro-macro interactions. The following examples
illustrate this aspect from a practical perspective.
The first illustration is provided by Bowles and Park (2005), who use the Veblenian concept
of social emulation to explain the allegedly counterintuitive relationship between rising inequality
and increasing working hours (figure 3.2). Due to social emulation of preferences a higher level
of income inequality induces an increase in consumption aspirations across households. In order
to live up to these aspirations a (sizeable) subset of these households increase their working effort,
which leads to an increase average working hours. A possible extension of this argument would
argue that this increase in the supply of labor reduces the bargaining power of workers and, hence,
leads to lower wages, with further increasing income inequality leading to a path-dependent
downward spiral.
Our second example considers the emergence and evolution of social conventions Hodgson
and Knudsen (2004) discuss an agent-based model, where drivers are forced to decide whether to
drive on the left or on the right side of a street. They study the conditions required to guarantee
the emergence of a stable convention. While their major finding is that habit-formation is a
probable vantage point for the emergence of conventions, the illustration in figure 3.3 extends
the underlying argument by illustrating the emergence of conventions in a systemist framework
considering both bottom-up and top-down effects.
These examples show that what Bunge’s concept of systemism offers is far away from
a methodological straight-jacket. Quite on the contrary, the schematic approach utilized in
these examples aims at illustrating how this approach can be employed to facilitate conceptual
thinking and the crafting of ontologically sensible theoretical frameworks on the basis of a
solid epistemological foundation. It further provides a useful meta-language that enables the
effective comparison of different theories of the micro-macro link in heterodox economics and
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Figure 3.3: The up- and downward effects underlying the emergence of a social rule (Hodgson &
Knudsen, 2004).
and Kapeller (2012, 4)).
3.5 Conclusion
The complex relationship between different ontological levels has received considerable attention
in heterodox theorizing. This has led to the development of a number of important independent
contributions to the role of aggregates and the issue of aggregation in social research, which
often allowed heterodox economists to circumvent typical fallacies of aggregation identified in
this chapter.
In this chapter we aim to show that the central pillars of different heterodox conceptions of
the micro-macro link are not only complementary, but can also be subsumed under a common
philosophical umbrella labeled ‘systemism’. This umbrella is a useful device helping to explore
the commonalities and differences in various heterodox approaches to the micro-macro link in
economics. In many cases such comparisons will facilitate a ‘heterodox convergence’, as in
the case of evolutionary-institutional and social economics (Elsner, 2014), while in other cases
the relationship may take the form of productive disagreement. Such a productive endeavor
requires a common denominator for the different approaches enabling mutual communication
and comparability. We argue this missing component is exactly what systemism can supply.
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Chapter 4
Agent-Based computational models - A
formal heuristic for institutionalist pattern
modelling?
Chapter Abstract
I investigate the consistency of agent-based computational models with the institutionalist
research program as outlined by Myrdal, Wilber and Harrison, Hodgson and others. In particular,
I discuss whether such models can be a useful heuristic for “pattern modelling”: Can they
provide a holistic, systemic and evolutionary perspective on the economy? How can agency
be conceptualized within ABMs? Building on these issues, I discuss potentials and challenges
of the application of ABM in institutionalist research. This discussion also relates to recent
methodological advances in neo-Schumpeterian economics. I explain how institutionalists can
benefit from these and suggest areas of research for joint work under the methodological umbrella
of ABM.
This chapter has been published as a regular research article in the Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 12(1),
pp 241-261. It is permanently available online under http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744137415000193. ©Millennium




Institutionalists have always been criticizing the neoclassical way of modelling the economy,
especially because of its obsession to a strict formalism. On the other hand, there have been
a number of attempts to introduce more formal modelling tools to institutionalist economics,
including the social fabric matrix (Hayden, 1982), system dynamics (Radzicki, 1988) and evolu-
tionary game theory (Elsner, 2012). In this article I discuss whether agent based computational
models (ABM)1 can provide a useful formal extension to the research program of original
institutional economics (OIE).2
ABMs are commonly associated with the rising research program of complexity economics.3
While some consider complexity economics to be an interesting extension to neoclassical eco-
nomics (e.g. Blume and Durlauf (2006)), others consider it to represent a completely new way of
thinking about economics Arthur (2006) and criticize the “analytical straitjacket” of neoclassical
economics from a complexity perspective (e.g. Farmer (2012)). The relation between OIE and
complexity economics is largely unexplored. Many concepts of complexity economics, though,
have been anticipated by institutionalists: Although using a different vocabulary, complexity
economists speak about cumulative causation, dynamic relations among individuals and an
organic, rather than atomistic, view on the economy. Consequently, ABMs should not be left
unconsidered by institutionalist economists. The study of whether ABMs can be a useful tool for
institutionalist research may also hint at potential convergences of institutionalist and complexity
economics.
This paper contributes to this question by investigating whether the use of ABMs is consistent
with the research program of OIE as it was outlined by Myrdal (1978), Wilber and Harrison
(1978) and Hodgson (1988). These works are still representative for a considerable part of OIE.
But they do not capture some recent developments in the field:
Firstly, within the OIE, there are strong voices criticizing the development towards be-
haviourism and empiricism, and argue for a stronger orientation towards Darwinism. How
exactly Darwinian principles should play a role in economic theory is subject to an ongoing
dispute. I will reflect on the methodological implications of this dispute to the extent it is relevant
to assess the role of ABM in OIE later in this paper.
Secondly, looking for more recent advances in institutionalist methodology leads to the
1Numerous acronyms exist and most denote synonyms, e.g. ABM, ABMS or IBM. Others, such as ACE (agent
based computational economics) accentuate that not only the model, but also the means to solve it and analyse the
outcomes are crucial. While I have much sympathy for this idea, I here stick to the most common acronym, ABM.
2While ABMs are usually written in computer code, they can, in theory, always be expressed via mathematical
equations. This is due to the famous Church-Turing thesis, which is at the heart of modern computer science and
recursion theory. ABMs are thus to be considered formal models. Within institutionalist economics, formal models
have always been handled with great care. I therefore emphasize that ABMs can never be self-explanatory but can
only be considered a heuristic, or a tool.
3Although not all complexity economists agree to the use of ABMs, see e.g. Durlauf (2005).
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question about the relation of OIE with modern evolutionary, or neo-Schumperterian, economics.
Several important methodological contributions were made by this research community. Al-
though it shares important origins with OIE, the two research orientations diverged significantly
in the past century. Neo-Schumpeterian economics took off with the seminal contribution of
Nelson and Winter (1982) and put economic dynamics and technological change at centre
stage of its analysis, with formal methodology playing a bigger role than in institutionalism.
Throughout this paper I will make several references to these contributions that carry important
methodological reflections from which many institutionalists can benefit. I will also question
how ABMs might help to motivate joint research and a stronger convergence of the programs, as
advocated for by e.g. Hodgson and Stoelhorst (2014, 04).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: After giving a short introduction to ABM in
Section 2, I will study the compatibility of ABMs with key aspects of institutionalist modelling
in Section 3. Then main potentials and dangers of ABM are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes and points to directions for future research.
4.2 What Agent-Based computational models are about
ABMs are expressed via a programming language and help to understand how individual actions
lead to patterns, how these patterns in turn shape individual behavior and what dynamics result
from this interplay on the level of the societal system as a whole.
ABMs differ from the strict analytical framework of conventional economics as the modeller
is not forced to make assumptions in such a way that an equilibrium path results in the model.
They allow a realistic and dynamic representation of the system under investigation in the sense
of an evolutionary science (Veblen, 1898).
The basic idea is to specify the fundamental entities (esp. the economic agents and their
relations) in an adequate manner, and to study the systemic and dynamic consequences of this
configuration. Because the resulting system usually is not tractable analytically, one relies on
numerical simulation to solve it. This means to proceed from the assumptions about the system to
the conclusions regarding its overall dynamics. This contrasts the practice in general equilibrium
modelling (esp. Computable and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium modelling): While
these models are said to be microfounded, one has to specify the assumptions on the micro
level not solely based on their adequateness, but in such a way that they stay mathematically
tractable and are suitable to yield a stable equilibrium path. While the equilibrium is formally a
conclusion of the model, it should be seen as an implicit macro assumption that dominates the
micro assumptions of these models.
ABMs on the other hand can be evaluated on all levels: The model agents, for example, can
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be subject to microcalibration. This involves a direct test of the adequateness of the agent design.
Thanks to the specification of the agents via computer code, there is no upper limit for the
complexity of the rules other than accountability considerations (Chen (2012), see also Section
3.4). More generally, ABMs allow heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents in the sense of
Herbert Simon (rather than in the sense of modern behavioural economics) that are not atomistic,
but directly interdependent and socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985). The embeddedness is
modelled via an underlying, possibly dynamic, graph. Such a graph could represent a simple
grid or an (potentially empirical) interaction structure among the agents. Agents can also be
capable of communicating with each other and of hiding or sharing information (Moss, 2002).
Technically, agents are instantiated as a digital object that has attributes and different rules
(called ‘methods’) according to which these attributes change. Such a specification of the agents
allows the natural implementation of heuristics, learning and habits through the methods. As
each agent is a distinct digital object, one can consider situations of true uncertainty directly
without transforming uncertainty into risk (Pyka & Fagiolo, 2007).
ABMs also allow the natural inclusion of institutions, rules and networks. These phenomena
are often subsumized under the meso level of the economy, because they affect an emerging
subset of the whole population (Elsner & Heinrich, 2009).4
ABMs can include these phenomena as the methods of the agents use not only the current
state of the agent itself as an input, but may also consider the states of her neighbors, a group of
agents or the state of the system as a whole. It is therefore straightforward to study phenomena
such as reconstitutive downward effects in ABMs. Let us look at an example:
Throughout this article I will use the model of Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) as an illustration
for the usefulness of ABM. The authors study the emergence and evolution of a simple traffic
convention.5 In their model, agents drive cars on a ring structure, half of them clockwise, the
other half anti-clockwise. Every round, each driver has to decide whether she wants to drive on
the right or the left.
The authors clarify that the experimentation with different decision rules in their model
helped them to identify a surprisingly easy, but very effective decision procedure (Hodgson &
Knudsen, 2004): Drivers develop a habituation of driving either on the left or right side and the
model shows how the presence of habituation fosters a convergence to a drive-left or drive-right
4Such a notion of “meso” is slightly different to what meso means in the “micro-meso-macro” framework
of Dopfer, Foster, and Potts (2004), where a meso unit is a social rule and all its acutalizations. But this notion
of meso can also be implemented in an ABM. (Dopfer & Potts, 2004, p. 211) even use an analogy of object
oriented programming, the dominating programming approach for ABMs, to illustrate the ontology underlying their
analytical concept of “micro-meso-macro.”
5Throughout the article I will use a simple definition of emergence: An emergent property is considered a
property of either the system as a whole or of a set of several parts of the system taken together that cannot be
observed for or derived of the single constituent parts of the system alone - for either epistemological or ontological
reasons. See Kim (2006) for an introduction and Harper and Lewis (2012) for an illuminating introduction to a
special issue on this subject.
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convention. The model also shows that habit formation is not the only relevant mechanism, but
that a combination of mechanisms leads to the emergence of the convention. Due to the modular
structure of their ABM, the authors were also able to study what happens if habit is substituted
by pure inertia, and that the functioning of institutions is best interpreted as influencing habits
rather than behaviour or preferences. This shows how ABMs can be used to study different
mechanism and their mutual influences on each other in one coherent model. It also illustrates
how ABM can serve as an analytical mean within a layered ontology.
It is an interesting consequence of the generality of the agent-based approach that it contains
the formal models of neoclassical economics as one particular special case. It is also worth
noting that ABMs are well established in many sciences outside economics, e.g. urban planning,
epidemiology, logistics or ecology. In evolutionary economics, after the important contributions
of Potts (2000) and Pyka and Fagiolo (2007), it is now an established tool to study technological
change.
4.3 ABMs and the methodology of OIE
It is not straightforward to identify the methodological core of the vital and pluralistic research
program of OIE. A very good starting point is the classical paper of Myrdal (1978) under the
heading “Institutional Economics”. In the same year, Wilber and Harrison (1978) characterized
the institutionalist way of modelling as pattern modelling and came to very similar answers as
Myrdal (1978). The criteria identified by the authors are still representative for a large part of
original institutionalists work and serve as a vantage point for the question of whether ABMs
can play a role in institutionalist economics today.
Five main criteria can be identified from their work: institutionalist models are necessarily
holistic, systemic, pay particular attention to relations within a society, are evolutionary and
based on a realistic conception of economic agency. I will now scrutinize these points one by
one. Thereafter, I consider the more recent methodological trends that were identified in the
introduction.
4.3.1 Holism: The relevance of downward effects
Wilber and Harrison (1978) explicitly distinguished between holism and systemism. Holism is
considered to be the opposite of atomism and entails a focus on the pattern of relations among
the agents and the economy as a whole (Wilber & Harrison, 1978, p. 71). This expresses the
belief that the whole is not only greater than the sum of its parts, “but that the parts are so related
that their functioning is conditioned by their interrelations” (Wilber & Harrison, 1978, p. 71).
Here it is important to distinguish among ontological and epistemological holism: If holism has
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an ontological meaning, the study of agency, individual incentives and the relation among the
parts making up the whole becomes unnecessary. Such a view must not be compatible with
institutionalist theory. Institutionalists have always stressed the learning capacities of individuals,
the variety of reasons guiding their decision making, their instincts and their idle curiosity.
Such concepts are worthless to the ontological holist as they would be mere derivatives of the
social structure in which the individuals exist. More adequately, holism is understood in the
epistemological sense: In order to understand the behavior of individuals, a deep understanding
of the social structure into which they are embedded is required. This is what Wilber and
Harrison mean when they argue that the process of social change is the product of human action,
which itself is shaped and limited by the societal structures it is embedded into. While their
distinction to systemism is not clear, their use of the concept of holism suggests that both the
relations among individuals and the relation between different ontological levels of the economy
are important.
This idea is most precisely developed in the institutionalist concept of reconstitutive down-
ward effects (Hodgson, 2002, 2006, 2011): individuals, groups and the entire population are
strongly interconnected and patterns emerge because of this interconnectedness of different onto-
logical levels. These emergent patterns then shape the consciousness and behaviour of the agents
on the individual level again. They are independent of the support of the single agent but can only
be sustained if they are supported by a critical mass of agents. Because these effects arise from
the action on the lower micro level, but these actions are influenced by the effects themselves,
they are called reconstitutive downward effects. Following the current conventions, a theory
considering reconstitutive downward effects would not be termed holistic, but systemic. (Wilber
& Harrison, 1978) made use of the term holism probably as a differentiation to neoclassical
individualism. But individualism “is also rejected by systemism alone” (Bunge, 2000).
Can ABMs be consistent with a view of the economy that stresses the mutual interdependence
of its different layers? Brian Arthur, a leading figure of the complexity movement in economics
and an advocate of ABMs, described them as models in which “[b]ehaviour creates pattern; and
pattern in turn influences behavior” (Arthur, 2006, p. 1553). This is the same as to say that “parts
are at once conditioning and conditioned by the whole” (Wilber & Harrison, 1978, p. 80). In an
ABM one specifies the agents and how they behave in certain situations. The trigger for their
behaviour can be, as explained above, their own state, the state of their direct environment, the
state of a certain group or the state of the global system. As other agents, groups and the system
as a whole are also influenced by the agent herself, it is straightforward to see how the concept
of interdependent levels can be accounted for in ABMs.
One could also deal with a more refined version of such a layered ontology within an ABM:
Building on the ontology of evolutionary realism of Dopfer and Potts (2004), Dopfer et al. (2004)
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propose a micro-meso-macro framework which puts the diffusion of rules at the centre stage: In
their analytical frame, a meso unit is not simply a subset of the whole population, but a rule and
all its instantiations in the population of agents. The micro level is represented by the economic
agents, who are users and carriers of rules, and the macro level is the interrelation of different
rules (deep structure) and the corresponding carrier groups of the rules (surface structure). Here,
the technical question of whether either agents or rules or both should be modelled as classes on
their own, forces one to be extremely precise on the theoretical level and to elaborate on small
but significant differences among different ontological and analytical approaches.
4.3.2 Systemism: Organized complexity and self-organization as central
properties of social systems
For Wilber and Harrison (1978, p. 71) systemism meant that “parts (of a system) make up a
coherent whole and can be understood only in terms of the whole”. This conception of systemism
is now outdated. The idea the authors convey is that the relations among the entities of the system
under investigation matter and can lead to ontological novelties (which then may feed back on
the related entities, see section 3.1).
This idea is captured by the philosophical framework elaborated by Mario Bunge. For Bunge,
systemism means to understand everything as either a system or a part of one. The parts of a
system are related in a particular manner, giving rise to emergent properties on higher ontological
levels.6 It is interesting that Bunge uses the work of Veblen, Myrdal and Schumpeter as examples
for systemist research and thus points to the strong affinity of OIE and neo-Schumpeterian
economics.
But even more importantly for the topic of this paper, there exists a strong theoretical affinity
to the conception of complexity of Weaver (1948). His concept of organized complexity is
at the heart of complexity economics and suggests a strong complementarity among OIE and
complexity economics. Weaver contrasts complex scientific problems from simple ones:
Simple problems include only few variables and were studied by pre-1900 physics and
engineering. Problems involving living organisms can never fall into this category: they involve
too many different aspects and, because of the interrelatedness of the variables, defy ceteris
paribus assumptions (Weaver, 1948, p. 537-538).
Weaver then distinguished between problems of organized and disorganized complexity:
A system consisting of many components shows disorganized complexity if some emergent
pattern exists because the linear interactions between the different elements smooth each other
out. The Law of Large Numbers describes such an emergent pattern. Most econometric theory
6For a more detailed exposition of Bunge’s systemism and its usefulness for economists see Kapeller (2015) and
Gräbner and Kapeller (2015).
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assumes this kind of complexity when it assumes error terms to be identically and independently
distributed.
In contrast, a system showing organized complexity exhibits patterns, which emerge because
the interactions of the different elements do not smooth each other out (i.e. are non-linear).
This is the case if there exists a kind of self-organization of the system such that the factors
are interrelated into an organic whole (Weaver, 1948, p. 539). When arguing for the need of
systemic models, institutionalists implicitly say that the economy exhibits organised complexity.7
The analytical models of neoclassical economics presume the economy to show disorganized
complexity. Their unambiguous results can only be obtained by assuming mechanical agents
that interact in a linear fashion.
Many ABMs are motivated with the argument that the economy exhibits organised complexity
(Potts (2000), Miller and Page (2007)). The implementation is straightforward: Heterogeneous
agents interact with each other and their environment. As there is no requirement for the system
to exhibit any particular dynamic (esp. an equilibrium path), assumptions can be made on entirely
proper considerations. One can then conduct artificial experiments by changing an aspect of
the model and check whether an emergent pattern is the result of the change or not. One can
model the system with an adequate specification without a compulsive formalism, but with the
obligation to state any assumed process explicitly.
Again, the model of Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) is an excellent example: the authors have
one version of the model with inertia instead of habit and thus can compare the effect of this
different decision making algorithm on the overall dynamics. The resulting convention in their
model is both dependent from individuals following it, but also influences individual behaviour.
Weaver’s definition of organized complexity also suggests to relax or drop assumptions
about fictitious central planning mechanisms such as the Walrasian auctioneer, but study the
economy as an interactive and self-organizing system without central control. The concept of
self-organisation has been discussed by leading scholars of Schumpterian economics such as
Witt (1997) and Foster (2000).
It also plays a role in the discussion about Darwinian principles in economic theory: While
some consider self-organisation as an alternative to Darwinian principles (Witt, 1997), others
claim that self-organisation is an important mechanism which has to be embedded into a broader
Darwinian framework (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2010). No matter whose position is taken, the
capacity of a system to organize itself without a central planner is considered to be important
and to deserve attention.
7Again, there are important parallels to the micro-meso-macro approach of Dopfer et al. (2004) For them the
relation between different rules, rule carriers and populations of rule carriers shape the trajectory of the system.
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Practically, this means that one has to deduce the overall dynamics from the interaction of its
constituent parts. This is exactly what ABMs were invented for. The next step is to consider the
precise structure of the interaction.8
4.3.3 Social structure and networks
A systemist analysis of the economy requires one to pay attention to the relations within the
economy (Bunge, 2004, p. 188). These relations are represented by networks (or graphs).
Network science has been a lively area of research and developed both a plausible taxonomy for
empirical networks and theories of how these networks could have come into existence.
Institutionalists should build on these insights: For most systems, “structure always affects
function” (Strogatz, 2001) , so one should be very precise about this structure. But networks
are difficult to describe verbally and the relation between network structure and the economic
outcomes is usually not intuitive. In this case ABM are a very strong ally in visualizing the
mechanisms underlying real-world dynamics.
Such an application of ABM contrasts the implicit practice of neoclassical economics to
assume complete (or trivial) networks, where all agents needs to be the same. This can only be
true in trivial (complete or empty) networks. But recent studies of networks showed that small-
world or scale-free networks are ubiquitous in reality.9 Small world networks are characterized
by small average path lengths between the nodes and comparatively high degree of clustering.
Roughly speaking, in small world networks the nodes may not interact directly with one
another but the number of middlenodes required to connect two randomly chosen nodes is usually
small. Additionally, there are groups of nodes that are very closely connected to each other,
i.e. where the probability that there is an connection between two group members is extremely
high. The constituent feature of scale free networks is that there are very few nodes with a lot
of connections to other nodes, and very many nodes with very few connections to other nodes.
More precisely, the distribution of the number of neighbours (i.e. the degree of the nodes) follows
a power law.
How these networks influence the distributional properties of an economic system can be
8An interesting concept in this context is that of self-organizing criticality. Open systems show self-organized
criticality if the system is characterized by a self-organizing process (e.g. the interactions of the agents) that leads to
a critical state of the system, i.e. a state of the system that is robust to small changes, but frequently experiences
‘avalanches’ of change, after the changes cumulated in a specific way. For more information on and applications of
this concept using ABM see e.g. Moss (2002).
9The issue is much more complex than presented here and empirical networks be described using different
statistics or the sake of the argument, the following coarse grained description suffices for our purposes. See the
excellent (and freely available) introduction to network theory of van Steen (2010) for further details.
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studied via ABM. Albin and Foley (1992), for example, considered changing network structures
in the general equilibrium framework and showed how a shift from central to de-central organi-
zation has severe distributional effects. Their model remained very abstract and one would not
classify it as an institutionalist model. They exemplify, however, the huge consequences of a
small change in the underlying network structure. This insight is important for institutionalists
when describing the stratification of real-world economies, because networks play an important
role for the observed stratification (and unequal distribution of wealth).
In order to figure out how this role looks like, one must build on a formal assessment of these
network structures, particularly because network structures are a catalysator to other aspects
(Page, 2012). To have these results in mind is important for the construction of purely verbal
models as well. Economic networks of directly interdependent agents acting without any central
control are ubiquitous in current times: The increasing fragmentation of valued added chains,
the growing importance of network-based information and tele-communication technologies,
and the ever more centralized industrial structure with few huge corporations and many smaller,
globally dispersed, sub-contractors (and the resulting hub and spoke networks) make it essential
to pay attention to the underlying network structure in the economic system under consideration.
ABM can be an indispensable tool if one wishes to explain rather than just to describe the role
of network structures: problems including network structures quickly become intractable in an
analytical sense. Purely verbal models, on the other hand, are not accurate enough to capture
important differences of various network structures, even in a qualitative way.
4.3.4 Evolution and agency
As an alternative to neoclassical equilibrium analysis, institutionalists developed concepts such
as circular cumulative causation, path dependence and reconstitutive downward effects. Much
appeal of ABM stems from the fact that they can constitute non-linear dynamical systems
exhibiting such non-ergodic properties, based on intuitive (behavioral) assumptions (Edmonds,
1999; Arthur, 2006). For neoclassical models (in the wider sense) it usually requires quite a bit
of axiomatic variation (Kapeller, 2011) to derive such properties within their optimization-cum-
equilibrium framework.
Evolutionary economists have already recognized the usefulness of ABM when developing
the concept of “History-friendly models” (Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, & Winter, 2001; Orsenigo,
2007). This concept tries to bridge the extremes of conducting very detailed and specific case
studies, and to design abstract and general theories:10 One starts with concrete case studies and
then expresses the verbal arguments rigorously in a formal language. For such purposes, the
10Note that these arguments are very similar to those of Radzicki (1988), who argued for the application of
system dynamic models in OIE.
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formalism has to be sufficiently flexible to include sufficiently realistic assumptions. ABMs
meet this criterion. The parameters of the resulting model get calibrated according to empirical
observations or on the basis of sound theoretical assumptions. Then the model is used to assess
the empirical consistency, robustness and generality of the verbal arguments by comparing the
resulting dynamics of the model to the true dynamics of the case study. If one is able to replicate
past behaviour of the system by having identified the central causal mechanisms, one can change
the model in order to construct alternative histories, e.g. to assess certain policy interventions.
History-friendly models are a nice example of a concept that has been developed largely
in the evolutionary economics community, but is highly relevant for OIE thinkers, e.g. for the
study of institutional change. Murmann and Homburg (2001) stress that rigorous case studies
are a prerequisite to proceed to the formal (history-friendly) model. OIE scholars have already
developed many of such historically grounded case studies and can build upon this work. For
this task, ABMs have proven successful (Malerba et al., 2001).
But the evolutionary flavor of ABMs is not limited to the aggregated level: The agents
themselves are not static and rational, but can be boundedly rational and adaptive. Their
reasoning is not necessarily deductive, but, following psychological evidence, can be inductive
and based on heuristics. They are not isolated representative entities, but socially embedded
agents (Edmonds, 1999; Pyka & Fagiolo, 2007).
An adequate representation of the economic agents is not only an important tool to make
models evolutionary in the institutionalist sense. It also contrasts the instrumentalist use of ratio-
nal agents of neoclassical economics with a representation of the economic actor that involves an
adequate level of descriptive accuracy. It helps to develop models that meet empirical findings
on different ontological levels (Pyka & Fagiolo, 2007).
This aligns well with the research praxis of institutionalists not to stop with the postulation of
a certain preference relation but to elaborate and justify their particular behavioral assumptions
more concretely. More concrete motives include a thirst for power, altruism, an instinct of
workmanship, idle curiosity, conspicuous consumption and time and space dependent habits (see
Rengs and Wäckerle (2014) for a concrete example).
Again, there are strong convergences between OIE and modern evolutionary economics:
Both seek a more realistic conception of economic agents and argue for assumptions justifiable
by evolutionary theory, termed “the principle of evolutionary explanation” by Hodgson (2004, p.
157).
Developing an adequate conception of agency for ABMs consistent with this principle repre-
sents an alternative research trajectory than that of neoclassical economics: realism of its agents
is less important and a common reaction to criticisms of the utility-maximising homo oeco-
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nomicus has been the use of more and more complex utility functions (e.g. by including social
preferences or by adding ‘decision defects’). Thus, it missed the essence of Herbert Simon’s idea
of bounded rationality, according to which agents reduce the complexity of their decision process
due to a lack of computational capacity. They employ heuristics to cope with the complexity
of their environment, rely on institutions and make decisions more inductively than deductively.11
ABMs can follow this more promising research trajectory using institutional and evolutionary
theory. Already the work of Herbert Simon highlighted how adequately human reasoning can
be represented via algorithms.12 More sophisticated decision procedures could be included
using genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms represent heuristics that help to solve optimization
problems in a satisfactory way if a straightforward maximization is not feasible. It starts with
a set of possible solutions to a problem, evaluates them according to a criterion, combines
them randomly based on their performance and evaluates the resulting combinations again. By
proceeding this way, the results usually become better and better. Such algorithms mimic the
principles of natural selection and can explain not only many biological phenomena but also how
certain instincts and behavioral habits have come into existence (Mitchell, 1999).
When employed on agents, they can help to simulate the learning behaviour of agents and
their way of adapting to their environmental requirements. This is one source for the ability of
ABMs to describe non-reversible dynamics and to resemble the principle of (circular) cumulative
causation and the path dependence of real world dynamics.
4.3.5 Newer trends in evolutionary and institutional economics
In addition to the core principles of institutionalist methodology discussed above, it is necessary
to have a closer look on actual methodological trends within institutionalism.
Important methodological conclusions emerged from the discussions about the potential
application of (evolutionary) game theory and system dynamics in institutionalist research: In
both cases, the formal models were motivated by the observation that traditional, mainly verbal,
pattern modelling does not allow for sufficient logical depth and rigour to address complex situa-
tions with different mechanisms playing an important role (Radzicki, 1988; Heap & Varoufakis,
2004; M. C. Vilena & Vilena, 2004). These arguments apply in a similar manner for ABM: it
allows to formalize different mechanisms very precisely without coming up with an analytical
straitjacket limiting the descriptive richness of the resulting model.
11Velupillai and Zambelli (2011) used the term “modern behavioural economics” to contrast the neoclassical
approach to bounded rationality in contrast to the “classical” approach from Herbert Simon and Alan Turing, among
others.
12In particular, the logical theorist, one of the machines built by Simon and Allen Newell, was the first machine
that could prove mathematical theorems and solve logical puzzles on its own and in the same manner than humans
do.
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Another discourse is about a closer orientation of OIE on Darwinian core principles: Some
argue that evolutionary economics necessarily have to be built upon the Darwinian principles
of variation, selection and replication (e.g. Hodgson (2002) or Hodgson and Knudsen (2010)).
Others claim that these principles are of great importance to understand and define the framework
conditions of economic activity (such as humans cognitive capacities, instincts, etc.), but are
ill-suited to study the resulting dynamics and cultural evolution within the actual economic
sphere (e.g. Witt (2004) and Cordes (2006)).
None of the two positions is incompatible with ABM. To the contrary: both approaches
emphasize the importance of a realistic conception of economic agents, their habits, heuristics
and cognitive abilities. As illustrated earlier, ABMs can be useful in this context. The same can
be said of out-of-equilibrium dynamics and self-organisation.
In the end, none of the actual methodological trends changes the classical cornerstones
fundamentally and all of them are likely to profit from the application of ABM.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Major chances...
While the proceeding section focused on how ABMs fit into the general criteria of institutionalist
pattern modelling, I now make some more general statements about how ABMs can contribute
to institutionalist research.
Identification of causal mechanisms ABMs help to identify whether a factor or mechanism
is sufficient or necessary to produce a certain pattern. In sharp contrast to the ceteris paribus
analysis in neoclassical economics, it studies the dynamic interaction effects of several factors or
mechanisms (e.g. the role of networks as a catalysator for other factors as discussed in Section
3.3). Such interaction effects are difficult to identify in purely verbal models. Furthermore,
ABMs can help to study how in an open system different initial states and trajectories can lead
to the same long term behaviour. For open systems, this property is known as equifinality. It is
important to identify equifinality because in order to explain an observed phenomenon, it might be
insufficient to provide one universal explanation. In open systems, the same phenomenon can be
reached via very different ways and from very different initial conditions. It is therefore important
to provide a constructive explanation of a phenomenon, i.e. to show the exact mechanism that
leads to the presence of the phenomenon of interest, and what other factors can yield the same
result. Such a constructive explanation is naturally implemented in ABMs.
Generalization of case study results Case studies are much more common in the institution-
alist literature than in conventional economics. This may partly be because facing the trade-off
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between accuracy and generality, mainstream economists tend to favour the latter in order to
allow a wide area of applicability (Gilboa, Postlewaite, Samuelson, & Schmeidler, 2014) while
institutionalists favour accuracy above generality.
There are some exceptional, more general theories developed by great institutional minds such
as Gunnar Myrdal (circular cumulative causation), Clarence Ayres (the nature of technology and
skills), and Thorstein Veblen (e.g. conspicuous consumption, institutional life cycle). Although
Diesing (1971) considers these concepts to be a mere grouping of real cases, I prefer to see them
as mechanisms taking place in different real world situations.
Following the example of history-friendly models, we saw how ABM can help to proceed
from the appreciative learning from cases to a formal model illustrating a general mechanism (cf.
Nelson and Winter (1982)).
In this way, ABMs represent a more rigorous way than the vague concept of contextual
validation of Wilber and Harrison (1978). Due to their accessibility to a wide range of verification
techniques on different scales (microcalibration, macrocalibration,...), ABM can help to compare
institutionalist models much more concisely with observed data than a verbal analysis, but more
transparently and appropriately than a purely econometric analysis.
Consideration of scaling effects Not all properties of a system are emergent. Some are only
an aggregation of the individual components. An interesting question is therefore to what size
a system, e.g. the society, can be reduced (or ‘scaled’) without losing its emergent properties.
Emergent properties that are the result of interactions among the components might require a
certain minimum group size of components that interact directly and indirectly with each other.
To understand this minimum group size means to study the degree of scale invariance of the
properties. It can conveniently be carried out via ABMs by controlling for the number of the
agents considered. Such a study is relevant for many applied institutionalist concepts such as the
varieties of capitalism research program and the evolution of cooperation in communities.
Increased transparency Recent incidents such as the misleading study of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) were grist to the mills of all critics of formal modelling in general. But such criticism
goes too far. Formalization, if done and assessed carefully, can improve the transparency of
theories significantly compared to purely verbal descriptions:
ABMs, as a particular kind of formalization, combines the advantages of verbal descriptions,
i.e. the flexibility to choose assumptions based on empirical or theoretical convincing arguments,
rather than tractability considerations, and analytical models, i.e their precision and rigour. ABM
can be considered the ‘golden middle’ between these two extremes.
As such they allow an extremely rigorous test of the validity of the formalized arguments:
Every assumption needs to be represented via the computer code. In the ideal case, the code
gets published after the publication of the model: everybody could check how the results depend
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on the assumptions and the replication of the study gets simplified. Such ‘open source’ ABMs
guarantee a maximum level of transparency about how the researcher comes from his assumptions
to the conclusions, as the very process of deduction becomes itself subject for public assessment.
Many authors already distribute their code on request which makes it easy to use their models
for educational means, e.g. in graduate training.
Better policy advice Building upon all the aforementioned points, ABMs are predestined to
elaborate reasonable policy advice. This usefulness is one of the main arguments in favour of
their application within institutionalism.
They may not only provide analogies, but provide concrete results which are subject to
replicability and critical scrutiny by all parties involved. Also, due to the fact that the state of
each agent is not necessarily expressed in only one dimension, ABMs are able to provide a
multidimensional perspective considering inconvertible properties such as ‘literacy’ and ‘income’.
This has been advocated by institutionalists ever since (Myrdal, 1978) and helps to avoid abstract
concepts such as ‘utility’, which can become misleading when elaborating policy advice.
In this context, history-friendly models provide a nice example of potential collaboration
among evolutionary and institutionalist economists. Their ‘alternative histories’ produced by
history-friendly models represent an optimal base for a discourse on adequate policy responses.
And while the existing models focus very much on the evolution of industries and technologies,
institutions have so far been a less active area of research.
Another important advantage in this context is the constructive character of ABMs: In a
dynamic economy, it is important to take adjustment paths into account. And while many
analytical models are not capable of describing the exact adjustment paths (e.g. game theoretic
models hinting to an existing Nash equilibrium), ABMs truly generate their results step by step
in a transparent manner (Epstein & Axtell, 1996).
4.4.2 ...and major challenges
The application of ABMs is, of course, not without difficulties. These are in particular the
following:
Instrumental tendencies ABMs tempt researchers to take a constructionist-instrumental stand-
point that seems to be incompatible with institutionalist epistemology and ontology. Instru-
mentalists do not try to describe the reality accurately but consider their theories to be mere
instruments replicating observed data.
As institutionalists have been skeptical to the idea that economic outcomes can be predictable
at all, their focus has always been on building explanatory models. ABMs are, of course,
simplified abstractions of real world economies. But strictly speaking they share this property
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with any model, including verbal models.
But as ABMs do not necessarily include the dominant equilibrium condition, they can include
different mechanisms, others than the aggregation of the behavior of utility-maximising agents.
This allows a mechanism-based rather than a prediction-oriented study of the overall system.13
Implicit focus on predictive power Related to the preceding difficulty, ABMs are frequently
used to predict economic outcomes. In this sense, they are perfectly compatible with Friedmans
methodological instrumentalism. If one tries to explain an economic phenomenon of a certain
time period via the use of an ABM, one might be tempted to proceed a few time periods more
in order to predict the further development of the system. One might then tune the model in
a way that the predictions fit one’s theoretical convictions and in turn accept a lower level of
explanatory accuracy. Such an approach is difficult to be identified later on and requires an
intensive review of the ABM.
Overerparametrization and decreased transparency ABMs tend to be overparametrized.
Overparametrization means adding variables, processes and methods until one gets a very good
fit to data or is able to create the patterns one wishes to explain. Overparametrization yields
extremely complicated models that are very hard to review and hard to discuss. Good ABMs
can help to identify important factors and to increase the transparency of a study, bad ABMs do
the reverse. The problem of overparametrization of ABMs is well known and there has been an
enormous progress in developing methods to test for overparametrization.
Such tests are difficult and cumbersome, however. They require excellent knowledge of the
relevant literature. Newcomers must often rely on the judgements of others. But one must recog-
nize that other quantitative models and verbal models are also vulnerable to overparametrization.
It is therefore important to have this problem in mind, but not to throw the baby out with the
bath water. One must never forget that the contrary, ‘underparametrization’, can be misleading
as well.
4.4.3 ABMs are compatible with the Institutionalist approach
Based on the above said one can conclude that ABMs may be affine to institutionalist pattern
modelling. There are some qualifications to this conclusion, however.
ABMs are abstract mathematical models and must be embedded into a more general process
story to get explanatory significance. This process story should be consistent with the criteria for
institutionalist storytelling and provide strong theoretical underpinnings for the ABM. Especially,
the assumptions must be justified and the range of applicability of the models be clarified. It
13This has been particularly the case since the dominance of the programming paradigm called object oriented
programming (OOP). The idea behind OOP is to build programs by defining objects corresponding to some entity
in the real world, and methods on these objects corresponding to processes in the real world.
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is crucially important that it is always the theory that dictates the choice of the formalism, not
vice versa. The overall insights of a study can never be reduced to the model outcome - only
the interpretation of the results in the broader and therefore necessarily verbal discussion yield
scientific progress.
After having considered the case of OIE, some concluding thoughts about ABM in insti-
tutional economics in general might be in order: Many of the arguments made above also
apply to new institutionalism: Especially the Austrian wing of new institutionalism may profit
from the application of ABMs. Leading scholars such as Hayek have always accentuated the
self-organizing nature of the economy and the important role of human agency. Self-organization
and a rich agency can, as has been made clear, be successfully studied in the ABM framework.
4.5 Conclusion
I have argued that ABMs can be a valuable heuristic and analytical tool for institutionalist
research. They are useful for building holistic, systemic and evolutionary models in the sense of
Wilber and Harrison (1978) and Myrdal (1978). This paper also contributed to institutionalist
methodology in a more general way by showing that it is modern systemism that best describes
the institutionalist perspective on the economy. Wilber and Harrison (1978) would have chosen
this term to describe institutionalist pattern models if they had written their article today.
All considered, this article suggests institutionalists to be open-minded to the application of
ABMs as they entail a large potential to clarify important and so far unresolved questions. This
is particular true for phenomena related to networks, aggregation (and scaling) behaviour and the
development of policy measures. They entail the desirable rigor of a more formal analysis, but
avoid the compulsory formalism of neoclassical economics: They could be seen as the golden
middle between a purely verbal and a formalistic approach to modelling. As even the process
of building a model may already help to get new insights into the subject, they can also be
considered to be a topos, i.e. a concept making the researcher ask important questions about the
subject of investigation.
Unfortunately, to get started with ABMs is not a trivial task. ABM projects are usually
realized by a group of researchers, including people with good programming skills. Yet it is
important to learn about the basics of building ABMs, even if you collaborate with other scientists
who support you in the implementation. The following resources will be helpful to get a better
intuition for ABM: Leight Tesfatsion’s website provides an excellent overview over existing
resources, including tutorials and online courses. Axelrod and Tesfatsion (2006) is meant as a
guide for newcomers to ABM and the handbook of Edmonds and Edmonds and Meyer (2013)
includes many useful contributions for beginners. Finally, the Complexity Explorer project from
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the Santa Fe institute offers an online course on ABM in Netlogo.
This paper suggests several lines for further research: In particular, neo-Schumpeterian and
OIE scholars should consider joint projects under the methodological umbrella of ABM: This
will be particularly fruitful for policy-relevant cases, where institutional and technological change
are both important. Many synergies are to be exploited. Several institutionalist applications of
ABM, such as Hodgson and Knudsen (2004), Elsner and Heinrich (2009), Heinrich and Dai
(2014) and Rengs and Wäckerle (2014) could serve as vantage points for such research.
Further research may also address how the application of ABMs relates to critical realism,
which has been becoming a more popular philosophical basis for institutionalist modelling. It
tends to be even more sceptical of any kind of formalization.
Such an investigation might further clarify the relation between critical realism and institu-
tionalism and may further strengthen the methodological base of institutionalist modelling.
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Chapter 5
Formal Approaches to Socio Economic
Analysis - Past and Perspectives
Chapter Abstract
This chapter is motivated by the observation that (1) socio economic analysis uses significantly
less formalisms than mainstream economics, and (2) that there exist numerous situations in
which socio economics could benefit from a more formal analysis. This is particularly the case
when institutions play an important role in the system to be investigated.
Starting with a broad conception of a formalism, this paper introduces and discusses five
different formal approaches regarding their adequateness for socio economic analysis: The
Social Fabric Matrix Approach, the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, System
Dynamics, (Evolutionary) Game Theory, and Agent Based Computational Modeling.
Every formalism entails implicit ontological and epistemological tendencies that have to be
reflected on if the formalism should contribute to a better understanding of the system under
investigation. The above mentioned formalisms are no exception. Therefore, this paper pays
particular attention to these tendencies.
In the end, antagonisms and possible convergences among the formalisms are discussed.
This chapter has been accepted for publication as a regular research article in the Forum for Social Economics




“The tool kit is not as important as the perspective, but it is imperative for giving
the perspective meaning in any applied sense.”
Hayden (1982, p. 638)
To conduct a socio-economic analysis means to seek understanding of the relationship between
the economy and society. The role of social and economic institutions plays a key role in any
such attempt and a natural overlap between the schools of social and institutional economics
exists.
This is particularly true for the part of institutional economics termed original institutional
economics (OIE). The other part, the new institutional economics (NIE), puts scarcity and
competition at a central stage of analysis, considers markets as a superior way to allocate scarce
resources in a society (Ménard & Shirley, 2014, Special Issue 04, p. 557) and shares the con-
viction that institutions must be explained with (at best boundedly) rational individuals as the
starting point. Only limited attention is given to the question of how their preferences come
about (Hodgson, 2004, p. 6). Despite this limited scope, new institutionalists have produced
many more formal models than socio economists or original institutionalists.
This paper was motivated by the observation that while formal analysis plays a more promi-
nent role in NIE, it is used quite sparely in the overlapping work of OIE and socio economics.
Why is this the case and could a more extensive use of formalisms increase the productivity of
social economics as a discipline? Are social economists and original institutionalists against
formal arguments per se?
A closer inspection shows that at least the latter supposition is wrong. The rejection of many
common mainstream formalisms is based on specific and reasonable arguments, e.g the critique
of the orthodox optimization-cum-equilibrium approach for requiring an excessive and specific
reduction of complexity to keep its models tractable. Also, Galbraith (1967), among others,
convincingly argued that powerful economic actors make their strategic choices not mainly as a
reaction to their environment, but mainly in order to change this environment. Galbraith uses the
example of big business corporations to illustrate this point. This form of different motivations
and a mutual interdependency of choices and the agent’s environment is rarely captured in a
formal analysis.
Similarly, a socio economic analysis requires the consideration of values, traditions, habits
and the different motives governing the behaviour of economic agents. To consider these aspects
adequately in a formalism similar to that of orthodox neoclassical economics (that includes many
implicit value judgements itself) is impossible.
Another source for the sceptimism against formal models stems from Veblen (2011[1908]).
For Veblen, mathematics “in its pure form” is a logical discipline only. Its results are only
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assessed regarding their logical consistency or elegance and it deals with logic, rather than
the “ephemeral traits acquired by habituation” (Veblen, 2011[1908], p. 489). It is therefore
“independent of the detail-discipline of daily life” and “independent of cultural circumstances”.
This statement aligns well with Veblen’s claim that modern, i.e. evolutionary, sciences can
by definition only get to transitional results, as their fundamental postulate is that of continuous
change in the real world. And if there is continuous change, all results are time (and probably
space) dependent and thus provisional. This perspective is shared by many socio-economists,
but is incompatible with the equilibrium approach that underlies the majority of economic
models today (Jo, 2011). These models are criticized for neglecting the the cumulative change
that has led to the current state of affairs and are not considered to provide valuable insights
as they can only be seen as small snapshots within greater societal dynamics. A related cri-
tique argues that mathematical models too often create a model world that does not represent
anything in the real world, neither whose mechanisms resemble the mechanisms of the real world.
This criticism certainly applies to some mathematical models, but there is no a priori reason
to believe that it applies to all. Mäki (2009) developed a framework, the functional decomposition
approach to modeling, that, from a realist perspective, helps to scrutinize the extent a model
represents the real world. This clearly shows that not all mathematical models constitute what
Mäki calls substitute systems, i.e. artificial systems that are studied in place of the real world,
rather than in order to understand the real world. 1
All the formalisms considered in this paper do not fall into the latter category. Neither are
they “mathematics in its pure form”. They include or require a theoretical framework into which
they are embedded and which guides their interpretation: A mathematical function in a model is
nothing more than a function. The theory motivating the models helps to interpret this function
with respect to the real world. These interpretations have to be rigorous and transparent. If
they are not, the criticism of Veblen will apply and the model gets separated from daily life and
its institutions (Veblen, 2011[1908], p. 490). But the examples discussed in this paper hint at
how one can circumvent these problems through an adequate theoretical framework, as will be
illustrated during the exposition of the different formalisms.
This paper discusses some formalisms that I consider to be particularly attractive candidates
for socio economic analysis. Each of them has particular advantages that can enhance socio
economic analysis in a particular sense, be it, e.g., an increase of the logical depth of the argument
(game theory, system dynamics), the possibility to study phenomena that cannot be subject to
verbal analysis (agent based models) or by structuring the overall assessment (SFM and IAD).
All of them have to be treated with some care as formalisms always shape the analysis in a
certain, often not obvious way. Consequently, I will pay particular attention to the implicit
1I have extended this framework and illustrated its usefulness for the examples of agent-based models and
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models in Gräbner (2015b).
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epistemological and ontological tendencies of the formalisms.
At this point it seems to be adequate to define what I mean when using the term ‘formalism’.
In a very narrow sense, a formalism denotes any abstract language, such as mathematical or
logical formulas, or a computer language. We may call these formalisms in the narrow sense.
But to limit the term to systems of such expressions seems to be too restrictive for our purpose:
A table that is to be completed via verbal words and then carries a specific message can also be
considered a formalism: Its structure carries information and shapes the meaning of the words
that have been used to complete it.2 The working definition we will use for such a formalism in
the broader sense defines it as a set of abstract or specific objects that are related to each other
in a certain way and which can be specified further in the course of analysis. Such a definition
captures the central idea of a formalism: A pre-defined set of variables and a pre-defined set
of relations that are then put together and specified by the modeller who makes use of this
formalism. The notion of pre-specification is key: It carries meaning that has to be reflected on
if the formalism is to be used successfully.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section I present four formalisms
that have already been used successfully in institutionalist theory and that I consider to have
particular potential for socio-economic analysis.3 In section 5.3 I propose agent-based models
as another useful formalism in this sense. As it is not yet well established in current research
praxis, I spend some more space on explaining its affinity to social economics. Section 5.4, after
introducing a useful taxonomy for the formalisms, discusses their ontological and epistemological
tendencies and elaborates on potential complementarities and antagonisms among them. Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Established Formal Approaches
5.2.1 The Social Fabric Matrix
The Social Fabric Matrix Approach (SFM-A) was developed by Hayden (1982) and summarized
recently in Hayden (2006a). Since its invention it has been used by institutionalists many times
and represents one formalism consistent with OIE methodology. See Fullwiler, Elsner, and
Natarajan (2009) for a detailed assesment of this claim and a number of case studies illustrating
the substantial usefulness of the approach. As such it seems to be a natural candidate to study
institutions within a broader social economic analysis. A SFM is a map that includes all the
2The social fabric matrix and the institutional analysis and development framework are examples of formalisms
in this broader sense.
3Note that there are other formalisms that have been successfully applied by socio-economists. Yet, it is
impossible to consider all of them in this single paper. The selection was made in accordance with my impression
about the overall relevance of the formalisms, the degree of controversy associated with their application and with
my personal preference. For an overview on other candidates see Radzicki (2003), F. Lee and Cronin (forthcoming
2015) or the special issue of the American Journal of Economics & Sociology (F. S. Lee, 2011).
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relevant components of the system under investigation and represents the relations and flows
between these components.
When written in matrix form, the rows and columns represent the different components of
the system that the researcher has identified. See figure 5.1a for an example. The rows contain
all the delivering components, the columns, the receiving components and the values in the
cells denote either the existence or absence of a direct relation among the components (if only
boolean values are allowed) or the strength of the relationship (if the value is some measure for
the existent flow). Note, however, that the SFM is a multidimensional tool, i.e. the relations
and flows of the SFM are not necessarily measured by the same unit - this distinguishes it from
simple Input-Output matrices.
Thus the matrix gives an overview of all the relevant flows in the system under investigation.
But, for many researchers an even more important point, the process of completing the matrix
helps one to ask new and relevant questions on the subject matter and to discover components
and relationships that would have stayed unconsidered otherwise (Fullwiler et al., 2009, p. 12).
The SFM can therefore be considered a heuristic forcing the researcher to think about the whole
system in which the concrete problem is embedded into and to identify the relevant variables
and relationships of this system. Because there are no pre-completed SFM, the researcher has to
build her matrix anew from scratch, which forces her to justify her selection of relevant factors
explicitly. The flexibility of the matrix prevents unreflected reference to standards, a common
mistake in the application of many formalisms. To the contrary, the matrix stimulates researchers
to be explicit about their subjective valuations.
As the matrix can naturally be interpreted as the adjacency matrix of a graph, the matrix
shown in figure 5.1a could also be represented in graph form, see figure 5.1b. If the matrix was
completed using boolean values denoting the existence or the absence of a relation between two
components, the result would be a simple digraph. If the values in the cells were a measure for
the degree of relation, a weighted digraph would result - although the different weights are not
necessarily comparable.
The interpretation of the SFM as an adjacency matrix yields many advantages. In particular,
one can use numerous useful graph theoretic concepts to deepen one’s understanding of the
system under investigation: For the resulting graph, reachability problems can be studied: In the
logic of a graph, a reachability problem asks for the existence of a path from node v1 to node v2.
In the context of the SFM this asks how different components are indirectly interrelated, and,
if the graph specification includes weights, how intense the interrelatedness is. One can also
compute the degree distribution or other measures of centrality in order to assess the relative
influence of the different components.
The SFM-A is probably the most widely used integrated framework within OIE. It has
been developed particularly for institutionalist analysis, and numerous scholars have used it
in their analysis.4 Users stress that the matrix helps to structure research, suggests ever new
4For a corresponding compilation see Hayden (2006a), or consider Tool (2003) and Fullwiler et al. (2009) for a
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(b) The SFM represented as a directed
graph.
Figure 5.1: An example of an SFM (subset of the original matrix) and a corresponding graph,
based on Hoffman and Hayden (2007).
interesting questions and forces the researcher to take a systemic perspective on the system under
investigation (Fullwiler et al., 2009). Furthermore, it does not require any inappropriate reduction
of complexity or abstraction from dynamics and is flexible enough to consider many different
aspects of the system, reaching from environmental variables over institutions and organizations
to the value system and persistent behavioral patterns. Especially when interpreted as a directed
graph, it has helped to generate surprising and policy relevant results, e.g. by considering the
contractual structure associated with the construction of a nuclear dump side by the Central
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact in Nebraska, USA, in collaboration with several big
companies. Hayden and Bolduc (2000) were able to reveal the corresponding costs for the public
that are, due to the contractual structure and the resulting system of positive feedback loops,
much higher than one initially would have expected. As a consequence of these results, the
project was abandoned.
5.2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The IAD is a general framework for the study of institutions and their development over time.
It was developed mainly by Ostrom (1990)5 and has been applied in many different occasions.
For Ostrom, frameworks are meant to illustrate the elements and relationship required for the
analysis at a most general level and thus to structure the following inquiry (Ostrom, 2011, p. 8).
The IAD is structured as illustrated in figure 5.2.
At the center stage of the framework is the action situation. This is the arena in which the
actors (inter)act and from which the dynamics of the system are triggered. The identification of
the action situation is one of the first steps the researcher has to take after the problem at hand
summary of the impact the SFM-A had on public policy.
5A more thorough introduction can be found in Ostrom (2005).
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Figure 5.2: An illustration of the IAD, following Ostrom (2005, p. 15).
positions at particular nodes may, must, or must not take. Scope rules delimit the
potential outcomes that can be affected and, working backward, the actions linked to
specific outcomes. Choice rules, combined with the scientific laws about the relevant
states of the world being acted upon, determine the shape of the decision tree that
links actions to outcomes. Aggregation rules affect the level of control that a partici-
pant in a position exercises in the selection of an action at a node. Information rules
affect the knowledge-contingent information sets of participants. Payoff rules affect
the benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and
outcomes, and they establish the incentives and deterrents for action. The set of
working rules is a configuration in the sense that the effect of a change in one rule
may depend upon the other rules-in-use.
Let us return to the example of conducting an analysis of common-pool
resources (see Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000). Now I will focus on a series of
questions that are intended to help the analyst get at the rules-in-use that help
structure an action situation. Thus, to understand these rules, one would begin to ask
questions such as:
• Boundary rules: Are the appropriators from this resource limited to local resi-
dents; to one group defined by ethnicity, race, caste, gender, or family structure;
to those who win a lottery; to those who have obtained a permit; to those who
own required assets (such as a fishing berth or land); or in some other way
limited to a class of individuals that is bounded? Is a new participant allowed to
join a group by some kind of entry fee or initiation? Must an appropriator give





























Figure 3. Rules as Exogenous Variables Directly Affecting the Elements of an Action Situation.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 189).
20 Policy Studies Journal, 39:1
Figure 5.3: A closer illustration of the action situation, taken from Ostrom (2011, p. 20).
has been defined. As illustrated in figure 5.2, the action situation is embedded into a broader
analysis:
The environmental conditions, the attributes6 of the community and its rules all have sig-
nificant influence on the action and interaction of the individuals. Sometimes the outcomes
from the action situation influence the environmental conditions which then in turn act upon the
action situation. The emerging feedback loops can be identified and clarified using the IAD.In
the very simplest c se, however, one assum s th external variables to be constant and focuses
one’s analysis on the action situation alone. Figure 5.3 illustrates how the analysis of the action
situation proc eds. Usually ne develops a particular model to study the a tion situati n in more
detail. For Ostrom, several models can be derived from the same theory, and different theories
are compatible with the IAD. It is therefore entirely possible to model the action situation using
6Attributes of a community include, but are not limited to, the level of trust and reciprocity, habits, the value
structure or cultural dispositions.
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purely neoclassical models, game theoretic models or any other kind of model (e.g. agent based
models, see section 5.3).
If one treats the variables marked as ‘external’ in figure 5.2 as exogenous variables, one is
concerned only with a model including the seven aspects illustrated in figure 5.3: The set of
actors containing all individuals involved, the set of positions the individuals can occupy (e.g.
managers, employees, members of an association, etc.), the set of actions that the individuals
can take, the description of the control individuals have on their choices (i.e. are decisions made
in isolation, or do individuals act on the behalf of others?) and the information available to the
individuals, the set of potential outcomes of the aggregated individual actions and a description
of how these outcomes represent costs or benefits to the individuals. All relevant information
has to be gathered before the actual modeling process can begin. Then one makes assumptions
about the behaviour of the individuals, their wishes, beliefs, their capacities, and so on. Although
the most widely used approach would be to use the conventional neoclassical utility maximizer
as a starting point, this is by no means required by the IAD. To the contrary, the questions
suggested by the IAD point to a more realistic and socially embedded actor. The experiments of
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) on the mechanisms underlying sustainable self-organization
of common goods within communities were motivated by the observation that, if one tries to
understand how communities manage their common goods without running into the problems
of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’, the conventional game theoretic individual will not be an
adequate candidate for the individuals in the action arena. Therefore, Ostrom refined her model
of individuals within the broader IAD framework.
In many situations, it does not seem to be adequate to consider the action situation in isolation
and to assume the external variables to be exogenous. For a systemic scrutiny of the problem
at hand, as it is required in institutionalist pattern models (Wilber & Harrison, 1978; Gräbner,
2015a), one models the external variables endogenously. Ostrom (2011) suggests a taxonomy
according to which one can incorporate the rules of the community under investigation into
the action situation, as illustrated in figure 5.3. Such a refinement is entirely possible in and
suggested by the IAD which could in general be interpreted as a sophisticated topos guiding the
researcher’s thinking, rather than a full-fledged modeling tool.
Another crucial part of the IAD is the very right part of figure 5.2: The evaluation of the
dynamics resulting from the action arena. The evaluation criteria must be specified by the re-
searcher in advance and depending on her theoretical orientation they can include only aggregate
and monetary measures, or can be multidimensional, as required for a social economic analysis.
Summarizing the above: The IAD framework is an extremely general framework that is
compatible with many different theoretical directions. It has gained an enormous popularity
among scientists and practitioners and is now used in various scientific communities, see Ostrom
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(2005) or Hodgson (2013a, 04) for compilations of work consistent with a socio-economic
viewpoint. These examples show that the value position of the researchers can be made very
explicit due to the prominent role attached to evaluative criteria and that cultural habits, beliefs
etc. can be included into the analysis of the action situation, allowing a truly systemic perspective
on the problem at hand. It is to be noted, though, that the perspective of the IAD is much more
focused on individual action than the SFM-A: The action situation is at the center stage, and
the overall dynamics are derived from the arena, even if a continuous feedback between action
situation, resulting outcomes and the subsystems of the entire system is possible. This issue will
be discussed in more detail in section 5.4.
5.2.3 System Dynamics
System dynamics was originally developed by Forrester (1971) and introduced into institutional-
ist economics by Radzicki (1988), who argued that institutionalist pattern modeling (Wilber &
Harrison, 1978) lacks structure, rigor and precision.7 He hoped to address these shortcomings
through the application of system dynamics, i.e. the computerization of the original pattern
models (Radzicki, 1988, p. 636). For him, the computational modeling technique of system
dynamics represents a computational approach not only broadly consistent with traditional
institutionalist pattern modeling. He even goes so far as to state that “the only real difference
between the two [system dynamics and institutionalist pattern modeling] is that the building
of formal computer models is generally not a part of institutional analysis” (Radzicki, 1988, p.
634). He calls system dynamics and institutionalism two “parallel universes” (Radzicki, 1988, p.
639). Given the aforementioned overlap between institutional and social economics, it is also a
natural candidate formalism for social economists.
A system dynamics model is a set of differential equations that is solved numerically. Its
vantage point is the claim that individuals in a given system follow goal seeking behaviour
(Radzicki, 1988, p. 640) and that the structure of a system, into which these individuals are
embedded, is an important driving force of its dynamics (Radzicki, 2009, p. 70). The structure of
the system involves its physical structure, organizational structure and the psychological decision
making structure. Such an analysis is to be considered a systemic approach as the goal seeking
behaviour of the individuals both affects and is influenced by the structure of the system.
The first step when building a system dynamics model is to identify the important variables
(or ‘stocks’) of the system under consideration and the dependency structure among the variables
(the ‘flows’). When considering the stocks, one must also pay attention to limiting factors, as
most stocks (but not all) face some natural constraint: The number of workers is bounded by the
overall population and the area of land is constrained by the size of the region. Such eventual
limitations must be specified in the model. The stocks of a system are related to each other via
7A thorough introduction can be found in Sterman (2000).
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Desired water volume
Tap angle





Figure 5.4: A simple causal loop diagram for a system dynamics model of a bathtub filling
situation according to Lane (2008). This diagram assumes that if the water volume rises, one
increasingly closes the tap in order to avoid flooding. Note that this is just a simplified illustration
of the model and that the strength and direction on the relationships can vary, depending of the
overall state of the model.
the flows, and the combination of these relations leads to the notion of feedback loops.
In the model building phase or when the model is presented to an audience, one can make
use of causal loop diagramming in order to illustrate the feedback loops and causal relationship
within the model: Stocks, flows and auxiliary variables are drawn as nodes of a directed graph,
and the edges between two nodes represent a causal relationship between the stock and flow. The
edges are labeled with either a ‘+’ or a ‘−’ depending on whether the relationship is positive or
negative. See figure 5.4 as a simple example.
These loops are then expressed in differential equations that specify the relationships more
precisely. Thus the system as a whole becomes a system of (usually highly non-linear) equations
that is solved via numerical simulation. The most general formulation of a system dynamics
model, given X = {X1,X2, ...,Xn} as a vector of the stocks, and p as a vector containing all
constants and the initial conditions, is therefore:
dXi
dt
= fi(X , p), i ∈ {1,2, ...,n}. (5.2.1)
Because of the use of differential equations, the system is inherently dynamic and the strength
of the feedback loops can vary during the evolution of the model. And as an unambiguous
analytic solution is not attempted, there are no general equilibrium assumptions made. For
simplicity reasons, a model is often initiated in the equilibrium state. But this is an assumption
made for convenience, not for technical necessity (Radzicki, 2010).
The translation of the theoretical model into equations and computer code ensures full trans-
parency and maximum rigor in the model formulation. Note that the researcher continuously
improves her knowledge about the system through the modeling process itself, as the obligation
to state all relationships explicitly and precisely leads to ever new questions about the system
under investigation. Similar to what has been said about the SFM-A, many authors (including
the inventor of system dynamics J. Forrester) claim that the building of a system dynamics
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(b) The causal loop diagram underlying
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Figure 5.5: These diagrams illustrate the strucutre of Fiddaman’s model (Fiddaman, 2002).
model and the corresponding learning process is even more valuable than the ﬁnal model itself
(Forrester, 1985; Radzicki, 2009).
Let me provide a quick example that illustrates the general structure of a system dynamics
model. While the model description is by no means complete and the interested reader should re-
fer to the original publication, it still gives an idea about the structure of typical system dynamics
models. Fiddaman (2002) studies the potential effects of climate policy on the socio economic
system and derives some policy advice about how CO2 emissions can be reduced most efﬁciently.
The structure of the model is illustrated in ﬁgure 5.5 and it becomes clear immediately that the
model represents a holistic view on the system under investigation. Furthermore, the author
includes boundedly rational agents and is able to study the dynamics of the socio-economic
systems.8
At the end of this section, a caveat is appropriate: SD came under heavy criticism by Hayden
(2006b). Hayden argues that the assumptions required by SD are too strong. He argues, inter alia,
that SD models treat the real world as a closed system and focus on (static) feedback loops rather
than on real dynamics caused by the relations between the system itself. There are indeed some
critical assumptions within the framework, but to dismiss the approach entirely might be to throw
the baby out with the bathwater: There are numerous examples of successful socio economic
analysis making use of system dynamics modeling, e.g. Fiddaman (2002), Hayden and Bolduc
(2000) and Bassi (2008). None of them claims that the SD model is an exact representation of
the real world. As mentioned in the introduction, this is impossible. But the approach allows one
to enrich a sound theoretical framework (or an SFM, see below) with a precise analysis of the
dynamic relationship among crucial variables. That one has to question the adequateness of the
assumptions made in the concrete case is self-evident. But this is true for every analysis.
8Note that Fiddaman (2002) has not considered any cultural habits of values explicitly in his model. But these
could be added into the model without great difﬁculty.
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5.2.4 Institutional Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory
Game theory has a long tradition in many different disciplines of science. It was introduced into
economics by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstein in
1944. Since then, its importance, also, but not only, in neoclassical economics, has been growing
dramatically.9
While original game theory is mostly in the tradition of the rational choice paradigm,
biologists developed a derivation called evolutionary game theory that does not rely on the
classical rationality axioms. It analyses how different strategies perform in different environments,
under which circumstances they replicate and how they evolve over time.10
Several authors point to the potential of (E)GT for socio-economic and institutional eco-
nomics. These include Field (1994), and more recently Hedoin (2010), Pelligra (2011) and
M. C. Vilena and Vilena (2004). But there is also a lot of criticism of the application of game
theory for a socio-economic analysis of institutions.
I argue that critiques of (E)GT often conflate the exclusive with the heuristic use of game
theoretic models: Varoufakis (2008), for example, highlights the usefulness of a very stylized
evolutionary game theoretic model to explain how discriminatory institutions emerge and cannot
be changed by single individuals alone, but only through a process of collective action. Yet he
concludes his paper with a critique of EGT for being agnostic on how such change may work, or
on how to criticize the resulting system of exploitation. He, in turn, argues for a historical enquiry
of the system under investigation to shed light on these questions. Valid as his remarks on the
limitations of EGT may be, one should note that much of his reasoning builds heuristically on
game theoretic models and that he makes extensive use of the taxonomy of interactions provided
by game theory. When I argue that game theoretic models can be useful for socio-economists I do
not say that they should substitute a historical account of the system under investigation or they
are able to speak for themselves. Varoufakis (2008) is correct in rejecting such an isolated appli-
cation of game theory if one wishes to understand societal systems. As all the other formalisms,
game theoretic models require a sound theoretical framework that allows a sound interpretation
of their mathematical structure and helps to elaborate on the consequences of the model outcomes
beyond the scope of the mathematical apparatus. To clarify what this means, I will discuss a
best-practice example: Paul D. Bushs Theory of Institutional Change and its refinement in a game
theoretic framework by Elsner (2012) illustrates how socio-economists can and have made use of
game theory to gain additional insights into the emergence and evolution of important institutions.
In his Theory of Institutional Change Bush (1987) established a coherent theoretical device
to analyse the value basis for behavioural patterns and the resulting dynamics in the form of
9For a very good introduction into game theory and evolutionary game theory from an institutionalist perspective
see Elsner, Heinrich, and Schwardt (2014).
10Strategies are often interpreted as genes, but also as values, behaviour, habits or the like. There exist settings in
which the strategies themselves are under ongoing change and players develop new strategies, according to the rules
of Darwinian evolution, see e.g. Lindgren (1992).
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progressive and regressive institutional change. Starting from the conception of an institution as
patterns of behaviours correlated by socially prescribed values, he builds on the dichotomy of
instrumental and ceremonial value systems and develops the distinction between ceremonially
and instrumentally warranted patterns (Bush, 1987, p. 1082). Using the idea of ceremonial
dominance, he argues convincingly how new technologies introducing new opportunities for
instrumental behaviour generally do not lead to institutional progress as the new instrumental
behavioural options get encapsulated through ceremonial values with more ceremonial or dialec-
tical behavioural patterns. Progressive institutional progress is possible only if the ceremonial
dominance in the society gets reduced by substituting ceremonial values with instrumental ones.
Enlightening as it is, the theory does not explain how ceremonial dominance emerges
endogenously in a given society, which could, in principle, also be instrumentally dominated.
25 years later, Elsner (2012) took up the Theory of Institutional Change and addressed this
shortcoming using an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of game theory in the Axelrodian
framework of the evolution of cooperation. Elsner elaborates further complementaries and
equivalences between the two approaches and stresses the similar policy prescriptions derived
from the two perspectives (Elsner, 2012, p. 38). He argues that although game theory cannot
provide an epistmological basis comparable to that of institutionalism, it can, if embedded into a
broader institutionalist process story, add rigour and logical depth into the institutionalist analysis,
can allow for a clearer distinction between different types of social rules and institutions, and
enhance the institutionalist analysis, e.g. by offering an explanation for the initial emergence of
ceremonial dominance in the context of Bush’s theory.
The model of Elsner shows that if the application of game theory is not considered a value
in itself and authors manage to provide adequate process stories into which they embed their
game theoretic analysis, the game theoretical part, in the end, takes the form of a heuristic adding
analytic clarity to the analysis. By doing so it enlarges their reach to more complex problem
structures, which could not have been understood without the support of such a clarifying
heuristic.
5.3 Agent-Based-Computational Models
5.3.1 Introduction and Affinity to Social Economics
Agent based computational models (ABMs) are a relatively new trend in the social sciences,
although they are already well established in many other research disciplines such as urban
planning, ecology, demographics, epidemiology, or logistics.11
When building an ABM one starts by programming the fundamental entities of a system as
11ABMs have been used in the social sciences since the 1990s, with Epstein and Axtell (1996) and their
“Generative Social Science” as a major vantage point. But there were some predecessors in the 60s, particularly in
the field of cellular automata theory.
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software objects. These objects represent autonomous agents and are able to interact with each
other and their software environment. The latter can be programmed either as a software object
as well or takes the form of statistical aggregates. In the former case, one could program an
object representing an agricultural landscape, that can be exploited by the agents. An example
for the latter case would be an aggregated variable representing the overall wealth of the agents.
This variable may influence the behaviour of the agents, e.g. if middle-class agents behave
differently than low-class agents.
One then studies the systemic and dynamic consequences that result from this configuration
by simulating the system and conducts artificial experiments by altering specific aspects and
comparing the resulting dynamics. Although the agents usually represent individuals, this is
not necessarily the case: depending on the system under investigation, the agents can represent
households, groups, organizations, or states.
The interaction among the agents can be entirely random or can be due to the topological
structure of the model: One can allocate the agents on a (possibly changing) graph that represents
an empirical interaction structure, on a grid on which the agents can make moves, or any other
topological structure. This allows to model the agents as socially embedded and interdependent
individuals.
Even more importantly, ABMs allows the study of decentralized decision making: There is
not necessarily an artificial central planning institution such as for example the Walrasian Auc-
tioneer in most general equilibrium models. Rather, the dynamics of the system modelled are the
result of the autonomous interactions of the different agents and illustrate the self-organization a
given system is capable of.
As the agents themselves are usually programmed in a computer language, a very flexible
specification is possible: The digital objects representing the agents can have several attributes,
such as income, saving, health, or a certain disposition. The objects also have functions,
according to which these attributes change, and behavioural functions that determine the actions
of the agents in certain situations. All these functions can have diverse inputs: The current state
of the agent, but also current state of other agents or of the system as a whole. As suggested
above, this means that, maybe contrary to what the name suggests, ABMs are not necessarily
individualistic models: The behavior of the agents can depend on entities on different ontological
levels: An agent can make different decisions depending on the state of the whole system, or
on the state of a certain group of agents. One can create a software objects that represent a
social institutions and affect the behaviour of the agents. By this, one is able to distinguish very
precisely between two different conceptions of institutions: If institutions are nothing more than
correlated behaviour that emerges because individuals have a memory and react to each other
depending on their experiences with similar situations in the past, there is no causal interaction
among different ontological levels and no downward causation in the strict sense. But if an
institution is represented by a proper object (which may change over time and whose effect may
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change depending on the support it gets from the agents) that interacts with the agents, then one
can speak of a direct interaction of two ontological levels and thus proper downward effects.12
Thus, ABMs allow a very precise study of institutions, rules and networks on a potential meso
level of the system and their corresponding relation to the individual agents (Elsner & Heinrich,
2009; Elsner et al., 2014). Also, the agents do not necessarily follow the same stimulus-response
pattern the whole time, but can be given the ability to adapt themselves to their environment,
learn from past experience and develop new objectives and strategies.
The above said immediately leads to the question of whether one could design an ABM
with highly sophisticated artificial intelligence agents that resemble the behaviour of humans
and thus guarantees a maximum level of realism. The fact that there is no unanimous answer
to this question indicates the enormous heterogeneity of different perspectives within the ABM
community: Advocates of the so called KISS (‘keep it simple, stupid!’) paradigm argue that
ABMs in general should be kept as simple as possible and one should focus on the rules that are
of essential importance for the research question, otherwise the models would itself become too
difficult to understand and it gets impossible to identify the critical mechanisms that yield to the
overall dynamics. Proponents of the KIDS (‘keep it descriptive, stupid!’) paradigm criticize the
tendency to reductionism inherent to the KISS approach and argue that agents should be built in
line with empirical results from psychology, anthopology and other empirical sciences concerned
with human decision making. 13 ABMs are compatible with both world views, and most models
take their place in between the two ideal cases. For socio-economists it is important that ABMs
allow a certain degree of realism that makes them compatible with different epistemological
perspectives, including the realist approach most widely accepted in social economics.
The heterogeneity of existent ABMs has already been mentioned. They represent entirely
different economic perspectives with very different underlying epistemologies and ontologies:
Some ABMs are considered macro models that want to model an economy as a whole, others
model only one particular market or one particular region. Some of the models try to be as
realistic as possible, others remain very abstract and illustrate the effects of some mechanisms in
isolation. Some ABMs are built for predictive purposes only, while others serve only explanatory
reasons. There are ABMs that are built for one particular system, e.g. the model of Geanakoplos
et al. (2012) for the housing market in Washington D.C., others are built as generic models that
12Note that the program does not tell you on which ontological level the different software objects belong. This
information must be given by the theory underlying the model.
13If one considers the economic agents to represent the micro level, ABMs are suited for microcalibration. This
involves a direct test of the adequateness of the agent design. It is common to consult field experts to judge the
behavioural assumptions or to exchange the agent with a real human being ‘playing’ the role of the agent in the
model and then by comparing how the software and the real human being have behaved. Because the behavioral
specification of the agents is done via computer code, there is no upper limit for the complexity of the rules other




try to illustrate more general properties of systems, e.g. properties that are shared by any housing
market in the USA. Also, the mechanisms included into the models are very diverse: Many
ABMs were built to study the role of interrelations between agents such as different underlying
network structures, others focus on the effects of particular decision heuristics. All this leads to
very different epistemologies and ontologies present in the ABM communities.14 It is clear that
only a small subset of all these ABMs are of interest for social economists, but in the future they
will (hopefully) increasingly build adequate ABMs themselves.
This seems to be appropriate as ABM can effectively address certain difficulties that social
economists face at the moment:
If one considers the economy from a systemic point of view, one has to take the interaction
among different ontological levels seriously. This involves the consideration of both aggregation
problems and the scrutiny of downward effects. Especially aggregation mechanisms often lead
to counter-intuitive results or are difficult to be expressed verbally. Take as an example the role
of social networks and self-organization for the functioning of exchange systems: Albin and
Foley (1992) have shown that even if one accepts all the usual axioms of the highly stylized
Arrow-Debreu economy and only removes the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer in favour of direct
interaction among the agents, the market will develop towards an equilibrium, but inequality
among the agents will increase. Also, the way the interaction among the agents is structured,
i.e. whether their interaction structure is modeled as a ring, a star or another type of network,
influences the dynamics. Today, there is a huge amount of empirical evidence about how interac-
tion networks in particular settings look like. These networks can be described with numerous
statistical measures, e.g. their degree distribution, their centrality, their clustering coefficient or
their density, among others. These statistics can make a huge difference in practice, yet they are
very difficult to be described with verbal language. ABMs can help to build a theory of how
different network structures affect certain exchange regimes and allow the use of the extensive
information we have about real world networks and how their shape affects the aggregation of
the individual actions within them.
Furthermore, ABMs help to study the causal effects of different decision procedures such as
habit or inertia: As the decision making algorithms can be changed during artificial experiments
with the model, we can elaborate how different cognitive procedures affect the system under
consideration. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) have built an ABM that studies the emergence
and evolution of a traffic convention. The decision making procedure of their agents involves
habituation and they show that habit and habituation can help people to coordinate on a certain
traffic convention. They are also able to show that the effect of habit is particularly important
and that it has a bigger effect than pure inertia. Such reasoning would have been impossible
14Unfortunately, most model applications do not reflect explicitly on their epistemological orientation, which
makes it difficult to assess the models from a critical perspective.
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without the heuristic use of their ABM because verbal language does not provide the necessary
exactness and does not allow artificial experiments to reveal the causal relationships. And it is of
certain importance for social economists who accentuate the importance to treat human agency
in a realistic and adequate manner.15 Note that this is one reason for the increasing use of ABMs
in sociology (Manzo, 2010).
5.3.2 Empirical Work and Relation to Econometrics
Another huge potential of ABM for socio economists lies in their potential combination with
econometrics. Econometric studies abound in social economics, especially because socio
economists claim to work on a sound empirical basis and to orient their theory strongly on reality.
But econometric models require quite strict assumptions about the relationship of the variables
in the system under consideration and the formalization of the hypothesis to be tested by the
researcher. Not only are these assumptions sometimes not met: if they are not, this fault also
often remains unconsidered for a long time, because more sophisticated estimation techniques
allowing the identification of the problem have not yet been developed. In the (still unresolved)
debate about the empirical validity of the Kuznets curve there have been periods in which certain
estimation techniques or data sets were used by the majority of the researchers, resulting in
general support for the thesis, until later the same techniques and data sets were shown to be
inadequate, new methods were applied and the support turned into rejection (Alvarez-Pereira
et al., 2015).
Furthermore, econometrics are generally inappropriate for considering aggregation mecha-
nisms: Most of the studies use either exclusively aggregated macro variables (in a macroecono-
metric framework) or micro variables (in a microeconometric framework) without considering
the important interplay between both (Chen, Chang, & Du, 2012, 02). The systemic analysis
attempted by socio economists requires a systemic perspective that explicitly considers the mech-
anisms between micro and macro levels, i.e. aggregation and downward effects. Aggregation
represents a particular challenge to econometrics if the system under investigation involves
heterogeneous agents (i.e. almost always). Delli Gatti et al. (2007) shows how many standard
econometric concepts, including Granger causality, impulse-response functions of structural
VARs and cointegration, lose their explanatory power and spurious results emerge as a conse-
quence.
ABM can be helpful to address these shortcomings:
Considering the problem of inadequate estimation techniques as in the case of the Kuznets
15The extensive survey of Chen (2012) shows how different types of agents can be implemented within the ABM
framework. The range of possibilities starts with zero-intelligence agents that may not be of primary interest for
social economists, but also include elaborate artificial intelligence agents that require a lot of effort to be built. The
adequate conception depends on the problem at hand. The important lesson for social economists is that a very
detailed description of agency is possible.
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curve, much confusion stems from the fact that many econometric studies are theoretically ad hoc.
The underlying models often consider only a single ontological level or are based on static rather
than dynamic models. It is therefore often not clear what time horizon has to be considered and
which kind of data is adequate for the empirical assessment. We have shown in Alvarez-Pereira
et al. (2015) how ABMs can provide the missing formal theory to diminish these problems:
Adequately specified they make clear statements about the time horizon to be considered and
they help to condense the aggregation effects in the data. In this regard, Chen et al. (2012, 02)
suggests to use ABM as a data generating mechanism in order to assess the consistency of the
econometric tests: If estimations both for individual parameters and the aggregated data are
both consistent, the model has been adequately specified. Without the help of an ABM this
consistency remains simply assumed and adverse results emerge.
Lastly, ABM can also help to scrutinize the empirical validity of theories on different levels:
As has been argued above, ABMs are subject to micro- or meso-calibration. If a theory gets
formalized through an ABM, the resulting model can be tested against the data not only through
its overall result, but through the different mechanisms within the model. This facilitates both
the construction and the assessment of explanatory theories.
5.4 Classification and Discussion
In the preceding sections I have presented formalisms that were (or should) seriously be con-
sidered by the socio-economic community. I will now compare them regarding their potential
fields of application and their ontological and epistemological tendencies. An overview is given
in table 5.1.
5.4.1 Frameworks, Theories, and Models
During this discussion I build upon Ostrom (2011) and her distinction between frameworks,
theories and models: A framework represents a general set of variables and certain general
relationships among these. It also provides a metatheoretical language with which one can
reason about these variables and relations. This language also helps to distinguish and discuss
different theories which put their focus on different parts of the framework and suggest more
specific assumptions that help to analyse the variables, their relations and the system as a whole
more precisely. One framework can therefore be compatible with different theories, which then
accentuate different parts of the framework and suggests different interpretations. Models then
involve very specific assumptions about some of the elements of a theory and are used to derive
precise predictions or explanations for these variables. Different models can be derived from the
same theory and implemented within the same framework. 16 In our context, some preliminary
16For Ostrom, examples of theories are game theory, public choice theory, transaction cost theory and the
like. I define theory in a broader sense such as the neoclassical or institutionalist theory, but this is not of crucial
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questions immediately arise: Which of the above described formalisms falls into which category,
and how does this relate to the relationship among the different formalisms?
The answer is obvious for the IAD: It is the canonical example of a framework. The variables
and relationships within the IAD can be further specified using different models, and depending
on the choice of the models, the overall study gets a more socio-economic, neoclassical or
different flavor. The IAD is not bound to a specific theory: There are examples of very orthodox
applications of the IAD with very strong assumptions regarding the individuals in the interaction
arena and the external variables as purely exogeneous. But there are also examples of studies
using the IAD within a systemic analysis of the problem at hand, considering important external
variables to be endogenous and to use more realistic models for the action arena. Still, the IAD
suggests by its design a certain epistemology and ontology, as discussed below.
The SFM is usually used as a framework: As already mentioned, it helps to structure the
ideas of the researchers and to express the different variables and relationships of the system
under investigation. The specific relations can then be further studied using different, more
specific models. Radzicki (2009) shows this for the case of system dynamics: The SFM provides
a general overview, and the relationships are then expressed via differential equations, giving
rise to a system dynamic model. But an SFM could also, in theory, be used as a model: If the
variables are defined in a very narrow sense, and the matrix represents a very definitive and
closed system, the SFM becomes a concrete model. But such cases are rather an exception than
a rule. 17
For the other three formalisms, the answer is straightforward: ABM, SD, and GT all represent
concrete models. All of them require the researcher to make very clear assumptions and to focus
on certain relationships suggested by a more general theory. ABMs for example are compatible
with different theories and represent a very flexible modeling tool that can be used to model
various situations from very different perspectives. But the single ABM is nevertheless a very
concrete model with specific assumptions and a concrete aim.
The grouping of the formalism into frameworks and models suggests seeing them as potential
complements, rather than strict substitutes: A model might be used within a framework, so the
two formalisms may not be mutually exclusive. This might be true in some cases. But the next
section shows that all of the formalisms carry implicit epistemological and ontological tendencies
that might be incompatible with each other and prevent a fruitful combination.
5.4.2 Ontological and Epistemological Tendencies
For the ontological and epistemological tendencies I distinguish three ideal cases: systemic,
individualist or holist tendencies. The technical design of all the formalisms suggests a certain
importance. I agree that the theory suggests the parts of the framework that are given particular importance.
17This shows that a clear-cut distinction between the three ideal types is not always possible. Also, different
researchers apply the formalism in a different manner. Still, they may be useful as a general taxonomy which
facilitates to think about formalisms and their application.
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approach. If this tendency is not adequately relflected, it will stay unrecognized, with significant
consequences for the outcome and the interpretation of the study.
I speak of an individualist tendency if the model or framework focuses on individual agency to
explain the phenomena present at various levels of the system under investigation. The distinction
between an ontological and an epistemological individualism is the following: While the
individualist ontology suggests the absence of anything such as a ‘social whole’, the individualist
epistemology does not deny such a social whole, but it denies the possibility of learning anything
about a system by considering this “social whole” directly. All relevant information on the
system can be gained by the exclusive study of the individual level. von Mises (1949) advocates
an individualist ontology when he argues that “a social collective has no existence and reality
outside the individual members’ actions.” A form of epistemological individualism is articulated
by John Hicks when he praises Leon Walras for having understood “that the only economic
explanation of a phenomenon is its reference back to individual acts of choice” (Hicks, 1934, p.
348).18
A holistic tendency means that a model focuses on the relationship among macro variables,
as the societal whole is assumed to transcend its individual members. What happens in the
system is the consequence of emergent properties of the system that cannot be explained from
the individual level. Again, an epistemological holist would not question individual agency,
but argue that individual actions are determined by macro variables alone. Studying the latter
already tells one everything about the former. An ontological holist would go further and deny
the existence of individual agency at all. Recent examples of a pure ontological holism are
hard to find. Durkheim, with his focus on social facts and his concept of an organic society, is
sometimes used as an example. Some also consider Marxism to be an example of ontological
holism, although there is an ongoing dispute on this subject.19
Systemism can be considered to be the ‘golden middle’ between individualism and holism:
Here the whole system is considered to be a composition of different sub-systems that possesses
both reducible and non-reducible properties. Individual behaviour both shapes and is influenced
by its environment: Both downward and upward effects play a role. For the ontological systemist,
there are different ontological levels within the system under investigation and all of them
contain relevant mechanisms and properties. Such a layered ontology is an essential part of
the Darwinian interpretation of institutionalism elaborated by Hodgson and Knudsen (2010).
Similarly, according to systemist epistemology one has to study all levels of a system and the
18Hodgson (2013b) rightly points to the confusion that is often associated with individualism when he discusses
the meaning of methodological individualism. Whether individualism includes the relation among individuals has
never been clarified. I think that the constituent element of individualism in any sense is the denial of downward
effects on individuals. This is in line with Kapeller (2015), who identifies this denial with a simple fallacy of
aggregation.
19Some passages of Marx suggest a clear holist ontology, e.g. his statement that “the capitalist functions only as
personified capital [...] just as the worker is no more than labour personified.” (Marx, 1982, p. 989). But there are
also other examples, e.g. the notion that “history is nothing else than persons pursuing their aims.” (Marx & Engels,
1956, p. 125).
134
5.4. CLASSIFICATION AND DISCUSSION
corresponding relationships in order to fully understand the system, both as a whole and in its
different parts. Such a view has been put forward e.g. by Bunge (2004).
Game Theory Regarding the underlying ontology, game theory is the most rigid formalism:
It is certainly rooted in individualist thinking. Still, game theoretic models can be useful for a
systemic analysis if they are interpreted adequately. But such an interpretation requires certain
effort, as Elsner (2012) has argued extensively. There is a clear epistemological tendency
towards individualism as the only endogeneous driving force in the model is the individual,
and a compatibility with a systemic epistemology can be achieved only if downward effects
are included via the rules of the game. GT is certainly not compatible with either holistic
epistemology or ontology.
System Dynamics At the other end of the spectrum we have system dynamics models: Al-
though certain individualistic variables can be included into the models, they mostly work with
aggregated variables, and the interaction among the agents on the micro levels is not modelled
explicitly. So while SD can be made compatible with a systemic ontology or epistemology, such
a specification is not directly suggested by its technical design. In any case, SD is incompatible
with both individualistic ontology and epistemology.
Agent Based Models ABMs are somehow in the middle, with a certain tendency towards
individualism: Agents are considered to be actors and one of the driving forces behind the
dynamics in the system. Nevertheless their behaviour and state can depend on the state of entities
on a higher ontological level, e.g. groups or the whole population. As was shown above, systemic
concepts such as reconstitutive downward causation can be considered in ABMs. Still, there is
some tendency towards individualism as the systemic processes must be actively included into
the models, while the upward effects from the micro to the macro level are naturally present in
any ABM, just due to its technical design.20
A danger of ABM is thus that one tunes the behavioural rules of the individuals in such a way
that the desired macro behavior gets deduced from the individual actions - such a specification is
not necessarily realistic, especially if there is clear evidence for other ontological levels playing a
role. Such a failure can be prevented if all the decision making procedures and other mechanisms
in the models are made subject of empirical assessment.
Social Fabric Matrix The SFM-A has a holist tendency, as individual decision making is
usually not directly included into the matrices. The focus is mostly on aggregated variables and
some influential institutions. Thus, the existence of different ontological levels is acknowledged
and frequently considered. But the behaviour of different individuals or emergent phenomena
20In fact, theory is required to allocate the different objects of the ABM on different ontological levels. Technically,
an agent is as much an object as an institution. That the latter belongs to a different ontological level must be
inferred from the underlying theory.
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triggered by the interaction of heterogeneous individuals are usually not modeled explicitly.
It seems therefore fair to say that the SFM-A has a holist tendency, at least concerning its
epistemology. But it can successfully be used for a systemic investigation as well, especially if
it gets enriched by ABMs to consider aggregation problems and the role of individual agency
explicitly.
IAD To the same degree at which the SFM fosters holistic perspectives, the IAD has a tendency
to favour individualistic studies. This is due to the focus on the interaction arena. But the
character of the study depends in the end very much on the model that is used within the
interaction arena. If one models the interaction arena via a game theoretic model and assumes the
external variables to be exogenous, one ends up with an individualistic study. If the interaction
arena is modeled using a more sophisticated ABM and the external variables and considered
endogenously, the resulting study is clearly systemic. The general tendency of the IAD is
therefore in the individualist direction, although it certainly allows for systemic accounts if the
models for the interaction arena are chosen accordingly. It is not compatible with either holistic
epistemology or ontology.
5.4.3 The Relation among the different formalisms
The above shows that the formalisms are not necessarily substitutes. In particular, frameworks
are usually accompanied by a model. But not all the models can be fruitfully employed with all
frameworks. Their ontological and epistemological orientation must fit together. Furthermore,
depending on the question at stake, different models may be the adequate choice. So, while
models and frameworks are no substitutes, different models and different frameworks are not
always competing with each other directly: SD models are predestined if there are some macro
variables of interest that influence each other according to rules that can adequately be expressed
via conventional differential equations. As argued extensively by Radzicki (2009), SD models
can effectively be used to supplement analysis within a SFM. This combination has lead to very
interesting results, e.g. in Hayden and Bolduc (2000). Because SD is an approach focused on
aggregate variables and relationships, it is only of limited value within the IAD framework, as it
cannot be used intuitively to model the interaction arena which is mainly concerned with the
decisions on the micro level.
ABMs are to be preferred over SD models if either individuals can be expected to be the
driving forces of a system or if entities from different ontological levels are expected to interact
with each other and aggregation is thus not necessarily straightforward. ABMs are also a good
choice if one has more precise information or hypothesis about the heuristics according to which
individuals make their behavioural choices: Often, these heuristics can be expressed much easier
via algorithms than via conventional equations, and their role for determining the dynamics of
the whole system can be explored.
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Because they allow a very detailed representation of real world systems and thus allow the
explicit consideration of various mechanisms and their interplay, ABMs are very well suited to
model the interaction arena within the IAD framework. They might also be useful to complement
a SFM, especially if the SFM includes nodes from different ontological levels and a system
dynamics model is thus more difficult to implement.
Both SD and ABM can be used to conduct artificial experiments and thus to effectively
generate policy advice. Also, both models can be used to complement and qualify econometric
assessment of different hypotheses. Again, ABMs are to be preferred if one wishes to assess
the role of aggregation and (reconstitutive) downward effects within the system. SD should be
used if there are reasonable information about the relation of macro variables, but a specification
of mirco mechanisms would involve considerable speculation. Especially if predictions for
alternative policy measures are to be derived, this would be a strong argument in favour of SD. 21
Game theory is a prominent choice if it comes to modeling the interaction arena within the
IAD. Numerous examples have proven the effectiveness of this combination from an orthodox
viewpoint, although the resulting models can be considered only partial successes if considered
from the perspective of socio-economics: As both the IAD and GT have individualist tendencies,
their combination will most likely fail to provide an inspiring study of a societal system as a
whole.
Also, if considered in combination with the SFM, GT can be very useful to illustrate a
relationship between two nodes in a qualitative manner, especially if the two nodes are on
the individual and/or the meso level. The embedding into the broader context of the SFM-A
effectively addresses the shortcomings of game theory and facilitates a systemic interpretation of
the model outcome and the rules of the game. Furthermore, within the broader perspective of the
SFM-A, practical policy recommendations can much easier be derived than in the rather abstract
GT models alone. If the game becomes too complicated to be solved analytically, it can easily be
implemented in an ABM framework: Especially GT models involving a topological structure or
many heterogeneous agents are solved numerically within an ABM. This is particular attractive
for socio-economic analysis as it allows a further relaxation of the otherwise rigid assumptions
in game theoretic models.
The last question is whether the SFM and IDA can be fruitfully used together. The only cases
in which this could be is if the SFM helps to identify important relationships between the external
variables with key variables in the interaction arena of the IAD, or if one uses a very specific
SFM within the IAD, either to clarify relevant dynamics within the set of external variables or
between external variables and the interaction arena. Both cases are theoretically possible, but
practically irrelevant. Even if the possibility exists, there are probably much more intuitive ways
to model the corresponding system than to artificially bunch two frameworks together that come
from, while not contrary, but different perspectives.
21Scholl (2001) argues for a certain complementarity among SD and ABM: They give insights to the same system
from different perspectives. This does not affect the argument that they are not to be used simultaneously together.
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5.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented different formalisms that can help socio economists in their scrutinies.
It is clear that neoclassical theory exaggerates the use of formalisms, but is by no means
representative for formalist analysis. All the formalisms discussed in this article can potentially
be useful for socio economic analysis, but to achieve this, the formalism must be embedded
into a broader theoretical frame: No formalism speaks adequately for itself. All have to be
interpreted, and their inherent ontological and epistemological tendencies have to be reflected.
This article therefore represents a potential starting point for a more extensive and adequate use
of formalisms in this sense. Much can be gained from such an application: Formalist analysis can
allow the consideration of questions that have not yet been dealt with (e.g. the role of empirical
network structure on societal dynamics) and existing arguments can be made more precise.
To conclude this paper, let us consider the question whether some of the formalisms outlined
here can help to bridge socio economic (of heterodox analysis more generally) with more
orthodox work. This might particularly be the case for the IAD framework or game theory, as
these are also employed by neoclassical economists. Besides the question about how much can
be gained from such a dialogue, there should not be too much hope put into the employability of
the formalisms discussed in this article: The fact that a certain framework or a way of modeling
is compatible with different theories still does not exclude the possibility that the resulting studies
are incommensurable: ABMs for example are compatible with a wide range of different theories,
including neoclassical theory.22 But different ABMs might not only yield very different results,
they are very different to compare. Their underlying ontologies might be entirely different,
the one model might be designed as part of an explanatory exposition, the other model as a
self-sufficient device for prediction. While both are models of the same type, they have nothing
else in common and can impossibly mutually advancing.
The more important message of this article, however, is delivered through the exposition of
cases where formalisms are essential for further progress in socio economic analysis and the
motivation of their reflected and adequate application in the future.
22One could argue, for example, that neoclassical DSGE models are nothing else but very specific ABMs.
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